Rethinking the Alliance: Kissinger's Year of Europe and the European Ambitions, 1972-1974 by SHEHU, ANDI
Università di Pisa
Dipartimento di Civiltà e Forme del Sapere
Rethinking the Alliance:
Kissinger’s Year of Europe and the European
Ambitions, 1972–1974
Candidato:
Andi Shehu
Relatore:
Arnaldo Testi
Luglio 2015
Për mamin tim
1

Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION 5
The Year of Europe speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Methodology and Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1 FRENCH–U . S . RELAT IONS AND NUCLEAR COOPERAT ION 17
Personal relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
“One ball of wax” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Nuclear cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
The halt of the French-U.S. nuclear cooperation . . . . . . . 29
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2 THE EUROPEAN OR IG INS OF THE YEAR OF EUROPE 33
Special relationship? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
British contribution to the genesis of the Year of Europe . . . . 43
French origins of the Year of Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3 A “NEW ATLANT IC CHARTER” FOR A “NEW ERA OF CREAT IV-
I TY IN THE WEST” 55
The speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Kissinger’s Vision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
The U.S. origins of the Year of Europe . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Ideology and left-leaning Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
What role for the United States? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Modified confrontation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3
4 MONETARY TROUBLES 81
Transatlantic monetary tensions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Brandt’s letter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
. . . and Kissinger’s reaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
The European joint float. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
A Temporary Conclusion on the Year of Europe . . . . . . . 107
5 FAC ING THE U . S . CHALLENGE 111
Un texte impérieux. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
To put flesh on its bones. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
A dialogue of the deaf? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
The Nine Unite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
The end of the Year of Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
CONCLUSION 137
The Year of Europe genesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
The Year of Europe failure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Further studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
BIBLIOGRAPHY 147
Primary Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Journals and Newspapers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Published Primary Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Memoirs and Other Writings by Policy-makers . . . . . . 149
Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
4
Introduction
On April 23, 1973, Henry Kissinger launched Year of Europe initiative. His mani-
fest goal was to kick off a search for a “new Atlantic Charter” in conjunction with
the European allies in light of the tensions that had beleaguered and weakened the
Atlantic Alliance during the previous years. The peculiar personalities of Kissinger
and Nixon reflected many of the procedures, of the ideology, and of the practical
proposals that marked both the origins and the later development of the vaunted
Year of Europe. Accordingly, the examination of their personalities is crucial for
the comprehension of the entirety of the Year of Europe enterprise.
On November 1972, Henry Kissinger was arguably at the zenith of his career as
the President’s National Security Advisor. He decided to offer an interview, “largely
out of vanity,”1 to the famous Italian journalist, Oriana Fallaci. She slyly asked
“How do you explain the incredible movie-star status you enjoy?” Kissinger balked
at his own urge to answer probably sensing icy ground ahead. He admitted he
had some theories, but wanted to hear hers first. After Fallaci’s suggestion that it
could have been the sheer magnitude of his successes, he could contain himself no
longer. He was in agreement with Fallaci’s theory, but for him those foreign policy
triumphs were of minor importance in explaining his movies-star status in the eyes
of the American public. He illustrated what he thought had brought him on the path
to stardom:
The main point arises from the fact that that I’ve always acted alone.
Americans like that immensely. Americans like the cowboy who leads
1 Henry Kissinger, White House Years. Little, Brown and Company, 1979, p. 421.
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the wagon train by riding ahead alone on his horse, the cowboy who
rides all alone into town, the village, with his horse and nothing else.
Maybe even without a pistol, since he doesn’t shoot. He acts, that’s all,
by being in the right place at the right time. In short a Western.
He went on in this romanticized depiction of himself not knowing that, by this point,
Fallaci’s noose was already around his neck. No one could stop the future Secretary
of State when he decided to throw caution to the wind:
All he needs is to be alone, to show others that he rides into the town
and does everything by himself. This amazing, romantic character suits
me precisely because to be alone has always been part of my style or, if
you like, my technique.2
Eventually Kissinger would specify that this interview had been “without doubt
the single most disastrous conversation I ever had with any member of the press”
and he would refer to its contents as “the most self-serving utterances of my entire
career.” He also hinted to the possibility that he had been misquoted or quoted out
of context,3 but Fallaci later produced the tapes of the interview proving that she
had not changed the gist of Kissinger’s description of himself.4
Looking back at this interview in his memoirs, Kissinger concluded that, despite
Fallaci’s “skillful editing” and despite the fact that “she sought psychological, not
factual truth,” still she had been “onto something.”5 Indeed it was difficult to obtain
2 Reproduced in Mark Feeney, Nixon at the Movies: A Book about Belief. University of Chicago
Press, 2012, pp. 168–170; also Oriana Fallaci, “Kissinger rivela”. In: Europeo, 16 November
1972; the first publication in the United States was Oriana Fallaci, “Kissinger: An Interview with
Oriana Fallaci.” In: The New Republic, 16 December 1976.
3 “Chagrined Cowboy.” In: Time, 8 October 1979; Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1409.
4 From the tapes emerges that Fallaci steered the interview, but she did not change the meaning of
what Kissinger had expressed. See Alessandro Cannavò, “Fallaci contro Kissinger: aveva ragione
lei: Il segretario di Stato americano ammise di sentirsi «un cowboy solitario»”. In: Corriere della
Sera, 10 September 2007; the entire tape is reproduced in Oriana Fallaci, Intervista con la Storia.
Bur, 2008, pp. 41–44.; also Christopher Hitchens, “Oriana Fallaci and the Art of the Interview.”
In: Vanity Fair, 1 December 2006.
5 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1410.
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factual truths from Kissinger’s dialogue with Fallaci, however the interview was
successful in depicting his opinions on what he thought the American public ad-
mired in him and in his style. The personal worldview of the man who had an very
important role in setting the direction of the U.S: foreign policy was (and is) rele-
vant for any historical analysis. Specifically, this interview was important because
it offered a glimpse on a romantic and sentimental side of Henry Kissinger that is
often ignored in the analyzes that depict him as the “ultimate realist.”
Kissinger was certainly not alone in defining the course of U.S. diplomacy. None-
theless, he and Nixon, were the absolute heavyweights in determining the course of
U.S. foreign policy. Richard Milhous Nixon was a strange and fascinating man. He
celebrated his triumph in the 1972 presidential elections – with the second largest
landslide in U.S. history – with a demand for the resignation of his entire staff.6
Also he was that same man who saw himself and his Administration as being “in a
deadly battle with the Establishment,” an amorphous hostile group who comprised
college professors, newspaper reporters, television commentators, columnists, think
tanks, the entire federal bureaucracy, Democrats outside of the South, Republicans
from north of Potomac and east of Ohio, and all the élite.7
This “Establishment” was, he thought, the most significant constraint to the re-
alization of his goals. In March 1973 he seethed with hatred at the “Establishment”
for pushing so hard on Watergate and he vowed that “they are asking for it, and they
are going to get it.” But why were “they” were so unrelenting? “They are having
a hard time now. They got the hell kicked out of them in the election.” He made,
finally, the logic leap to what was behind all of it:
6 Alistair Horne, Kissinger: 1973, the Crucial Year. Simon & Schuster, 2009, p. 2.
7 Quotes from Stephen E. Ambrose, “Comparing and Contrasting Ike and Dick.” In: Leon Friedman
and William F. Levantrosser, eds. Richard M. Nixon: Politician, President, Administrator. ABC-
CLIO, 1991, pp. 18–19; and from Robert Mason, Richard Nixon and the Quest for a NewMajority.
University of North Carolina Press, 2005, chapter 2; Horne, Kissinger, pp. 26–27
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But the basic thing is the Establishment. The Establishment is dying,
and so they’ve got to show that despite the successes we have had in
foreign policy and in the election, we are just wrong. They are trying
this Watergate as the whole thing.
The media who nicknamed Nixon “Tricky Dicky” responded by giving him neg-
ative press coverage; arguably one of the worst in the history of U.S. presidents.
The historian Robert Dallek concluded his analysis on Nixon writing: “The inner
workings of the Nixon presidency [...] show a secretive, devious, thoughtful, ener-
getic, erratic, and painfully insecure man who struggled against inner demons and
sometimes uncontrollable circumstances to reach for greatnes.”8
The “improbable partnership” between a "secretive yet aloof old-fashioned politi-
cian, given over to oversimplified rhetoric” and “a Harvard professor of urbane in-
telligence”9 lies at the heart of this dissertation. The personal relationship of this
very odd couple was itself an ongoing patch of strained relations. The aforemen-
tioned interview with Fallaci provoked profound resentments in Nixon leading him
to cancel his Kissinger’s Christmas invitation to the White House in 1972. This
coupled with his staff’s resignation led to “the loneliest and saddest Christmas I can
ever remember”10 and Nixon told David Frost that it had been “much sadder and
much lonelier than the one in the Pacific during the war.”11
Another example of their strained relationship was illustrated by the monikers
they used. Nixon demeaned Kissinger calling him “jew boy” and “psychopathic”
behind his back and occasionally to his face. Kissinger reciprocated in kindness,
with more creativity, referring to Nixon as “madman,” “our drunken friend,” or “the
meatball mind,” particularly during meetings with journalists, perhaps as a way to
8 Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power. Harper Collins, 2007, p. 89.
9 Time, 26 March 1973.
10 Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography. Simon & Schuster, 1992, p. 479.
11 David Frost, “I Gave Them a Sword”: Behind the Scenes of the Nixon Interviews. Morrow, 1978,
p. 137.
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establish a feeling of intimacy.12
At any rate this “improbable partnership” had achieved, well before 1973, a
remarkable degree of symbiosis. Margaret MacMillan observes howKissinger “was
prepared to sit for hours, if necessary, while Nixon, as was his way, worked out his
ideas in rambling conversations. As he told a journalist, ‘if I am not in there talking
to the President, then someone else is in.’ In Kissinger, Nixon had found someone
who was his intellectual equal, who understood his policies and who would carry
them out.”13
What is more, their “dark view of human nature and democratic society”14 in-
formed their relationship with enemies and allies alike. Variations in circumstance
as well as region and country influenced the outcome of their policies, but the over-
all impact of their personalities on the Administration was very significant, as their
making of foreign policy would forcefully demonstrate, particularly in the case of
the Year of Europe.
Besides personality, there is something else that lies at the center of this disser-
tation. It is the year 1973. Why this particular year? Because 1973 saw the signing
of the pact to end the Vietnam war, although defeat on that front was not too far
away. It was the year of a flourishing détente with the Soviet Union up to the agree-
ment “to prevent nuclear war” signed on June 22, 1973. And yet it was the same
year when all hopes were undermined by Watergate. It was the year that Kissinger
– “the single most powerful man in the world” in the words of the historian Alistair
Horne15 – won the Nobel Peace Prize and became Secretary of State in September,
strengthening an increasingly debilitated president. The Yom Kippur War rocked
12 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, p. 93.
13 Margaret MacMillan, Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World. Random House Trade
Paperbacks, 2008, p. 86.
14 Jeremi Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century. Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.
204.
15 Horne, Kissinger, p. ix.
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the Middle East, international relations, and the global economy; in far-off Chile,
Allende was ousted and killed by the brutal coup by General August Pinochet with
some kind of open secret U.S. intervention.16
0.1 The Year of Europe speech
On April 23, 1973, Kissinger launched a transatlantic initiative that was to mark
and bedevil European–U.S. relations for more than a year. He addressed the editors
of the Associated Press at the Waldorf–Astoria hotel in New York. 1973, Kissinger
said, was the Year of Europe because “the era that was shaped by decisions of a
generation ago is ending” and the “dramatic transformation of the psychological cli-
mate in the West” required a “new era of creativity.” The recent loss of U.S. nuclear
superiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the ongoing relaxation of East–West tensions,
and the onset of inter-bloc negotiations – the Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe (CSCE) and the Mutually Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) – were
compounded by an increasing transatlantic economic competition and new genera-
tions in Europe and the United States that “take stability for granted.”
A new consensus on security was needed for Kissinger; as fear no longer sufficed
to unite the West, the allies had to identify common interests, purposes and values
beyond security and extend their cooperation to the political and economic realms.
He intended to solve these problems with a comprehensive approach, linking to-
gether security, diplomacy, money and trade, and at “the highest level.” The United
States, he promised, would make further concessions for the sake of European unity,
provided there was a spirit of reciprocity. And finally, notwithstanding a growing
16 For example, Andreas Killen, 1973 Nervous Breakdown: Watergate, Warhol, and the Birth of
Post-Sixties America. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2008, p. 2.
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internal pressure coupled with American reluctance to sustain further global involve-
ments, the U.S. government pledged not to withdraw its forces unilaterally, again,
provided a fairer distribution of the defense burden.17
The speech on the Year of Europe received a lukewarm reaction from the Amer-
ican press and an uneven, but mostly negative, European reaction. Some noticed
“à nombre de points satisfaisant,” despite the “partagés des charges” was not cou-
pled with “partagés des responsabilités et des decisions.”18 Others saw behind
Kissinger’s rhetoric the intention to build a U.S.–ruled “groupement mondial où
l’Europe ne se voit reconnaître qu’une vocation régional.”19 Europeans carefully
studied each other’s reaction. None of them was happy with the timing, no one
felt really consulted, and neither of them knew what Kissinger had told to the other
European countries. They wondered on how to include other Europeans in a coordi-
nated, possibly positive, response. Initially some of them thought that a collective
response was what Washington desired. Bonn, London and Washington knew that
the “key to unlock the Year of Europe”20 lay in Paris.
What the National Security Advisor thought would bring an European reaction
similar to the one produced by the announcement of the Marshal Plan a quarter
of century earlier, instead, brought about the most acrimonious exchanges in the
post–World War II period. The “new Atlantic Charter,” at the core of Kissinger’s
proposal, never saw the light of the day. The relations deteriorated reaching their
lowest point during the October war. Paris led a united European front that directly
confronted the United States.
17 The speech is reproduced in Henry Kissinger, “The Year of Europe, April 23, 1973.” In: Depart-
ment of State Bulletin. 14 May 1973, pp. 593–598.
18 Kosciusko-Morizet, 23 April 1973, Ministère des affaires étrangères (MAE), Direction d’Europe,
Sous-direction d’Europe occidentale, Série Communautes économiques européennes (hereafter
EC files), 1971–76, 3810.
19 Sauvagnargues, 27 April 1973, ibid.
20 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval. Weidenfeeld & Nicolson, 1982, p. 163.
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When the oil shock hit, it hit much harder in Europe than in the United States.21
In Western Europe it led to a sauve-qui-peut atmosphere. The European front crum-
bled on February 1974 during the Washington Energy Conference, when France,
up to that moment at the helm of the EC’s response, found itself completely iso-
lated against the other Europeans. The Gymnich compromise of April 21 and 22
established an informal mechanism of consultation with the United States on inter-
nal discussions of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), the recent effort of
coordinating European foreign policies.22
The complete overhaul of European, and later of the United States, leadership
during the first half of 1974 brought about a sharp decline in controversies and con-
flicts in the transatlantic discourse. Georges Jean Raymond Pompidou, the French
President, died at the beginning of April; Willy Brandt, the Nobel Peace Prize win-
ner of 1971 and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, resigned inMay
1974, after Günter Guillaume, one of his closest aides, was exposed as an agent of
the Stasi, the East German secret service; British Prime Minister and “the only Eu-
ropean" Pompidou saw in the U.K, Edward Richard George Heath, had called an
election for February 1974 that resulted in a hung parliament, in which the Tories
had the most votes but Labour had slightly more seats, forcing him to resign after
a failed attempt to establish a coalition government with the Liberal Party; finally
the Watergate scandal led Nixon to resign in August in the face of almost certain
impeachment and removal from office.
21 For example, Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power, Simon & Schus-
ter, 2008, pp. 598–599; Fiona Venn, The Oil Crisis. Longman, 2002
22 There were different interpretations in Europe on the meaning itself of this compromise, Aurélie
Èlisa Gfeller, Building a European Identity: France, the United States, and the Oil Shock, 1973–
1974. Berghahn Books, 2012, p. 154.
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0.2 Methodology and Documents
This work lies at the confluence of political, diplomatic history and economic his-
tory. It tries to highlight the way in which the several strands that comprised the
international relations during the first half of the 1970s were linked in giving birth
to the Year of Europe and in its successive unfolding. The study concerns with a
trait of European integration history nested in the larger contest of transatlantic re-
lations and that of the Cold War. It is, therefore, mandatory to avoid privileged and
a priori interpretation paradigms; ideology, contingency, economy, and personality
grew naturally as the main interpretative keys of the Year of Europe without a delib-
erate choice. They emerged because of the peculiar nature of Kissinger’s enterprise,
the centralized style of U.S. foreign policy, the limited number of European actors
effectively involved, at least during the first stages, in the exercise. Lastly, they
emerged as a consequence of the nature of the documents to which I dedicated my
attention.
The Year of Europe initiative was deliberately, in Kissinger’s intentions, a high
politics matter to be solved at the level of the head of states and foreign ministers.
The elaboration of the initiative was, as in many instances with Kissinger and Nixon,
secret. Small bits managed to seep through to the press, but, up to April 23, almost
no one had understood why 1973 was to be called the Year of Europe. These facts
are important because they open the way for study of the Year of Europe genesis
on documents pertaining a limited number of people, without compromising the
historical understanding.
The institutional complexity compounds the mixed nature of the problem itself,
i.e. the fact that the Year of Europe included security, monetary, commercial and
diplomatic questions. Fortunately there are some simplifications that can be made
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without hampering significantly the accuracy of the analysis. On the U.S. side, the
unprecedented level of centralization in the direction of U.S. foreign policy – for
example with a complete exclusion of the Department of State – meant that the
personalities and the choices of the limited number of people involved weighted far
more than would have happened in a more open and inclusive system. For example,
on the Year of Europe, Rowland Baring, Lord of Cromer and British ambassador to
the United States from 1971 until 1974, wrote that the “State Department show[s]
no sign of having been consulted in advance.”23
On the European side, Germany’s, Britain’s and France’s decisions had more in-
fluence than those of the other ECmembers. As one British official wrote at the time,
the common European positions was “bound to be very substantially influenced by
that of the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and France.”24 The
three big countries appraised the position of the other EC countries, sometimes they
included the views of those other countries in their decision-making process because
“Europe is a Europe of Nine and if Europe is to speak with a single voice, this voice
must represent the Nine and must not be the exclusive result of positions adopted
by those whom one may consider as the three principal European powers.”25 Ev-
erything considered, European response rested mostly on Bonn, London and on the
hardest nut to crack: Paris. Moreover, Kissinger’s (and, at least initially, French)
strong preference for bilateral and secret diplomatic exchanges through backchan-
nels with the head of states of those three countries adds more fuel to the argument
that a small number of countries and of persons was involved in the Year of Europe
initiative.
23 Letter: Cromer to Brimelow, AMU 3/507/1, 8 May 1973. In: Keith Hamilton and Patrick Salmon,
eds. Documents on British Policy Overseas Series III, Volume IV: The Year of Europe: America,
Europe and the Energy Crisis, 1972–1974. Whitehall History Publishing/Routlege, 2006 (Here-
after DBPO 3.4), doc. 87.
24 Paris tel 4 to Ottawa, MWE 3/304/1, DBPO 3.4, doc. 189.
25 Ibid.
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The dissertation is based on multi-archival and multi-national research. I have
consulted documents from the Centre historique des archives nationales (CHAN)
and the Ministère des affaires étrangères (MAE) in Paris. In the MAE there is a very
large collection a of documents that pertains the inner working of the Quai d’Orsay
and includes a wide-range of its bureaucracy. In the CHAN the papers of the French
ambassador to the United States, Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet and those of Pompi-
dou offered an intimate on the direct link – Kosciuscko-Morizet was Kissinger’s
choice as his backchannel to Pompidou – between Kissinger and the French Presi-
dent. From the French documents it was possible to determine the timing and the
motivations that produced their summer 1973 policy shift on the Year of Europe,
from the absolute refusal to participate to the initiative to a French-led EC common
response directed at the United States.
I have also consulted the National Archives of the U.K. government, located near
London, in Kew. The British archives are excellently organized and offer a vast
array of documents on both inter-european transatlantic relations. The view from
London is completed with the records collected in the Co-Rom titled Documents
on British Policy Overseas, Series III, Volume IV: The Year of Europe: America,
Europe and the Energy Crisis 1972–1974 and edited by Keith Hamilton and Patrick
Salmon.
For studying the United States position I used some of the documents collected
in the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA) and the Digitized Memorandum
of Presidential Conversations: Nixon Administration, Gerald R. Ford Presidential
Digital Library (DPMC:Nixon). Moreover I had access to several collections of
documents on U.S. foreign policy present in the Foreign Relations of the United
States books and to the collections of Nixon’s speeches collected in the volumes
titled Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States.
15
Finally, when deemed necessary, I have consulted newspapers, other periodicals,
and the memoirs and essays published by the majority of the protagonists of the
year 1973. Confronting the personal memoirs with the documents has led me to
understand that a great deal of historical interpretations were already laid out by the
protagonist’s themselves. This is particularly true in the case of Kissinger, but it is
still notable, for example, in the case of the French foreign affairs minister, Michel
Jobert.
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Chapter 1
French–U.S. relations and nuclear cooperation
It started all so well. The election of Richard Nixon to the Presidency of the United
States in 1969 brought new life to the French–U.S. relations. The real admiration
that both Nixon and Kissinger had for Pompidou was an important factor in the cre-
ation of this new atmosphere. However it is unnecessarily reductionist to maintain
that personal relationships are the sole ore the most important factors in elucidating
the shifts in foreign relations; additional proof is therefore mandatory. The shared
mistrust in Paris and Washington for German’s Prime Minister, Willy Brandt, Ost-
politik, and for German nationalism and neutralism was one such additional reason
for the thaw between France and the United States. Other factors, like the fledgling
English influence on the EC polity, have to be carefully assessed even though, at
first glance, they appear less relevant.1 That being said, there is strong evidence to
suggest that the personal relationship was at least one factor in reforging a strong
France–U.S. bond. Additionally the personal and informal facet of international
relations holds a very important role and was the leading factor behind the genesis
1 On the importance of British accession see, for example, Mark Gilbert, “The Significance of
British Entry into the European Community in 1973.” In: Antonio Varsori and Guia Migani, eds.
Europe in the International Arena during the 1970s. P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2011, pp. 71–84.
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of international fora, such as the G7. These were established in mid-1970s with
the explicit intent of facilitating the creation of an intimate and relaxed atmosphere
between the leaders of the Western countries.2
In this chapter I will examine the U.S. policy towards France during a timeframe
that covers the entire period enclosed by this dissertation, from 1972 to 1974. I will
pay a special attention to the security and nuclear dimensions given their importance
in French foreign policy. In concomitance I will evaluate the indirect impact that
the U.S. initiative had on secret French–U.S. nuclear cooperation.
1.1 Personal relationships
Kissinger expressed his esteem for Pompidou in his books by describing French’s
foreign policy under Pompidou, and under his successor Valéry Giscard d’Estaing,
as “often prickly,” but “serious and consistent.” Not only Pompidou’s foreign pol-
icy was, in Kissinger’s words, “compatible with our purposes” but sometimes also
“steadier and more perceptive than our own.”3 France’s strategic vision emerged
in contrast to the other European allies, Great Britain included. The British “still
possessed the experience and intellectual resources of a great power,” however they
“acted less as if their decisions mattered” and worse still, “rarely sought to embody”
their own sage advices “in a policy of their own.” Kissinger’s final assessment
stemmed from the consideration that French leaders did not shy away from con-
2 See the Introduction in Federico Romero and Emanuel Mourlon-Druol, eds. International Sum-
mitry and Global Governance: The Rise of the G7 and the European Council, 1974–1991. Taylor
& Francis, 2014, pp. 1–8.
3 Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 420–421.
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siderations of national interest and they understood the “imperatives of balance of
power.”4 For the self-portrayed “ultimate realist” there was no better compliment.5
Nixon’s profound admiration for de Gaulle6 extended in part to Pompidou. Pom-
pidou on the other side appreciated in Nixon “un esprit précis, intéressé par la pen-
sée des autres quand elle lui paraît claire et réaliste”7 Moreover Brandt’s version of
Détente,Ostpolitik, made France a much more credible ally in Nixon’s eyes because
both countries shared the interest in maintaining the status quo.8 During a meeting
with Pompidou Nixon told his colleagues that “we really need [...] a healthy dose of
French skepticism or cynicism in dealing with the Soviet Union.”9 In an other oc-
casion Kissinger even claimed that he had detected very early the political talent of
the French President.10 For all these reasons Nixon, Kissinger and their team tried
to build a solid relationship with France and Pompidou, although this endeavour
was jeopardized by false assumptions and misconceptions on both parts.11
Indeed, the exercise became disheartening and counter-productive by the end of
Pompidou’s and Nixon’s term. “What started as an effort to foster Atlantic unity
turned into a device to organize all the democracies against the United States.”12
4 Ibid.
5 Jussi Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy. Oxford
University Press, 2004, p. 292.
6 For example, Franz Schurmann, The Foreign Politics of Richard Nixon: The Grand Design. In-
stitute of International Studies, 1987, pp. 51–55; Richard Nixon, Leaders: Profiles and Reminis-
cences of Men Who Have Shaped the Modern World. Warner Books, 1982, pp. 40–80.
7 Michel Jobert, L’autre regard. Grasset, 1976, p. 134.
8 See, for example, Wilfred Loth, “The Road to Vienna: West German and European Security from
1969 to 1973.” In: Wilfred Loth and Georger-Henri Soutou, eds. The Making of Détente: East-
ern and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965-75. Routledge, 2008, pp. 153–167; Raymond L.
Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan. Brook-
ings Institution, 1994; Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, p. 375.
9 Nixon–Pompidou Meeting, 24 February 1970, Digital National Security Archive (hereafter
DNSA), http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/home.do, Doc. KT00742.
10 Michel Jobert, Mémoires d’avenir. Grasset, 1974, p. 152.
11 For example, Laurent Césari, “Les relations personnelles entre Nixon, Pompidou et leurs en-
tourages.” In: Éric Bussière et al., eds. Georges Pompidou et les États-Unis : Une « relation
spéciale » 1969–1974. P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2013, pp. 34–35.
12 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 192.
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Triggered by the “Year of Europe” speech, that Kissinger delivered to an annual
Associated Press gathering of prominent publishers, newspapers editors and media
executives at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City on April 23, 1973, an
increasing number of acrimonious exchanges poisoned the atmosphere between Eu-
ropean capitals and Washington and lasted at least up to the Washington Energy
Conference in February 1974.13
The year 1973 started on a high note with the agreement in Paris, on January 27,
aimed at bringing to an end of the ten-year old war in Vietnam. In this atmosphere
was rooted Nixon’s hope to resume “most intense consultations” endeavoring “to
put relationships between Europe and the United States on a new even more dy-
namic and constructive basis, consistent with the change in the international situa-
tion.”14 Just twenty days before Kissinger’s fated speech Pompidou wrote to Nixon:
J’espère que l’année 1973 [...] sera un année de renforcement de paix
et que nos deux pays [...] sauront trouver des relations confiantes, à
l’image de celles que j’ai toujours eues personnellement avec vous, les
moyens de contribuer à résoudre le problèmes qui se posent aux États-
Unis et à la France, et ont des incidences internationales non néglige-
ables.15
Nixon and Pompidou had established a lively correspondence with each other. Nix-
on’s first letter followed the Pompidou’s election at the Élysée Palace in June 1969.
In this letter Nixon immediately set the tone by stating that he was looking for-
ward to work with the French President “to develop closer relations between our
13 For the integral test of the speech see Henry Kissinger, “The Year of Europe,” April 23, 1973. In:
Department of State Bulletin. 14 May 1973, pp. 593–598.
14 Kissinger to a press conference 16 September 1972, quoted in Keith Hamilton, “Britain, France,
and America’s Year of Europe, 1973.” In: Diplomacy and Statecraft 17.4 (2006), p. 872.
15 Message du Président de la République au Président des États-Unis, 2 April 1973, MAE, US files,
1971–75, 741.
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countries.”16 They exchanged letters for several reasons: to relate informations on
internal matters,17 to report on bilateral conversations with communist leaders,18
to discuss matters of international concern,19 or even to confront differing view-
points.20
This heart-to-heart exchange of informations and viewpoints between the two
presidents reached its apex in the encounter held on May 17, 1973 where Pompi-
dou and Kissinger met to iron out the topics of the imminent Reykjavik summit.
While the late May summit proved to be a semi-failure, the conversation between
the National Security Advisor and the French President was a very candid one.21
Pompidou was genuinely accommodating and not at all shocked by the Year of
Europe speech; Kissinger himself was particularly forthcoming:
Permit me to deal first with the relations between the United States
and the Soviet Union. To speak with you in complete frankness, even
though our tactics may seem faulty on certain points, it is very impor-
tant that you understand perfectly the objectives of our strategy. [...]
16 Richard M. Nixon, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon, 1969:
Containing the Public Messages, Statements, and Speeches of the President. Government Printing
Office, 1971, p. 462.
17 Correspondance de Georges Pompidou avec des responsables américains, dossier 1969-1971, 11
March 1970, Centre historique des archives nationales (CHAN), 5AG2 115; Pompidou’s answer,
14 March 1970, Ibid.
18 On Nixon’s voyage in China, 3 and 17 August 1971, Ibid.; On their respective visits in Moscow,
5 and 29 October 1970, Ibid.
19 For example, on Cambodia, 14 May and 6 June 1970, Ibid.; Another example was a highly criti-
cal letter on Vietnam from Pompidou “en raison du caractère amical et confiant de nos relations
personnelles,” 27 December 1972, Ibid.; the immediate answer was sent through the French am-
bassador the following day, Ibid.
20 On the Palestian question, 21 December 1970, Ibid. Also see on Pompidou’s emphasis on a
transatlantic entente Gfeller, Building a European Identity, p. 6 and Georges-Henri Soutou, “Pres-
ident Pompidou, Ostpolitik, and the Strategy of Détente.” In: Helga Haftendorn et al., eds. The
Strategic Triangle: France, Germany, and the United States in the Shaping of the New Europe.
John Hopkins University Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006, p. 242.
21 On the importance of this encounter see Georges-Henri Soutou, “Le Président Pompidou et les
relations entre les États-Unis et l’Europe.” In: Journal of European Integration History 6.2 (2000),
pp. 133–134. Also Marc Trachtenberg, “The French Factor in U.S. Foreign Policy during the
Nixon–Pompidou Period, 1969–1974.” In: Journal of Cold War Studies 13.1 (2011), pp. 6–8.
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Have we chosen the Soviet Union over China? This is a crucial
question that you have asked and my response is absolutely negative.
[...] If the Soviet Union managed to render China impotent, Europe
would became a Finland and the United States would be completely
isolated. [...] In fact, it is more a question of playing China against the
Soviet Union. [...]
It is nevertheless important that this movement not serve as a pretext
for a Soviet attack against China. It is consequently necessary that our
policy be such that it does not seem to be directed against the Soviet
Union and that detente is carried on in parallel with the Soviet Union.
[...] We aimed to gain time, to paralyze the Soviet Union. [...] I am
prepared to go over our text paragraph by paragraph [of the agreement
“to prevent nuclear war”] with M. Jobert to explain the deeper reasoning
to him.22
An elaborate delaying machinery that would be soon put in motion in a very similar
fashion towards France itself. “It may be complex but it is not stupid” remarked
Kissinger before concluding his long speech by guaranteeing that they had “never
discussed this so openly with another leader.”23 Those same things Kissinger told
to the Chinese. He went even further with them by admitting that this was not a par-
ticularly bold policy, but this “complicated methods” were necessary. They needed
to “manuever,” not just because of the Soviet threat to China, but also because of
the political situation in the United States and in Europe.24
22 Kissinger–Pompidou Meeting, 18 May 1973, DNSA, Doc. KT00728. For the French version 18
May 1973, CHAN, 5AG2 1022.
23 Ibid.
24 William Burr and Henry Kissinger, eds. The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with
Beijing and Moscow, New Press, 1998, pp. 94, 177—199, 303, 386.
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1.2 “One ball of wax”
What about the defense and the nuclear dimension of French–U.S. cooperation? Be-
fore focusing on that specific issue, I will examine the general policy that the U.S.
intended to pursue in their relationship with European allies. In the U.S. eyes the
several strands of bilateral issues, trade negotiations, monetary issues, and security,
were to be weaved together during 1973.25 This was the so-called “one ball of wax”
approach which was one of the chief anxieties of the British and French officials.26
Cromer wrote that: “In American thinking it would make sense for, say, some con-
cession in GATT to be offset by some counter-concession in – say the security field
(eg on infrastructure programmes) or any of what we would regard as only distantly
related fields.” Unfortunately for the European side, the ambassador wrote that this
meant “that the Americans will exploit every advantage they have, to get what they
want.”27
Up to the late 1960s the institutions of the Atlantic cooperation removed the
need for the nascent European Economic Community (EEC) to handle some of the
most problematic aspects of international cooperation; there was the North Atlantic
25 See, for example, the study that the National Security Council (NSC) issued in December 1972
where the notion of linkage was central, Kissinger, Memorandum for the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of
Agriculture, “NSSM 164: United States relations with Europe,” 18 December 1972, Nixon Pres-
idential Materials (NPM), NSC, Institutional Files, 194. See also Analytical Summary–NSSM
164, U.S. Relations with Europe, 29 January 1973. In: Kathleen B. Rasmussen ed. Foreign Re-
lations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume E–15, Part 2: Documents on Western Europe,
1973–1976. Government Printing Office, 2014, (Hereafter referred as FRUS E15.2), pp. 8–16.
26 For British fears see Niklas H. Rossbach,Heath, Nixon and the Rebirth of the Special Relationship:
Britain, the U.S. and the EC, 1969-74. Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp. 146–155; Catherine Hynes,
The Year that Never Was: Heath, the Nixon Administration and The Year of Europe. University
College Dublin Press, 2009, pp. 79–81; Giulia Bentivoglio, La relazione necessaria. La Gran
Bretagna del governo Heath e gli Stati Uniti (1970-1974). Franco Angeli, 2012, p. 291. For the
French opposition to linkage see Gfeller, Building a European Identity, pp. 65, 129. See also
“Carrying on.” In: The Economist, 12 May 1973.
27 Letter: Cromer to Greenhill, AMU 3/507/1, 19 January 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 14.
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Treaty Organization (NATO) for security and defense and the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) for the preservation of monetary stability.28 The EEC could focus
eminently on the attainable tasks of creating a customs union and a common agricul-
tural policy. This protective cocoon was centered on U.S. foreign-policy leadership
through the web of international institutions and strong bilateral relationships with
Washington. As U.S. leadership began to weaken in the wake of a growing West-
ern European confidence,29 the U.S. entanglement in Southeast Asia,30 détente,31
and, most eminently, the collapse of Bretton Woods,32 the European countries and
institutions had to broaden their agenda and cope with bigger problems and larger
opportunities. The U.S. influence retained much of her strength nonetheless and, in
the context of the “one ball of wax approach,” Cromer thought that “they will not
scruple to use their relations with each of the member states of the Community to
further their objectives in the multilateral negotiations: in short, to divide and rule
wherever they can.”33
The French opposition to what they dubbed globalisation was, if possibile, even
stronger: “La notion d’Alliance Atlantique implique, dans l’esprit de Washington,
une mise dans le balance de cette protection américaine et de la bonne volonté
économique de l’Europe. Chacun sait que nous n’admettons pas ce lien”[emphasis
mine] was the comment in an internal study on the “problème du partage des
charges” just four days before the encounter between Kissinger and Pompidou on
28 This paragraph is heavily indebted to N. Piers Ludlow, “European Integration and the Cold War.”
In: Melvyn P. Leffler, Odd Arne Westad, eds. The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume
2, Crises and Détente. Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 179–197.
29 Wilfried Loth, “States and the Changing Equations of Power.” In: Akira Iriye, ed. Global Interde-
pendence: The World after 1945, Harvard University Press, 2014, pp. 11–199.
30 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times.
Cambridge University Press, 2005, chapter 5.
31 Jussi M. Hanhimäki, The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transforma-
tion of the Cold War. Potomac Books, 2013, pp. 61–76.
32 Duccio Basosi, Il governo del dollaro: interdipendenza economica e potere statunitense negli
anni di Richard Nixon (1969-1973). Polistampa, 2006, chapters 7-9.
33 Letter: Cromer to Greenhill, 19 January 1973, AMU 3/507/1, DBPO 3.4, doc. 14.
24
May 17.34 The need to keep the different spheres of security, defense, economics,
and monetary stabilization treated separatedly in their own different fora was an
entrenched idea at both the Quai d’Orsay and the Élysée Palace. On February 1974
Pompidou told to Michel Debré that “Kissinger veut parler de tout, non seulement
de l’énergie mais du système monetaire. Je suis vraiment très embarrassé pour
répondre”; Debré’s answer was straightforward: “Je comprends votre embarras.
Moi qui suis hors du government, ma réponse ne peut être que negative.”35
1.3 Nuclear cooperation
Yet, despite the fact that these profound disagreements on how to deal with some
of the fundamental problems on the international arena, the nuclear collaboration
between France and the United States was in full gear during the first half of 1973.
It was put partially on hold only in September that year. There is little need to
stress the importance of this cooperation and many French historians have devoted
considerable ink and paper to this problem.36 On January 1973 the Secretary of De-
fense, Melvin Laird, wrote to Nixon that, given the administration’s “determination
to place US-French relations on a better footing,” for the last four years the Depart-
ment of Defense had done “what it could to help realize this objective.” How? By
34 Note : Les États-Unis et l’OTAN (problème du partage des charges), 14 May 1973, MAE, US
files, 727.
35 Michel Debré, Entretiens avec Georges Pompidou. Albin Michel, 1996, p. 210.
36 See, for example, Pierre Mélandri, “Une relation très spéciale: La France, les États-Unis et
l’Année de l’Europe.” In: Jean-René Bernard et al., eds. Georges Pompidou et l’Europe : Col-
loque, 25 et 26 novembre 1993. P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2013, pp. 106–110; Georges-Henri Soutou,
“La problématique de la Dètente et le testament stratégique de Georges Pompidou.” In: Cahiers
du Centre d’études d’histoire de la défense 22 (2004), pp. 91–98; Maurice Vaïsse, “Les ‘relations
spéciales’ franco-américaines au temps de Richard Nixon et Georges Pompidou.” In: Relations
internationales 119.3 (2004), pp. 345–362.
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giving to France “considerable help within the limits of your guidance” and in the
process they had “saved them appreciable time and money” and had helped the in
improving “the operability and reliability of their current missiles.” However, he
concluded, “we cannot give an adequate answer to the question of how far and fast
we are prepared to proceed with the French in missile assistance without coming to
grips with identical questions where the U.K. is concerned, and without more clearly
identifying how these programs fit into our overall European and SALT [Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks] policies.”37
In the following months, while the Year of Europe controversy was growing
into a full-blown crisis, this partnership became even stronger. The Nixon admin-
istration decided to go on with the collaboration with Paris despite sharp “areas
of conflict between the United States and France” such as “differences on interna-
tional monetary reform, France’s policy of preferential trading arrangements with
its old colonies, and France’s policy on agriculture, transformed as it has been into
the EC’s Common Agricultural Policy.”38 Just one day after the meeting between
Kissinger and Pompidou on May 17, one U.S. official observed that with “regard to
the Reykjavik talks, the United States will be in a very strong and positive position
as Defense has just informed the French of our willingness to move ahead in the
new areas of cooperation.” This new areas were: “information on nuclear effects
simulators, sale of small simulators, general hardening technology and information
on Soviet ABMs.”39
Furthermore, albeit a sizable part of the European press and many important
political figures in France and in Britain were already vocal in their criticism of
the Year of Europe initiative, it seemed that the nuclear and defense cooperation
37 Laird to Nixon, 23 January 1973, FRUS E15.2, 1973–1976, pp. 929, 932.
38 Analytical Summary of a Study Prepared by the Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Group for Europe,
undated, FRUS E15.2, 1973–1976, pp. 937–38.
39 Clift to Scowcroft, 19 May 1973, FRUS E15.2, 1973–1976, p. 946.
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would be steeped up. The French were really interested in what the French his-
torian Georges-Henri Soutou has called “le saint des saints,” in essence specific
information about the locations of Soviet surface-to-air missiles and medium- and
intermediate-range ballistic missile sites. “J’accepte donc volontiers que nos ex-
perts se rendent à Washington et que l’échange s’accélère”40 confirmed Pompidou.
During the July 27 meeting between the new French minister of defense, Robert
Galley, and top U.S. officials, the French representatives added that “il s’agit donc
bien d’échanges d’informations sur la base d’une liste de sujets très classés dans
le domaine des missiles et des armes nucléaires.”41 Galley returned to the United
States on August 31.42 It would appear, that despite the very public exchange of
blows between Paris and Washington, Kissinger was right in his early assessment
on April 24, the day after the Year of Europe speech, in telling to his collaborators
that he did not “believe [that] the official French reaction will be as hostile as the
press.”43
Indeed in the immediate aftermath, Pompidou’s reaction was not particularly hos-
tile but it became more confrontational as the summer approached and this change
was inspired in part by the very Gaullist new Foreign Minister, Michel Jobert.44
This transatlantic row sparked a policy change on the U.S. side. In mid-August
Kissinger met with James R. Schlesinger, the Secretary of Defense, and other ex-
perts on security matters to prepare the August 31 meeting with the French Defense
Minister. Kissinger’s position on nuclear collaboration with France had undergone
a radical volte-face. The show of European unity, that he had unwittingly se in
motion, had unsettled him. Kissinger admitted that the U.S. “are having massive
problems with the Europeans,” and therefore he resolved “to try to bust the Euro-
40 Quoted in Soutou, “La problématique de la Dètente,” p. 97.
41 Quoted in Trachtenberg, “The French Factor,” p. 38.
42 Memorandum of Conversation, 31 August 1973, FRUS E15.2, 1973–1976, pp. 957–970.
43 Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting, 24 April 1973, FRUS E15.2, 1973–1976, p. 942.
44 See chapter 5.
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peans. The French can be useful in this. We will hit the British, ignore the French
and deal with the Germans and Italians.” For this to happen, they had “to whet their
appetites in August [on nuclear cooperation].” More specifically, Kissinger wanted
to say something that looked “like a step forward” but did not “give them anything
yet.” What is more, to avoid any possible pitfall or misinterpretation he stressed
that the U.S. “wouldn’t give them anything but tidbits” while striving to “look more
competent” than the French counterpart. Essentially they had to give to the French
“the idea [that] it is attainable and [that] we can make progress.” The attention to
detail was paramount in this shrewd scheme and Kissinger emphasized that they
were never to “say ‘if we were going to help’ or ‘we are going to help.’ Just give
them the impression.”45
The aforementioned about-face on the nuclear collaboration had already materi-
alized in Kissinger’s approach as soon as August 9 during a meeting with Schlesinger.
On that occasion, the soon to be Secretary of State, was still unclear on the finer
points:
What we want is something which makes Galley drool but doesn’t give
him anything but something to study for a while. I will brutalize Galley.
Is that doable? Lead them on without giving up anything – we want to
get a handle on them without [their] knowing it.46
What was the purpose of this convoluted maneuver? Kissinger’s aspiration was
to slow down the French program until 1976 because if “the program is a failure by
the next election, the French might get a neutralist government.”47 In this context,
“neutralist” most probably meant neither socialist nor gaullist.
45 Memorandum of Conversation, 17 August 1973, FRUS E15.2, 1973–1976, pp. 955–956.
46 Kissinger–Schlesinger meeting, 9 August 1973. In: Digitized Memorandum of Presidential
Conversations: Nixon Administration, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Digital Library (hereafter
DMPC:Nixon), http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/dmemcons.asp.
47 Memorandum of Conversation, 17 August 1973, FRUS E15.2, 1973–1976, p. 957.
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The French nuclear program had its origins in the decision made by the admin-
istration of Pierre Mendès-France in 1954 and had run largely independently from
the United States up to the 1970s.48 It was wishful thinking to anticipate a change
of government – moreover a “neutralist government” - set in motion by the hypo-
thetical failure of the twenty-year-old French Nuclear program. Not to mention the
implied implausibility of Pompidou’s government being completely outmaneuvered
into sitting back and doing nothing in the meantime. But why “get a handle” on
France? Because, Kissinger explained “We must break up the Europeans. And the
French are essential.”49 Fortunately there was at least one good news: “Pompidou
is dying.”50
1.4 The halt of the French-U.S. nuclear cooperation
Some French historians have concluded that the nuclear cooperation was halted by
the French counterpart because the United States required access to informations
that would compromise France’s nuclear independence.51 However there is some
evidence that suggests that the French were eager to continue the collaboration.
Galley made this abundantly clear on different occasions.52 He even “stated that the
French would be willing to present all their atomic data in order to obtain ‘negative
advice”’[emphasis in the original].53 There were same problems with the assistance
48 See the very thorough Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National
Identity after World War II, MIT Press, 2009.
49 Memorandum of Conversation, 17 August 1973, FRUS E15.2, 1973–1976, p. 956.
50 Kissinger-Schlesinger Meeting, 5 September 1973, DMPC:Nixon.
51 Soutou, “La problèmatique de la Dètente,” pp. 90–98; Pierre Mélandri, “Aux origines de la
coopération nucléaire franco–américaine.” In: Maurice Vaïsse and Colette Barbier, eds. La
France et l’atome : Études d’histoire nucléaire. Bruylant, 1994, pp. 250–251.
52 See Trachtenberg, “The French Factor,” pp. 38–43.
53 Memorandum for Walsh, 26 September 1973, FRUS E15.2, 1973–1976, p. 977.
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to the French nuclear program though: “With respect to assistance on warheads, the
President has only limited authority, inasmuch as he is specifically constrained by
legislation and treaty: the Atomic Energy Act and the Non Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) [...] Nonetheless, we can probably give ‘negative guidance’ without running
into the legal issue, but it is a delicate matter.”54
In a meeting between Schlesinger and Galley, in Secretary Schlesinger’s office,
while discussing French needs in nuclear matters there was a clear explanation of
Galley’s (and, implicitly, Pompidou’s) position:
M. Galley then paused to express the French philosophy – in French,
“to express himself clearly” and in a spirit of great frankness.
Although the French attitude will change as this cooperation devel-
ops, the basic policy is unchanged. Faced with either buying miss[i]les
from the U.S. as the British do, or continuing to play the card of inde-
pendence – with France itself manufacturing everything necessary for
the defense of France – they chose the latter course. However, to save
the time, resources and money resulting from false starts, they are de-
pendent upon American assistance. However, recognizing the need for
delicacy, there will be no written trace of what assistance is given.55
So, while nuclear cooperation never ceased completely, as testified by a conversa-
tion between Kissinger and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, once he took over as presi-
dent, on 5 July 1974,56 nonetheless there was significant freeze. That being said,
it is noteworthy that even as late as January 1974, Kissinger was not completely
sure about the direction of U.S. policy regarding cooperation with the French. Sure
54 Ibid.
55 Emphasis mine, Memorandum for the Record From the Deputy Director of the Office of Strategic
and Space Systems, Department of Defense (Walsh), 26 September 1973, FRUS E15.2, 1973–
1976, p. 978. For further details on the ongoing cooperation between France and the United States
see the recently declassified Memorandum of Conversation, 31 August 1973, FRUS E15.2, 1973–
1976, pp. 957–970; Memorandum of Conversation, 25 September 1973, FRUS E15.2, 1973–1976,
pp. 971–974.
56 Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Le pouvoir et la vie, Vol. 2: L’affrontement, France Loisirs, 1991, pp.
186–191.
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the French were, in Kissinger’s view, “unadulterated bastards,” that “haven’t had a
sensible Foreign Policy since Talleyrand.” This was one of the typical Kissinger’s
temper-tantrums57 and stood in stark contrast with his own memoirs. Regardless he
still wanted to “start up with Galley,” “one we can work with.” This time around
he hoped that “at some time all of them [the Europeans] can say you bastards [the
French], you talk about unity and then you go this bilateral route with” the United
States.58 The result of this back and forth policy was that only in February 1974
Pompidou told Michel Debré: “Les Américains ne veulent plus rien nous donner.”59
1.5 Conclusion
In conclusion what can we deduce about the French–U.S. cooperation on the nu-
clear field and on its relationship with Year of Europe? Was its impact significant in
historical terms on the basis of what we know of the later development in “le saint
des saints”? To propose an answer to this kind of question, historians must make an
implicit counterfactual hypothesis. To say that an event was significant implies that
that one event transformed the path of what was likely to happen and, in so doing,
it diverted subsequent events into new directions.60 A provisional answer, in antici-
pation of a more detailed analysis of the Year of Europe initiative consequences in
chapter 3, is that Kissinger speech sparked a transatlantic crisis that led Washington
to reevaluate – and to use as leverage – a fundamental policy towards France, one
of the most important allies in Western Europe in Nixon’s and Kissinger’s vision.
57 See the moderately critical biography Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography; and the memoir of John
Ehrlichman, Witness to Power: The Nixon Years. Simon & Schuster, 1982.
58 Kissinger–Schlesinger meeting, 4 January 1974, DPMC:Nixon.
59 Debré, Entretiens, p. 210. Also quoted in Trachtenberg, “The French Factor,” p. 40.
60 See Gilbert, “The Significance of British Entry into the European Community,” pp. 71–72.
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What about nuclear cooperation itself? The penchant that Kissinger had for
secrecy heavily weights on our capacity to understand clearly what happened. As
the French historian Maurice Vaïsse summarizes: “Même s’il n’est plus question
de nier la réalité de la coopération franco–américaine, le secret qui a entouré toute
cette affaire continue à obscurcir sa chronologie, son importance, ses modalités, ses
arrière-pensées.”61
61 Maurice Vaïsse, “La coopération nucléaire militaire franco–américaine (1976–1974).” In: Bus-
sière et al., Georges Pompidou et les États-Unis, p. 71.
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Chapter 2
The European Origins of the Year of Europe
Looking back at what had happened in 1973, Edward Heath, the British prime min-
ister from 1970 to 1974, lambasted the Year of Europe: “For Kissinger to announce
a Year of Europe without consulting any of us was rather like my standing between
the lions of Trafalgar Square and announcing that we were embarking on a year to
save America!”1 This affirmation was not simply a late version of the facts due to
the 25 years between the events and the publication of Mr. Heath’s autobiography.
Already in his encounter with Walter Rostow on June 19, 1973, Heath maintained
that the initiative was “launched without any attempt at preliminary consultation
with Europe.”2
He was not the only one who lamented a lack of proper communication. Jobert,
said bluntly to Kissinger that the Europeans had “had no advance word” and that
this approach had been “in effect a shock” to the European side3 and, like Heath,
1 Edward Heath, The Course of My Life: My Autobiography. Hodder & Stoughton, 1998, p. 493.
2 Armstrong letter to Acland, 19 June 1973, AMU 3/507/1, DBPO 3.4, doc. 133, p. 2. A hand-note
on the border of the same page, probably by Antony Acland, Principal Private Secretary to the
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, contradicts the claim that there had
been no consultations between U.S. and U.K..
3 Kissinger–Jobert meeting, 17 May 1973, DNSA, Doc. KT00728.
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he reiterated the argument in his autobiography.4 In a letter to Nixon on August 4,
1973, even Brandt lamented the lack of previous consultation with European allies.5
In his memoirs Kissinger dismissed this type of criticism and insisted that the
initiative had been well prepared. The speech itself, had been established over a
month in advance. An outline had been given to the French in mid-April and the
British had received a copy four days before Kissinger delivered the speech. In
general, in Kissinger’s view, the allies had been consulted on the U.S. endeavor for
several months.6 This sharply diverging recounting of the same events by some of
the main protagonists has led many historians to wide-ranging interpretations of the
origins of the Year of Europe initiative and the ensuing transatlantic row. The blame
has been ascribed on either the U.S. side or on the European leaders.
Which was the guilty side of the Atlantic? Was there a real consultation of
European allies on the Year of Europe? Were Brandt, Heath and Pompidou all privy
to the political vision that Kissinger intended to put forward with his speech? If it
were so, why the European leaders lied saying that that they were not consulted?
In his study of the British origins of the Year of Europe, Matthew Jones concluded
that “far from being kept in the dark, British officials had a role in the origins of
the Year of Europe itself.”7 The German historian, Fabian Hilfrich, observed in
his study that the speech “did not take Bonn by complete surprise, but its broad
scope was nontheless unexpected”8 Kosciusko-Morizet, after being consulted on
the initiative by Kissinger himself on March 19, flew in Paris to brief Pompidou in
4 Jobert, L’autre regard, p. 288.
5 Cited in Daniel Möckli, European Foreign Policy During the Cold War: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou
and the Dream of Political Unity. I.B.Tauris, 2009, pp. 145, 410.
6 Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 1273–1275; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 149–153.
7 Matthew Jones, “‘A Man in a Hurry’: Henry Kissinger, Transatlantic Relations, and the British
Origins of the Year of Europe Dispute.” In: Diplomacy & Statecraft, 24.1 (2013), p. 86.
8 Fabian Hilfrich, “West Germany’s Long Year of Europe.” In: Matthias Schulz and Thomas A.
Schwartz, eds. The Strained Alliance: US–European Relations from Nixon to Carter. Cambridge
University Press, 2010, p. 241.
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person. According to his view Pompidou “n’hésita pas” and gave his “feu vert [...]
pour cette « Année de l’Europe »9 Nonetheless the French ambassador immediately
observes that “la réalité fut malheuresment un peu différente de qu’il [Kissinger]
m’avait annoncé. . . .”10 Finally, in his book Daniel Möckli concludes that: “What
Kissinger referred to as consultation in early 1973 amounted little more than him
laying out his analysis of Atlantic problems and indicating that the U.S. would soon
want to deal with these problems.”11
While these conclusions and observations offer insights into what happened be-
fore and after the April 23 speech, many of the questions of the previous paragraph
remain unanswered. I will try to provide an answer by examining documents on
both sides of the Atlantic.
2.1 Special relationship?
Britain’s fresh signing of the European Community accession treaty on 22 January
1972 was still poisoned by de Gaulle’s vetoes and by the “Soames affair.” De Gaulle
vetoed the UK’s application to join the Community in 1963 and again in 1967, hav-
ing in the meantime embarked on a boycott of European institutions and threatened
to pull France out of the Community. It was therefore not entirely surprising that
de Gaulle now privately discussed with Sir Christopher Soames, the British ambas-
sador in Paris, the possibility of France allying with the UK to create a free trade
area, incorporating the Six (the members of the Community) as well as the Seven
9 Georges Pompidou et l’Europe, p. 209. The American historian Marc Trachtenberg quotes this
passage to show that the French were aptly informed on the initiative in “The French Factor,” p.
27.
10 Ibid.
11 Daniel Möckli, European Foreign Policy, p. 145.
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(the EFTA countries). This grouping would be directed by Britain, France, Germany
and Italy. Prime Minister Harold Wilson leaked de Gaulle’s proposals to Germany
and other countries, provoking loud cries of betrayal by the French.
Edward Heath’s Conservative government was thus very eager to demonstrate it
commitment to working with France in a new esprit communautaire. Heath had per-
sonally led the negotiations for the accession to the CE during the Harold Macmil-
lan government and had seen his reputation unscathed, or even enhanced, despite
that failure. He was awarded the Charlmagne Prize in 1963, a prestigious recog-
nition for his efforts in the cause of European unity.12 Heath developed a strong
personal relationship with Pompidou, in addition to his strong friendship with Pom-
pidou’s private secretary and later foreign minister, Michel Jobert.13 Furthermore
their views converged on many topics as testified by an eloquent correspondence
between the two leaders.14 Their good relationship was hailed by the press and has
led some historians to speak of a new Entente cordiale.15 During the Reykjavik
summit, an ill but still in charge Pompidou referred to him as “the only European"
he knew in the U.K.16
One of the most candid assessments of the challenges that Britain had to face
in her new role as Community member was delivered by Cromer the day after the
Nixon’s election by a landslide for a second term as President of the United States.
He considered the Republican victory a good thing for Britain because Nixon was
“a good friend of ours” and one “who has respect for Britain and in particular your-
12 Hynes, The Year that Never Was, p. 7.
13 Dominic Sandbrook, State of Emergency, The Way We Were: Britain, 1970-1974, chapter 4.
14 MAE, Série Secrétariat général 1956–1971, Sous-série Entretiens et Messages, 45, 27 November
1971.
15 Diana L. Copper, “La svolta di Pompidou nei rapporti franco–britannici: la nuova Entente Cor-
diale (1969–1974). In: Ventunesimo Secolo 5.9 (2006), pp. 179–198 and Hamilton, “Britain,
France, and America’s Year of Europe,” p. 871.
16 Memorandum of conversation, 31 May 1973, FRUS E15.2, 1973–1976, pp. 99–100. For the
French version AN 5AG2 1023; also Eric Roussel, Georges Pompidou. Lattès, 2004, pp. control-
lare (550-570?) and Jobert, L’autre regard, p. 293.
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self [Douglas-Home, the foreign and commonwealth secretary] and the Prime Min-
ister.” As for Britain’s role in the Community he observed that they would have
to prove their “wholehearted commitment,” primarily relating to the “peculiarly
delicate” problem of seeking to ensure that the relationship between the enlarged
Community and the United States started off on the basis of “friendship, instead of
antagonism.”17
In the meantime on the other side of the Atlantic the enthusiasm for the Tory
victory in Britain was barely contained. Completely ignoring the counsel of the
American Embassy in London, the polls and other advisors, Nixon became an “un-
abashed partisan of the Tories.”18 He repeatedly tried to call Kissinger to express
his joy over the Heath’s victory.19 The President was persistent in his calls to Heath
himself, leading Heath’s housekeeper to wake him vociferously lamenting that “a
man called Nixon keeps telephoning and demanding to speak to you.” When Nixon
finally made contact with the new PrimeMinister he advised Heath to relax the most
in the two months between the election and the inauguration of the new government.
When Heath told him that he was already Prime Minister he exclaimed “God, what
a system.”20 This was one of the first signs of Nixon’s difficult understanding of the
finer points of European politics.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in London welcomed this state
of affairs although with some reservations. One analysis on the practical value of
the relationship concluded that “on balance, we still get more than we give, in some
fields a good deal more.”21 There were continuous strains between the two govern-
ments mainly caused by economic frictions and over United States troops in Europe;
17 Cromer to Douglas-Home, 8 November 1972, The National Archives (TNA): Public Record Of-
fice (PRO) Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 73/138. See also Hynes, The Year that
Never Was, pp. 74–75; Hamilton, “Britain, France, and America’s Year of Europe,” p. 872.
18 Hynes, The Year that Never Was, p. 10.
19 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 932.
20 Heath, The Course of My Life, p. 307.
21 Brief by FCO, 23 September 1970, TNA: PRO FCO 7/1899.
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both the Congress and the U.S. public opinion exerted a strong pressure, fuelled by
the ongoing Vietnam conflict, to prioritize domestic concerns over overseas com-
mitments. Nevertheless Nixon and Kissinger continued to consider London their
main partner in Europe.22
One example that reinforces the argument of a strong link, the “special rela-
tionship” between the two countries was the remarkable collaboration between
Kissinger and Sir Thomas Brimelow, then deputy under-secretary in the FCO, in wa-
tering down the Soviet proposal of an agreement “to prevent nuclear war.” Kissinger
asked to Brimelow to draft a revised text in what was dubbed “Operation Hulla-
baloo” in London.23 Brimelow became Kissinger’s desk officer in conditions of
very tight secrecy despite the risks involved with such an operation and the charges
of duplicity that would arise if other European countries were to disclose their role
in the negotiation, confirming that Albion was as perfidious as ever.24 Heath ex-
pressed his concerns to Nixon that the original Soviet draft was “aimed at depriving
NATO of the protection of the United States nuclear deterrent.” Fortunately now it
had been reshaped by the British themselves and rendered an innocuous agreement
to work toward the objective of the non-use of force to settle disputes. Kissinger
was not worried about NATO, but the British draft “did not provide projection for
China.”25
This entire exercise sparked several reflections on the British side. In an abrasive
letter Cromer wrote to Brimelow “that they largely follow the text of the record you
did yourself before leaving here.” Then he added:
22 For a different opinion see Trachtenberg, “The French factor.”
23 Stephen R. Twigge, “Operation Hullabaloo: Henry Kissinger, British Diplomacy, and the Agree-
ment on the Prevention of Nuclear War.” In: Diplomatic History 33.4 (2009), pp. 689–701.
24 Brimelow to Greenhill, 22 January 1973, Brimelow papers, DBPO 3.4, doc. 15; Brimelow to
Greenhill, 25 January 1973, Brimelow papers, DBPO 3.4, doc. 17.
25 Record of discussion: Heath/Nixon, AMU 3/548/8, 2 February 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 22.
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Our first impression is that although Kissinger spoke as always, both
lucidly and confidently, there appeared to be an underlying element of
strain and perhaps emotion beneath his outwardly calm exterior; this
has been emerging progressively. [...] Moreover, some of the issues
which concern the Administration now are not such as to fall easily
within his own intellectual scheme of coping with problems, since they
cannot easily be broken down into relatively simple issues. In addition,
he must undoubtedly be up against a certain amount of opposition on
one front or another, and he may be finding life more trating than usual.
Be that as it may, I think there is an increased danger that with so many
balls in the air, one or other of them may come down with a nasty crash.
[...]
Secondly, his astonishing intellectual arrogance, though masked by
a calm manner and no exaggerated words, showed through most promi-
nently. [...] I found his general scorn for ‘the Europeans’ [...] particu-
larly disturbing. At one time I thought this might be a reflexion of his
master’s voice. Now I am not so sure.
Thirdly, as always, we were struck by the astonishing anomaly of
the most powerful nation in the world invoking the aid of a foreign
government to do its drafting for it, while totally excluding its own
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
And finally he concluded his letter with the recommendation that “we must always
remember, if only at the back of our minds, the highly devious nature of Kissinger’s
intellectual make-up.”26 This type of arguments on Kissinger’s personality and
methods were repeated by many British officials in their evaluation of the reasons
of the Year of Europe failure.27
There were other reasons why the U.S. administration choose to work more
closely with the Heath government. There were several straws in the wind dur-
ing the final months of 1972 as the peace negotiations to end the Vietnam War
were brought to their climax. Nixon was incensed by the critical stance of several
26 Letter: Cromer to Brimelow, Brimelow papers, 7 March 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc 44.
27 See chapter 5.
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NATO allies over the intensified bombing of North Vietnam in December 1972.
Lord Cromer wrote in January 1973 that he had not realized the “intensity of rage
against all those who have publicly criticised President Nixon’s recent Vietnam pol-
icy and those who attract the greatest wrath are the Allies. We therefore stand out
for the time being as blue-eyed boys”28 All the other “U.S. allies in Europe have
fallen into disrepute to some extent for the same reason, and the prestige of Europe
generally is pretty low at present. The White House tend to see the European na-
tions as weak, selfish, indecisive, and suspicious of U.S. motives, and hence a pretty
unrewarding lot to try to manage.”29 Nixon himself reiterated the concept to Heath
during an encounter in Washington at the beginning of February. He first thanked
him for the fact “that when we were under tremendous pressure, the British stuck
with us” and added that what Heath did, “did not go unnoticed, and what others did,
did not go unnoticed either. It is hard to understand when allies turn on you.”30
Kissinger’s own advice to Nixon was that “There continues to be a special re-
lationship (Heath strongly prefers the term natural relationship) with the U.K. and
in your talk with the Prime Minister you can range over a number of issues more
freely than with other Europeans.” However there was one caveat: Heath’s position
was delicate because of the EC membership. U.K. couldn’t assume the position of
“U.S. advocate in the councils of the EC” because the old suspicions of the “Trojan
Horse” would then be revived.31
Later, in his memoirs, Kissinger even compared Heath to a new de Gaulle32 and
dubbed him “the only British leader I encountered who not only failed to cultivate
the ‘special relationship’ with the United States but actively sought to downgrade
28 Quoted in Jones, “‘A Man in a Hurry’,” p. 87 from Cromer letter to Greenhill, 17 January 1973,
Prime Minister’s Office files (PREM) 16/1976.
29 Minute: Overton to Hankey, 13 February 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc 25.
30 Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger), 1 February 1973, FRUS E15.2, 1973–1976, p. 707.
31 Quoted in Jones, “‘A Man in a Hurry’,” p. 87.
32 Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 964–965.
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it and to give Europe pride of place in British policy.”33 Yet Heath did not want
to put more distance than necessary between Britain and the US; he wanted to be
a good European but not at the expense of relations with the US, and he was not
a zealous guardian of sovereignty. Heath stressed that the long-term relationship
between the EC and the United States should be built to reflect the “real interest
in maintaining closest possible ties.”34 Heath’s private secretary and close advisor,
Sir Robert Armstrong, explained that in Heath’s view, Europe should deal with
the United States as a Community to ensure a basis of equality. For this reason
he dismissed French objections to the creation of administrative arrangements to
discuss transatlantic problems.35 Therefore his Gaullist credentials were very slim
by any account. Yet Kissinger’s mammoth memoirs became somewhat dominant in
the interpretation of Heath’s policy: the relations withWashington were undermined
by Heath’s European ambition.36
Another example of the difficulty that Kissinger had in understanding Heath
is offered by his reaction to the British Prime Minister’s visit in Washington in
February 1973. After the visit Heath thought that it had been a very profitable
encounter. He told Cromer that the main ingredient for its success had been “the
timing”; it could not “have been better.” For him it “was a good start” although
“we shall have a lot to do in 1973 if we are to accomplish the main objectives on the
European trade and monetary questions.”37 A gloomy Kissinger interpreted the visit
in a completely different way; he saw troubled times ahead. There was “a nearly
33 Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal. Simon & Schuster, 1999, p. 603.
34 Sir Douglas-Home Private Office Papers, memorandum from Heath to Nixon, 30 October 1972.
35 Letter: R T Armstrong to Acland, MWE 3/304/2, 12 December 1972, DBPO 3.4, doc. 4.
36 On this points see the discussions in Morten Rasmussen and Ann-Christina L. Knudsen The Road
to a United Europe: Interpretations of the Process of European Integration. P.I.E. Peter Lang,
2009, pp. 74–78; Andrew Scott Allies Apart: Heath, Nixon and the Anglo-American Relationship,
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp. 2-10. and chapter 5; Niklas Rossbach Heath, Nixon and the
Rebirth of the Special Relationship: Britain, the U.S. and the EC, 1969-74, Palgrave Macmillan,
2009, chapter 4.
37 Heath to Cromer, TNA: PRO FCO 81/193, 6 February 1973.
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impenetrable opacity about Heath’s formulations which, given his intelligence, had
to be deliberate.” He went further stating that the talks had been a complete failure
due to the British explicit communautaire line. “He wanted to avoid any whiff of
Anglo–American collusion” was Kissinger’s conclusion.38
Many historians have analyzed different facets of Kissinger’s personality and
politics. Unfortunately many brilliant recent works tend to ignore Kissinger’s emo-
tional side that is well documented.39 The reason for the reputation of Kissinger
as “the ultimate realist”40 lies mainly in “Kissinger’s assiduously propagated self-
portrayal” because in “thousands of pages of memoirs and countless interviews, he
has relentlessly depicted himself as the consummate intellectual.”41 If the “relation-
ship between Kissinger the self-styled realist and Kissinger the tantrum-throwing
depressive” is taken into account many of his reactions - not to mentions his out-
bursts - towards Heath and of other European leaders become understandable.42
In conclusion Nixon and Kissinger had still a very strong preference towards
working with London on the most delicate matters. The methods they used were
still very secretive and, although Heath told them that he would be bound by the
Community line,43 Nixon’s final comment was that Britain and the United States
must “do some hard thinking together – without necessarily telling the rest of the
Alliance at any particular stage.”44 And that they did.
38 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 142–143.
39 See the insightful article from Barbara Keys, “Henry Kissinger: The Emotional Statesman.” In:
Diplomatic History, 35.4 (2001), pp. 587–609; also Isaacson, Kissinger; and Ehrlichman,Witness
to Power. The recent spate of Kissirengerology includes excellent works such as Mario Del Pero,
The Eccentric Realist: Henry Kissinger and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy. Cornell
University Press 2010; Jussi Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American
Foreign Policy. Oxford University Press, 2004; Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century.
40 Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect, p. 292.
41 Keys, “Henry Kissinger,” p 590.
42 Keys, “Henry Kissinger,” p. 591.
43 Record of discussion: Heath/Nixon, AMU 3/548/8, 1 February 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc 19.
44 Record of discussion: Heath/Nixon, AMU 3/548/8, 2 February 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc 20.
42
2.2 British contribution to the genesis of the Year of Europe
For one there was the very secret “Operation Hullabaloo,” but Kissinger was ea-
ger to utilize this familiar and trusted resource. At the beginning of March 1973
he asked Brimelow and Cromer to aid him with crafting idea on the problems of
transatlantic relations. He said them that “the United States had started a massive
Governmental effort” to find an appropriate process for elaborating common views
on political content, military doctrines and economic aspects. “It was not the U.S.
wish to set security off against economics” he assured them, “But they did need a
general framework.”45
Only four days later, on March 10, Nixon explained to Kissinger that “European
unity will not be in our interest, certainly not from a political viewpoint or from an
economic viewpoint,” because the entire Europe was, in his view, “leaning Left.”
For this reason “political considerations must completely override economic con-
siderations in monetary and trade talks.”46 Nixon had decided this way against the
advices of Treasury Secretary George Shultz47 and told him to “be forthcoming”
with the Europeans.48 He told Kissinger that this was “going to be a bitter pill for
Shultz to swallow but he must swallow it.”49 Kissinger was thus conveying Nixon’s
position to Brimelow and Cromer when he sad that he ”wanted to take the economic
deliberations away from the economists.”50
45 Letter: Cromer to Brimelow, Brimelow papers, 7 March 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc 44.
46 Nixon to Kissinger, 19 March 1973 (draft). In: Kathleen B. Rasmussen ed. Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1969–1976 Volume 31: Foreign Economic Policy, 1969–1976 (Hereafter FRUS
31). Government Printing Office, 2009, p. 119.
47 Nixon meeting with Economic Advisors, 3 March 1973, Tape Transcript. In: FRUS 31, p. 69;
and Nixon–Kissinge–Schulz Meeting, 7 March 1973, Tape Transcript. In: FRUS 31, p 106.
48 Ibid., pp. 106, 111.
49 Nixon to Kissinger, 19 March 1973 (draft). In: FRUS 31, p. 119.
50 Letter: Cromer to Brimelow, Brimelow papers, 7 March 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc 44.
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“The U.S. Administration itself had no clear idea of what should be done” con-
fessed Kissinger, they “did not want to spring a grand design on the Europeans.”
How was this to be brought to a point? By discussion preliminary to
a Summit? Or by bilateral discussion? How did the United Kingdom
envisage the evolution of the Atlantic relationship over the next ten
years? Was it possible to get a conceptual framework? The U.S. and
the U.K. ought to do this in the closest consultation. They would let us
see the U.S. studies. Could the U.K. put its best people onto this?51
Under this barrage of questions Brimelow asked for a timeframe; Kissinger told
him that they could see some U.S. papers by the beginning of April and the others
by the beginning of May. He even said that he intended to discuss these matters in
the European Capitals after the Bilderberg Conference in May.52 What made him
change idea and deliver his speech on April 23? Did he really had time to consult all
the other Allies on this matter as he said the British he intended to? Or had already
consulted them bilaterally without wanting to inform the British?
The British tried then to outline the many difficulties that such an approach could
present: the absence of a forum in which all these problems could be discussed to-
gether; the infrequent meeting of EC political directors; the disinterest of many
Committees of the Community in questions of strategy - instead they “worked with
their noses very close to the grindstone.”53 There was little institutional logic, from
the European point of view, in the notion of a transatlantic process embracing de-
fense and economic because EC membership was not synonymous with European
membership of NATO. The Nine were still divided on many issues, and if there was
one thing that they agreed upon, it was that there should be no “globalization of
issues.”54
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Brussels tel 25, 17 January 1973, MWE 3/304/1, DBPO 3.4, doc. 12.
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After this encounter Brimelow wrote to the Cabinet Office in London that Kissin-
ger’s ideas on how to organize transatlantic relations were “unclear, rambling and
not altogether consistent” and “he is not clear in his own mind what he needs or with
whom he should be talking to.”55 While Kissinger asked for the “best men” in U.K.,
he could not rely on anyone in the U.S. administration because as Nixon told him:
“these thoughts must not get into the bureaucracy and must also not be discussed in
any public forum.”56 “All told” concluded Brimelow “I was left with the impression
that Dr. Kissinger is baffled by and worried about the problems of the trans-Atlantic
relationship; that he does not feel free to consult his own ‘bureaucracy’. . . and that
what he would like would be a think piece from us.”
In a meeting held on March 21 Heath gave his green light to Brimelow’s search
for a “conceptual framework” for East–West relations during the next decade.57 In
the revised form the draft had to avoid certain pitfalls. First of all it should not
give “hostages to fortune in the form of any suggestions that we necessarily accept
Dr. Kissinger’s approach on matters such as a radical revision of NATO strategy.”58
Secondly, being “that Dr. Kissinger does not have a profound understanding of eco-
nomics,” “it would perhaps be wise not to get in too deep with him at this stage.”59
Thirdly, the draft had to be presented as a personal response which did not reflect the
considered position of the Government.60. Finally, there was the matter of secrecy.
“It could however only do harm if our partners were to hear about our views from
the Americans rather than ourselves. We hope, therefore, that nothing will be said
by the Americans to any of our European partners (including Chancellor Brandt in
55 Letter: Brimelow to Norbury, 7 March 1973, Cabinet Office files (CAB) 164/1232.
56 Nixon to Kissinger, 19 March 1973 (draft). In: FRUS 31, p. 119.
57 Minute: J J B Hunt to Heath, 5 April 1973, CAB 164/1232, DBPO 3.4, doc. 62.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Note by Trend, Hunt and H F T Smith, 12 April 1973, CAB 130/671, DBPO 3.4, doc. 65.
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his forthcoming visit) about the existence or value of these Anglo–American discus-
sions.”61
As a precaution, in case other Europeans became privy to the document, the
paper set out a whole series of questions, rather than outlining real proposals. Im-
portant imponderables such as:
• “What degree of Western agreement on economic, monetary and energy prob-
lems is required to preserve the possibility of a common Western political
position in East-West relations?”
• “Is there a prospect of moving, over the ten years, from the hollow ‘detente’
diplomacy of the Soviet Union to a lasting accommodation with the East?”
• “Should the West elaborate a trans–Atlantic strategy for ‘detente’ diplomacy
and long term view of genuine detente?”
• “Can anything be done to facilitate a greater French contribution to Western
defence?”
• “How would moves towards a European defence community affect the United
States?”
• “Will the subject matter of East/West economic relations remain constant?”
This outcome was accurately planned.62
The result of Brimelow’s work on the “conceptual framework” had the rather
ungainly title “The Next Ten Years in East–West and Trans–Atlantic Relations” and
was dismissed by Kissinger as “mildly fatalistic” just four days before his fated
speech.63 In this meeting, that lasted for nearly four hours, Kissinger explained to
sir Burke Trend, the cabinet secretary, and to Brimelow that he wanted to make the
transatlantic relationship “an ‘emotional necessity’ to American public opinion.”64
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Record of meeting: Trend/Kissinger, 19 April 1973, CAB 164/1233, DBPO 3.4, doc. 69.
64 Minute: Trend to Heath, 24 April 1973, CAB 164/1233, DBPO 3.4, doc. 74.
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Trend concluded that Kissinger “clearly had not had time to study our memoran-
dum,” “nor did he offer us any of the corresponding studies which he alleges that he
has in preparation.”65
K[issinger] continues to be obsessed by the problem of coming to grips
with a Europe which will not speak with one voice on any subject
and appears incapable of understanding that all the various subjects
of current concern are as organically interrelated as K[issinger]’s own
conceptual approach requires them to be. He now genuinely wants
to make progress on this front - almost to the exclusion of anything
else; and this is the dominant theme of his speech yesterday. I waited
to see at what point he would raise Indo–China, which is usually the
first topic on which he wants to unburden himself; and I asked myself
whether this was because it might provoke questions from ourselves
which K[issinger] would rather not answer in the circumstances of the
present disarray in Laos and Cambodia or whether it was because the
whole problem of South East Asia had genuinely receded in his mind
in order that Europe might have priority. Whatever the answer, there is
no doubt that, as regards Europe, he is now a man in a hurry.66
Trend anticipated that Watergate could be behind this newfound sense of urgency
in Europe.67 In recounting the meeting - “in effect a dress rehearsal” - of April 19
with Kissinger, Trend wrote that it was “not an exaggeration to say that practically
everything which Kissinger said to us in Washington reappears in a rather more
defined way in the subsequent speech.”68
In summing up the British contribution to the Year of Europe, my conclusion is
that there were some frank discussions between London and Washington on both
transatlantic and East-West relations . But there was no meaningful contribution
from the Heath government or from the FCO officials to the ideas that lay behind the
65 Letter: Trend to Greenhill, 24 April 1973, SMG/304/1, DBPO 3.4, doc. 73.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid. On the Watergate connection see chapter 3.
68 Minute: Trend to Heath, 24 April 1973, CAB 164/1233, DBPO 3.4, doc. 74.
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Year of Europe. The “conceptual framework” rested entirely on U.S. conceptions
and methods.
2.3 French origins of the Year of Europe
In his dialogue on transatlantic relations with Paris and Bonn, Kissinger used the
same approach, secret, bilateral, based on personal contacts with confidants of the
respective leaders. For Germany the obvious choice was Egon Bahr with whom he
had already employed back channels for several years. As for Pompidou, Kissinger
choose Kosciusko–Morizet. He assured all his interlocutors that he was America’s
preferred, and most trusted partner, in Europe. And this was why he wanted to start
a pre-discussion with them about transatlantic relations before multilateralising the
debate.69
The dialogue with Paris had not been intense in comparison with the British
one. During a visit in Paris in December 1972, Kissinger recalled in his memoirs,
had suggested to Pompidou the idea of an Atlantic summit meeting sometime dur-
ing 1973. In Kissinger’s view, “Pompidou was avuncularly encouranging.”70 It
is probable that this invitation was prompted by the interview given by Pompidou
to the The New York Times that same month.71 The argument that Pompidou had
not given any hint of a negative reaction during his discussions with Kissinger was
69 Möckli, European Foreign Policy, p. 146; Hilfrich, “West Germany’s Long Year of Europe,”
p. 241; Daniel Möckli, “Asserting Europe’s Distinct Identity: The EC Nine and Kissinger’s
Year of Europe.” In: Schulz and Schwartz The Strained Alliance, pp. 197–198; Claudia Hiepel,
“Kissinger’s Year of Europe – A Challenge for the EC and the Franco–German Relationship.” In:
Jan Harst, ed. Beyond the Customs Union: The European Community’s Quest for Deepening,
Widening and Completion, 1969-1975. Bruylant, 2007, p. 282.
70 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 130.
71 James Reston, “Pompidou favors US–Europe Talks.” In: The New York Times, 14 December 1972,
p.1.
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reiterated almost a year later, in a November 1973 meeting of the Department of
State concerning US-Europe relations.72 That same interview was brought as proof
of Pompidou’s position. Unfortunately, Pompidou claimed internally that his argu-
ments had been overstated, and that he would continue to support bilateral summits
only.73 One can only wonder if this was the real stance of Pompidou or if it was
dictated by the need to refurbish his Gaullist image even with his collaborators.
The first conversation with the Kosciuscko–Morizet in which Kissinger talked
openly about “l’état de nos réflexions sur le questions européennes” happened on
March 16. Somewhat predictably Kissinger told the ambassador that “Pour le Prési-
dent Nixon, la France est l’interlocuteur par excellence.” Obviously, in Kissinger’s
opinion, they had to work on these themes and they had to do it before Europe
was “dominée par M. Palme et Miterrand.” And there it was the elephant in the
room: the final objective of future encounters, and implicitly of the Year of Europe,
was to solve once and of all “l’ambiguité allemande.”74 The ambassador asked
Kissinger what he meant with this term. Kissinger said that he did not want to
question Brandt personality, but it was clear to him “que les Allemands menaient
plusieurs jeux à la fois”75 The German question did never surface in the documents
related to Kissinger’s conversations with the British officials that I have consulted.
72 Kristin L. Ahlberg and Alexander Wieland, eds. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–
1976 Volume 38, Part 1: Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1973–1976 (Hereafter FRUS 38.1). Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 2009, pp. 105-106.
73 Möckli, European Foreign Policy, p. 411.
74 Kosciusko-Morizet, Déjeuner en tête a tête avec M. Kissinger, 16 March 1973, CHAN, Kosciusko-
Morizet Papers, 582AP, 37; there was a hint about U.S.–European relations in Kosciusko-Morizet,
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75 Kosciusko-Morizet, Déjeuner en tête a tête avec M. Kissinger, 16 March 1973, CHAN, Kosciusko-
Morizet Papers, 582AP, 37.
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Two other encounters followed between Kissinger and the Kosciusko-Morizet.
The first one on March 29 in which Kissinger had as its main purpose the organi-
zation of a meeting between Pompidou and Nixon before a “tremendous publicity
thing” with Brežnev, i.e. the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. “Only
you and I are aware of this question” affirmed the ambassador. “That is the way I
want to keep it. That way you and I can blackmail each other” was the rapid quip
from Kissinger before passing to more pressing matters.
Our basic thinking is this: We believe that if we go into trade negoti-
ations without a framework, confrontation will almost certainly result.
If our President has to male each decision one at a time, on its own
merits, he will be motivated by domestic political pressures. We also
have defense issues to discuss. It is helpful to get an overall framework
to discuss economics, defense and political issues. We cannot have a
monetary crisis every six month, and we both have an energy crisis.76
They met again a couple of weeks later and Kissinger when they chose Iceland as
the preferred place for the forthcoming meeting between the two presidents. Then
Kissinger started to explain what he intended to do with the Russians. “We will
not make an agreement with them where we will not use nuclear weapons. The
only thing we will discuss is something that states as an objective that ultimately
nuclear weapons should be excluded.” This was what the draft from Brimelow
was all about after all. Then Kissinger stated that up to that point there was no
text, and he would keep the ambassador informed on any development. And finally
Kissinger returned on European–American relations: “I know that even your Presi-
dent thinks that maybe some sort of condominium between the U.S. and the USSR
could emerge.” He wanted to bring about a “practical situation where this becomes
and looks untrue,” something, “maybe later this year, that could have a dramatic
76 Kissinger–Kosciusco-Morizet Meeting, 29 March 1973, DNSA, doc. KT00690.
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impact on the American public.” because they needed “conscious elite support.”
And back to basics: “In Germany, at the back of his mind [probably Brandt’s], he
is trying to create a special security zone of the two Germanys and Poland. That
would be a disaster for Europe and Germany. The President and I have always liked
Franco-German cooperation.”77
During the final phase of this meeting, while they were talking about a possible
collaboration in supersonic technology, Kissinger decided to reveal something to
Kosciusko-Morizet: “I’m thinking of making a speech on April 23, not to France
but to Europe, to invoke a response. What do you think?” The ambassador vaguely
said that “it [wa]s a question of timing.” Unflappably Kissinger added that he had
not in mind a “detailed outline,” just something about what “European–American
relationship should be like.”78
And that was that. This was what Kissinger called consultation with France.
2.4 Conclusion
The major problem with these secret bilateral dialogues, and the principal reason
why all European leaders acted so surprised at the Year of Europe speech, was that
Kissinger confused a general discussion on Atlantic problems with real consulta-
tions on his planned initiative. They were caught off guard because they did not
expect such far-raging proposals in a speech that they were secretly asked to give
public backing. Moreover, Kissinger’s suggestions came at an awkward time: The
EC had just completed its first round of enlargement with the accession of Britain,
Denmark and Ireland on January 1, 1973. Precisely when the British were anxious
77 Kissinger–Kosciusco-Morizet Meeting, 13 April 1973, DNSA, doc. KT00702.
78 Ibid.
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to demonstrate their European credentials the Nixon administration asked them to
“deliver” Europe because “even allowing for hyperbole and perhaps some desire to
divide and rule, we are seen as America’s staunchest and most dependable ally”79
Cromer prophesized that “such is the trust of President Nixon, that therein could lie
the seeds of disillusion in the future, on occasions when Community policy, which
will of course embrace British policy, is at variance with American thinking.”80
What about Kissinger’s and Nixon’s methods? Again Cromer offered his inter-
pretation based on his understanding of Kissinger’s conception of Realpolitik:
The style of diplomacy practised by the President and Kissinger is most
suited to dealings with a single partner (or adversary) of broadly equiv-
alent power and ambitions; and across a range of issues that can be
treated as a whole, so that the full logic of the diplomacy of power
can be deployed, bargaining chips can be amassed; negotiation from
strength can be indulged in; and secrecy can be maintained. Negotia-
tion with the Russians fills this bill.
Cromer’s explanation did not differ significantly from the one offered by many his-
torians in explaining the triumphs of the Kissinger–Nixon duo in their dealings with
the Communist powers.81 Cromer went on with his analysis explaining that what
helped them in their dealings with the Communist powers, was actually an obstacle
in their dealings with liberal democracies:
By comparison with US/Soviet dealings, negotiations with the West Eu-
ropean allies, whether in preparation for East–West meetings or on eco-
nomic or commercial matters, are frustrating, unequal, tiresomely com-
plex in the range and depth of the issues they involve, and hard to con-
trol. Such negotiations are less susceptible to treatment by the exercise
79 Minute: Overton to Hankey, 13 February 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc 25.
80 Washington diplomatic report 180/73, 22 February 1973, AMU 3/548/3, DBPO 3.4, doc. 29.
81 See for example, Jussi Hanhimäki, “Foreign Policy Overview.” In: Melvin Small, ed, A Compan-
ion to Richard Nixon. Wiley, 2011, pp. 345–361; Robert D. Schulzinger, “Nixon and Kissinger.”
Ibid., pp. 362–379; Keith L. Nelson, “Explorations of Détente.” Ibid., pp. 400–424.
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of power, which tends to alienate an ally even if it forces concessions
from him. These negotiations not only frequently require consultation
in advance of decision–making, which the centralised style of govern-
ment based on the White House makes difficult, but they also involve
distasteful questioning of the U.S. judgement of where the Western or
general interest lies. [...] These are, I believe, the considerations that lay
behind Sonnenfeldt’s recent reported remark that the Americans find it
easier to negotiate with their adversaries than with their allies.82
In the following chapters I will examine howmuch tiresome and unrewarding Nixon
and Kissinger reputed their contacts with European allies. Their perceptions of
the European countries as greedy and ungrateful group that was a really hard lot
to manage led them to assume a confrontational stance toward them. This stance
did not differ very much from the one they had previously assumed toward the
Communist powers.
82 Letter: Cromer to Greenhill, 19 January 1973, AMU 3/507/1, DBPO 3.4, doc. 14.
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Chapter 3
A “New Atlantic Charter” for a “new era of
creativity in the West”
In the previous chapters I have analyzed some of the consequences of the Year of
Europe speech and I have, subsequently, scrutinized the extent of the European
contribution to the genesis of said speech. My principal argument has been that a
significant fraction of the blame for the failure of the initiative resided on discordant
diplomatic approaches and procedures – not to mention the differing timing and
objectives – followed on the opposite shores of the Atlantic Ocean. In this and
the following chapter I will examine what led to the transatlantic row besides the
misperceptions and incomprehensions that characterized the initiative.
It is my contention that, in addition to the negative initial European reaction
when timing and methodology ruled the day, substantive differences were the main
factor in toppling every attempt – European or American – to deflate the diplomatic
crisis. For example, the Nixon Administration understanding of the concept of Eu-
ropean unity differed markedly from the European ones. Moreover, what did the At-
lantic Alliance represent? What was the role of Europe in the larger Alliance? Not
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to mention the cross-links between a unifying Western Europe, the defraying Euro-
pean support of U.S. foreign policy, the blooming superpower and inter-European
détente, and the inclusion of Japan – and possibly of China – in the anti-Soviet coali-
tion envisioned by Kissinger and Nixon. These substantial differences compounded
initially and gradually superseded the initial faux pas and were the driving forces in
heightening the controversy between Washington and European capitals during the
summer and the fall of 1973.
In his memoirs, Kissinger called it “The Year that Never Was.” He blamed his
own timing in launching the initiative, but also the cunning maneuvering of Jobert,
Heath’s coolness towards the “special relationship,” and German fears that addi-
tional coordination on the Atlantic level might doom Ostpolitik. These changed
European circumstances coalesced, in his view, with the Watergate scandal – “the
single most corrosive factor” – and with the Middle East October war in determin-
ing the course of transatlantic relations.1 Finally Kissinger admitted that the speech
itself was hastily written and apologized, more than once, to his European counter-
parts for his own failure in presenting to them a more detailed account of the speech
as a result of this supposed late drafting.2 He went so far as to confess to Jobert
on May 17, 1973, that he did not “finish writing it until Saturday". At the end of
the day he recognized some mistakes, but he saw them as just “tactical” ones and
he thought that they were precipitated by lack of time and preparation by reason of
other “preoccupations in America.”3
In summing up Kissinger’s explanations, one is gracefully chaperoned to the
seemingly logical conclusion that the entire venture came to naught because of con-
tingent problems and tactical errors. Conversely, I will try to demonstrate that many
of the substantive contents of the Year of Europe speech were rooted in Nixon’s
1 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 192–193.
2 Ibid.; Möckli, European Foreign Policy, p. 145.
3 Kissinger–Jobert meeting, 17 May 1973, DNSA, Doc. KT00728.
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and Kissinger’s defense, political, and economic understanding of Europe’s role in
the international architecture put forward by the United States. The “troubled part-
nership[s]” between Washington and European capitals were a fundamental part of
Nixon’s Grand Design.
I will, at first, analyze the parts of the speech that caused the biggest concerns in
Europe. Thereupon I will try to link the ideas subsumed by those parts of the speech
with Kissinger’s and Nixon’s writings and conversations regarding Europe up to the
eve of the public address on April 23. Were the contested parts the speech, and the
underlying ideas, linked of Europe’s role in the grand scheme of things envisioned
in the White House? I will try to demonstrate that the answer is positive and that, as
a consequence, the allegedly4 hasty nature of the drafting and the other contingent
problems singled out by Kissinger will loose much of their significance.
3.1 The speech
The speech on Europe was the first public speech that the President’s National Se-
curity Advisor gave on a substantive topic of this significance.5 Truth be told, orig-
inally it was to be delivered by Nixon himself, but he handed the assignment to
Kissinger instructing him cheerfully to “explain to Europe what we are all about.”6
Therefore he was not used at giving formal public speeches and, as Alistair Horne
puts it, “indeed, under another administration it was the kind of speech that might
have been expected from a secretary of state.”7
4 Gfeller demonstrates that this drafting was not so hasty after all: Gfeller, Building a European
Identity, p. 26.
5 Kissinger, Years of of Upheaval, pp. 151–152.
6 Marvin L. Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger. Little Brown, 1974, p. 428–429.
7 Horne, Kissinger, p. 108.
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The very initiative had been rekindled by the President after three months of
partial disinterest in furthering the idea of a Year of Europe, whatever the original
meaning this phrase carried. In the previous months even the planned presidential
trip to Europe had been put on halt, probably because he saw neither political advan-
tages nor the right atmosphere in Europe; he decided to wait for a more auspicious
moment.8 Jean Monnet, one of the famous founding fathers of the European Union,
wrote to William Rogers, the U.S. Secretary of State, to express his concerns about
transatlantic conficts, particularly those relating to commercial and monetary mat-
ters. On 22 January Rogers wrote to the President to express his and Monnet’s
concerns, but the letter was intercepted by Henry Kissinger’s staff and reached the
President’s desk only a month later.9
Kissinger’s consuming jealousy of Rogers had produced repeated threats of res-
ignation from the National Security Advisor.10 His emotional outbursts caused by
minor incidents, such as Rogers’s meeting with a foreign ambassador, had tragi-
comic overtones. Just a few months after taking office, Nixon had become so tired
of Kissinger’s rants about Rogers that he constituted a special “Henry-Handling
Committee.” Ehrlichman, Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman, and Attorney General
John Mitchell were supposed “to calm Kissinger and keep him on an even emo-
tional keel.”11 However Kissinger’s unrelenting stonewalling of Roger’s attempts
to play a role in foreign policy was succeeding.
On January 31, 1973, Nixon was asked during a press conference to spell out
what the administration meant with Year of Europe. His answer was grounded in
the fact that the completion of the “long and difficult war in Vietnam” was coming
8 Luke A. Nichter, Richard Nixon and Europe: The Reshaping of the Postwar Atlantic World. Cam-
bridge University Press, 2015, p. 111.
9 Ibid; Gfeller, Building a European Identity, pp. 22–23.
10 For example, Richard Reeves, President Nixon: Alone in the White House. Simon & Shuster,
2001, p. 302.
11 Keys, “Henry Kissinger” p. 588.
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to an end; this meant that the U.S. “must turn to the problems of Europe.” His
reasoning was the following: “We have been to the People’s Republic of China. We
have been to the Soviet Union,” and now the time was ripe for putting European
problems “on the front burner.” However he downplayed the frase “the Year of
Europe” which was a creation of the press to distract from important issues.12
I will shortly examine what was said in U.S. government circles since Septem-
ber 16, 1972, when the concept of Year of Europe first emerged during a press
conference in London when Kissinger raised the expectations of a Nixon’s visit in
Europe13 In the ensuing months the initiative was never really put on the “front
burner” and phased in and out of Nixon’s priorities.14 But before delving at depth
into the ideational and practical origins of the speech, I will examine its entirety
highlighting the parts that produced complaints, grumbles and outright criticism
from Europe. Kissinger’s speech was delivered before an influential audience of
senior media executives and the United States Informations Service broadcast the
address live to Europe to ensure maximum coverage.15
“This Year has been called the Year of Europe” started Kissinger “not because
Europe was less important in 1972 or in 1969,” but because “the era that was shaped
by decisions of a generation ago is ending.”16 Kissinger invoked the “new realities
that require new approaches.” He went on to reveal to his vast audience what those
“new realities” were:
• The revival of Western Europe thanks to “its movement toward economic
unification”;
12 Richard M. Nixon, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon, 1973:
Containing the Public Messages, Statements, and Speeches of the President. Government Printing
Office, 1975, p. 57.
13 Hamilton, DBPO, p 3; Nichter, Richard Nixon and Europe, p. 105;
14 For a late example that this was still British perception ad mid-February see, Minute: Overton to
Hankey, AMU 3/548/8, 12 February 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 25.
15 Hynes, The Year that Never Was, p. 103.
16 Mally, The new Europe and the United States, pp. 29–37.
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• The “near–equality” in the “East–West strategic military balance”;
• The growing importance of Japan; accordingly it ought to be included in all-
new “‘Atlantic’ solutions”;
• The flourishing of Détente was accompanied by a – to a certain extent unex-
pected – fallout of “new assertions of national identity and national rivalry”;
• “Unforeseen” problems like the one related to the energy supplies for indus-
trialized nations.
These remarks were, for the most part, widely accepted “realities” on both sides
of the Atlantic; In Kissinger’s view, their stacking up had inexorably produced “a
dramatic transformation of the psychological climate in the west.” In turn this trans-
formation had hatched a new generation in Europe and in the United States who
“takes stability for granted” and a new atmosphere in America characterized by a
“reluctance to sustain global involvements” due to “decades of global burdens” and
to the “frustrations of the war in Southeast Asia.”17
The solution Kissinger was looking for had glorious precedents in the forties
and in the fifties when “the West responded with courage and imagination.” That
same “courage and imagination” and more was acutely needed again, “the Atlantic
nations must join in a fresh act of creation” and “lay the basis for a new era of
creativity in the West.”18 The shared conviction of a dire need for reform casted an
auspicious light for Kissinger’s enterprise. Up to this point he had touched heartfelt
issues and, with all probability, European leaders thought that those problems had
to be dealt with. Aside from the ironic quip from Pompidou that for Europe “every
year was a year of Europe” for the Europeans,19 this part of Kissinger’s speech did
not arouse any significant controversy.
17 Ibid., p. 29–30.
18 Ibid.
19 Frank Costigliola, France and the United States: The Cold Alliance Since World War II. Twayne
Publishers, 1992, p. 174.
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In the following passage of the speech Kissinger described the kind of approach
that he and Nixon had in mind for solving those problems: “The political, military,
and economic issues in Atlantic relations are linked by reality, not by our choice
nor for the tactical purpose of trading one off against the other.”20 Unfortunately
for Kissinger, most of the Europeans did not see, or did not want to see, this self-
evident link between, for example, monetary stability and European nuclear safety.
The stubborn French, in particular, refused to face the proposed reality of linkage;
after all, they thought, there were many national and international approaches to
“political, military, and economic issues.” In fact, for them, Kissinger’s reality was
no reality at all. For the other European countries the problem of linkage was not
so existential, but they too were afraid that the U.S. wanted to use the security
commitments as a way to exact economic concessions from the Europe. Were the
Europeans right in their assessment of U.S. hidden agendas? Or was Kissinger
telling the truth about American intentions?
Kissinger added in the subsequent segment of the speech that it was his and the
President’s intention for these problems to be discussed and solved “at the highest
level” and not “left to technicians.”21 This phraseology was not meant to appeal to
all those “technicians,” who had worked for years on those same issues in national
bureaucracies or in the relevant international forums, like the IMF, the OECD, or
NATO.
Then Kissinger gave what was perceived by some analysts as un ultimatum: “by
the time the President travels to Europe toward the end of the Year” there had to be
completed a “new Atlantic charter setting the goals for the future.”22 This portion
showed a distinct lack of political awareness on dealings with Western European
countries. Kissinger had been warned by the British that setting deadlines would
20 Emphasis mine, Ibid., p. 31.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
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not have helped him in achieving a political compromise with countries that were
so diverse, some of them members of NATO, some members of the EC, and others
members of none.23
The part of the speech that produced a sort of allergic reaction from Europe was
nested inside the successive section. Kissinger identified the principal problems that
plagued the Atlantic Alliance. He decided to explain them separately in spite of the
link provided by reality:
• “In economic relations” he identified the “regional personality” of the Euro-
pean Community against the international trade and monetary responsibilities
of the United States;
• In defense matters he was convinced that they were “organized on the princi-
ple of unity and integration,” but he pointed at the “radically different strategic
conditions,” whose implications were yet not clear;
• He observed that diplomacy was still being conducted essentially by “tradi-
tional nation–states.”
But then he asked for trouble adding that “The U.S. has global interests and respon-
sibilities. Our European allies have regional interests.”24 It is really difficult to
understand how such a statement could end up on a speech directed toward Euro-
pean leaders “at the highest level”. If this was Kissinger’s and Nixon’s opinion of
Europe’s role in their Grand Scheme is not my focus in this context. The answer to
whether it slipped through or if it landed there intentionally offers more insights on
the administration’s working on the initiative. I think it was a real misstep because
it had a very high probability of incensing the European, particularly the Gaullist
spirit of France. For the sake of clarity I will anticipate one of the conclusions of
the following two chapters: the above depicted role for Europe was the one that
23 For example, Washington diplomatic report 180/73, AMU 3/548/3, 22 February 1973, DBPO 3.4,
doc. 29.
24 Ibid.
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Kissinger and Nixon had in mind for the international architecture that they were
devising. Therefore, in my opinion, the statement sneaked into the speech because it
was so an ingrained notion in Washington that its presence did not ring any alarming
bells.
A consistent portion of the speech was dedicated to the Administration’s “agenda
for the future.” Once more, some of the arguments contained in this segment con-
tained further seeds for future discords. European “special arrangements” with other
countries in Europe, in the Mediterranean basin, and in Africa were leading, in
Kissinger’s view, to a “closed trading system” that appeared to be “at the expense
of the United States.” This, Kissinger explained, had had consequences on U.S.
commitment to a unifying Europe:
The United States will continue to support the unification of Europe.
We have no intention of destroying what we worked so hard to help
build. For us European unity is what it has always been – not an end
in itself but a means of strengthening of the West. We shall continue
to support European unity as a component of a larger Atlantic partner-
ship.25
This assertion led to diverging interpretations on the European side. Some favor-
able listeners heard a pledge to a continued support of the process of European
unification and the assurance that the sort of “economic rivalry,” that had repeatedly
festered the relations between the nations that comprised Free World, would have
been henceforth avoided. At the same time, others were disturbed by the concomi-
tant caveats that were a bitter pill to swallow for many committed Europeans.
Kissinger expressed very clearly Nixon’s opposition to “unilateral withdrawals
of U.S. forces from Europe,” but underlined that the burdens were to be shared eq-
uitably. Finally, on diplomacy, he explained the détente was still one of the main
25 Ibid., p. 33.
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objectives of the US. Détente’s success “had created its own problems,” particularly
in regards to European fears of superpower condominium. This underlined “the
necessity to articulate a clear set of common objectives” because, as Kissinger ex-
plained, “the perception of common interests is not automatic; it requires constant
redefinition.”26
In the closing remarks of his speech Kissinger summarized “America’s contri-
bution” to the sustaining of the Alliance, stressing that the entire Year of Europe
exercise was not meant as an “American prescription,” but as an “appeal for a joint
effort of creativity” which encompassed such diverse things as:
• Support for European unity, but requiring to “be met in a spirit of reciprocity”;
• No U.S. unilateral troop withdrawals, but demanding “from each ally a fair
share of the common effort for the common defense”;
• A continued construction of détente with, wherever possibile, the contribution
of America’s allies;
• The administration’s assurance that the United States would never consciously
hurt European interests;
• The inclusion of Japan into a geographically enhanced “Atlantic Community.”
Once again Kissinger casted an admired eye to the examples offered by the past,
like the Atlantic Charter, and to the possibility of “match[ing] and dwarf[ing] them”
in the future.27
26 Ibid., pp. 34–36.
27 Ibid., pp. 36-37.
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3.2 Kissinger’s Vision
With a close scrutiny of some of the hidden or implied assumptions of Kissinger’s
speech, I will summarize Kissinger’s vision and draw an outline of the kind of
transatlantic bargain he set forth on April 23. Europeans would have to recognize
that military, political and economic issues were “linked by reality” and, accord-
ingly, had to be approached comprehensively; these issues were not to be left to
“technicians,” but addressed “at the highest level”; Japan ought to be a member of
the enterprise; European interests were “regional,” whereas U.S. had “global inter-
ests and responsibilities” which could be different from the European ones; what
is more, European unity was “a means to the strengthening of the West” and “com-
ponent of a larger Atlantic partnership.” Every concession bestowed to Europe by
the Nixon administration had to be met in a “spirit of reciprocity.” Lastly, the U.S.
would not withdraw forces from Europe, provided a fairer distribution of the defense
burden.28
This was a very ambitious initiative. It rhymed with the Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
and Winston Churchill’s “Atlantic Charter”; as the latter defined key principles for
a new post–war order, the initiative called for a comprehensive overhaul of Atlantic
relations. It combined some policy-specific proposals with an ideational aspect of
reinvigorating the Alliance. In a fit of hyperbole James Reston wrote the following
day on the The New York Times that the speech deliberately resembled George Mar-
shall’s June 1947 commencement address at Harvard University that had launched
the deliberations leading to the Marshall Plan.29 Kissinger reinforced this interpre-
28 Ibid., pp. 29-37.
29 James Reston, “A Plea for Partnership; Kissinger, Like Marshall 26 Years Ago, Asks Mutual
Efforts on Mutual Issues.” In: The New York Times, 24 April 1973. See also the autobiography
from Martin Joseph Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time: Memoirs of a Diplomat. University of
Georgia Press, 1998, pp. 330–332.
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tation by affirming in his memoirs that he had been inspired directly by the Marshall
Plan in concocting the Year of Europe.30
Interestingly, the speech comprised no procedural ideas as to how to approach
this complex exercise. Once more it appeared, perhaps as another deliberate attempt
to emulate the former U.S. Secretary George Marshall, Kissinger seemed to leave
it to the Europeans to devise and organize the procedures. In Pompidou’s unmistak-
ably ironic undertones toward Kissinger’s quandary was one of the best depictions
of the problems posed by a brainchild of this magnitude: “Conception is more fun
than giving birth.”31
It is worth noticing that some British and French officials suspected immediately
of the U.S. administration’s difficulties in understanding the enormous procedural
challenges that confronted the Europeans in trying to comply with such an encom-
passing overhaul of the transatlantic relations. Economic and defense issues were
treated in separate institutions, with eight of the thirteen European NATO allies be-
longing to the EC and one EC member, Ireland, being neutral. Also the European
Commission represented the Community in trade matters, which is why it was later
involved in the Year of Europe.32
Finally there was nowhere to be found in the speech any reference to Europe’s
new political aspirations. There was no mention of the recent October 1972 Paris
Summit and its declared goal of a European Union, or of the EPC and the linked
attempt to harmonize their diverse foreign policies through EPC’s new procedures.
Kissinger identified as the source of problems in the Atlantic relations only the
autonomous détente policies, probably referring to German Ostpolitk and French–
Soviet bilateralism, completely ignoring, for example, the CSCE that was so mean-
30 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 193.
31 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p. 605.
32 See chapter 5.
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ingless in his hard-power grounded “realism” that “they can write it in Swahili.”33
Such American ignorance of, or disregard for, the enlarged Europe’s pursuit of a
political identity – and the included procedures – became one of the major reasons
the Year of Europe evolved so differently from what Kissinger had envisaged.34
3.3 The U.S. origins of the Year of Europe
Was there a clear endgame in Nixon’s and Kissinger’s Year of Europe? The renewed
focus on Europe was felt as necessary after the overhaul of the international archi-
tecture during the previous years. Initiatives as diverse as the opening to China,
the MBFR and the SALT talks, were admired and feared in Europe. Some coun-
tries, France in particular, pursued actively policies that run against MBFR and
SALT because of growing fears of condominium.35 Many felt that Europe’s secu-
rity, provided as it was mainly by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, was rapidly dwindling.
Therefore the rekindling of U.S.–European relations was a welcome change.36
But what were the expectations in Washington? As is normally the case with
human issues, different people held contrasting views even within the small group
that led American foreign policy during the Nixon-Kissinger era. My aim will be to
33 Jussi M. Hanhimäki, “‘They Can Write it in Swahili?: Kissinger, the Soviets, and the Helsinki
Accords, 1973?75.” In: Journal of Transatlantic Studies 1.1 (2003), pp. 37?58.
34 For a similar interpretation see Möckli, European Foreign Policy, p. 145.
35 Nils Bertel Einar Andrén and Karl Edvard Birnbaum, Beyond Détente: Prospects for East-West
Co-operation and Security in Europe. BRILL, 1976, p. 27; Geir Lundestad, The United States
and Western Europe Since 1945: From “Empire” by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2003, chapter 6; Georges Henri-Soutou, “The linkage between European integration
and détente: the contrasting approaches of de Gaulle and Pompidou, 1965 to 1974.” In: Piers N.
Ludlow, European Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik–Westpolitik, 1965-1973. Routledge,
2007, p. 24; Ennio di Nolfo, Storia delle relazioni internazionali: Dal 1918 ai giorni nostri.
Laterza, 2008, pp. 1195–1211.
36 Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect, pp. 275–276; Hanhimäki, The Rise and Fall of Détente, p. ;
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determine Nixon’s and Kissinger’s position on American–European relations given
of their strong hold on the management of the foreign policy of the United States.37
Moreover it was their personal gumption and taste that drove almost entirely the
Year of Europe.38 Was it simply a ploy against the mounting pressure of the Wa-
tergate scandal? The sacking of Haldeman and Ehrlichman for their involvement
in the Watergate affair was only a week away, in the closing days of April 1973.
Or was it economics, ideology, or same sort of imperial grand design that deter-
mined the administration’s stance? In the last chapter the views held by Kissinger
and Nixon will be compared with the French and British analysis of U.S. intentions.
Were those analysis right in assessments of U.S. motives? Were their fears of hid-
den traps to European unity itself grounded on sound readings of American strategic
objectives?
3.3.1 Ideology and left-leaning Europe
In a March 10 draft memorandum to Kissinger, while discussing on the transition
from the post-war generation to the new one described by Kissinger his April 23
speech, Nixon wrote:
The way the Europeans are talking today, European unity will not be
in our interest, certainly not from a political viewpoint or from an eco-
nomic viewpoint. When we used to talk about European unity, we were
thinking in terms of the men who would be at the top of Europe who
would be in control. Those men were people that we could get along
with. Today, however, when we talk of European unity, and when we
look far ahead, we have to recognize the stark fact that a united Eu-
37 William P. Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency. I.B.
Tauris, 1998, p. xiii and chapter 10.
38 Particularly notable in the last days before the speech, see chapter 4.
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rope will be led primarily by Left-leaning or Socialist heads of govern-
ment.39
On another occasion, while speaking to his advisors he illustrated the problems that
plagued Europe:
But here, but here they [the Europeans] are, all of them now forced in a
very – a lurch to the Left, also, in all of these countries. The Germans
are already socialists, or at least have a soclalist-leaning government.
The French may damn well get one this weekend.40 The Italians, of
course, are being hit by the socialists. The British would be if they
had an election today, but fortunately, their Labour government, the
socialists, are so goddamn divided, and Heath is a decent fellow that he
stands on.41
Europe’s supposed drift to the left was thus identified by Nixon as one of the main
problems. Was this ideological rift with left-leaning Europeans that led to a wors-
ening of U.S.–European relations, at least in Nixon’s perception? Offering a purely
ideological interpretation for the actions and the analyses of the Administration that
produced the about face with China, one of the most important Communist powers,
during the “week that changed the world” is complicated.42 So profound was that
change in foreign policy toward China that, during the first days of 1973, Kissinger
wrote to Nixon that, regarding the relation with China, “in plain terms we have
now become tacit allies.”43 Nevertheless the words written and spoken by President
Nixon reinforce the idea that, for him at least, the perceived European “lurch to
the Left” had very strong policy implications for the United States. So important
39 See the note 2 in: Address by Kissinger, 23 April 1973, FRUS 38.1, p. 24.
40 National elections were held in France on March 4 and 11.
41 Conversation Between Nixon, Burns, Ash, Stein, and Volcker, 3 March 1973. In: Kathleen B.
Rasmussen ed. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume 31: Foreign Economic
Policy, 1973–1976. Government Printing Office, 2014, (Hereafter FRUS 31), p. 68.
42 Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect, pp. 185–187, 196–200.
43 Emphasis in the original, Kissinger to Nixon, 2 March 1973, FRUS 38.1, p. 7.
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was this fact in his view, that he was not sure that he started to doubt the merits of
European unity tout court.
Nixon was not alone in using Cold War and ideological lens in his approach
toward European partners. Some historians have highlighted Kissinger’s rigidly
bipolar perception of the international system; this perception, in their view, has
informed his approach to allies and enemies alike.44 As for Kissinger himself, he
wrote in 1968 that the transition toward a multipolar world was in the best interest
of the United States because bipolarity encouraged rigidity:
A bipolar world loses the perspective for nuance; a gain for one side
appears as an absolute loss for the other. Every issue seems to involve
a question for survival. The smaller countries are torn between a de-
sire for protection and a wish to escape big–power dominance. Each
of the superpowers is beset by the desire to maintain its preeminence
among its allies, to increase its influence among the uncommitted, and
to enhance it security vis-à-vis its opponent.
In a multipolar world the “Rigidity is diminished, but so is manageability.” Fi-
nally, in a multipolar system would provide greater opportunities for working out a
shared concept of international order with the additional built-in degree of “natural”
or “organic” balance not present in a bipolar system. “A more pluralistic world,”
Kissinger concluded, “is profoundly in our long-term interests.”45 Was Kissinger
rigidly bipolar or was he in favor of a multipolar world?
What emerges from this differing interpretations is, yet again, a conflict be-
tween Kissinger the scholar and Kissinger the National Security Advisor. The latter
44 For example, Del Pero, The Eccentric Realist, pp. 96, 149; Robert S. Litwak, Détente and the
Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969-1976. Cambridge
University Press, 1986, pp. 83–84; Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect, pp. xviii–xix, 49, 303–304.
45 In Henry Kissinger, American foreign policy: three essays. A. H. Wheeler, 1971, pp. 56-59; see
also Jeremi Suri, Henry Kissinger, chapter 2, 4; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A
Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War. Oxford University
Press, 2005, pp. 279–280; Alex Roberto Hybel, Ideology in World Politics. Routledge, 2013, p.
161.
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emerged as more and more dualistic in his dealings with the international system.
In her fresh approach to Kissinger’s strategy and worldview, Barbara Keys states
that:
Kissinger embraced triangular diplomacy and Nixon’s opening to China
– and indeed was personally drawn to Zhou Enlai – but his worldview
remained rigidly hierarchical, with the two nuclear giants firmly at the
top. [...]
Kissinger’s prioritization of U.S.–Soviet relations arose from intel-
lectual predispositions and cognitive assessments of the balance of pow-
er, but it also had strong emotional roots that derived from Kissinger’s
complex and multifaceted friendship with [the Soviet ambassador, Ana-
toly] Dobrynin. The affection and trust that sprang from his personal
feelings about the Soviet emissary shaped Kissinger’s perceptions of
the Soviet Union, leading him to overestimate the overlap of interests
between the two countries and to exaggerate Moscow’s interests in help-
ing the United States with its intractable problems.
And she concludes saying that the “ease and habit of this relationship, and the prac-
tical and emotional benefits it brought, reinforced Kissinger’s inclinations to see
the U.S–Soviet relationship as his primary focus in foreign affairs.”46 Kissinger the
National Security Advisor become, thus, more rigidly bipolar as a combination of
ideology and personal friendship. This rigidity transferred to his dealings with the
rest of the world skewering his understanding of many local conflicts, for example,
in Chile,47 Portugal,48 and in Europe in general.49
46 Keys, “Henry Kissinger,” pp. 602–603.
47 Tanya Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War. University of North Carolina
Press, 2011.
48 Mario Del Pero, “The United States and the Crises in Southern Europe.” In: Antonio Varsori and
Guia Migani, eds. Europe in the International Arena during the 1970s. P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2011,
pp. 301–316; Mario del Pero, “I limiti della distensione: gli Stati Uniti e l’implosione del regime
portoghese.” In: Antonio Varsori, ed. Alle origini del presente: L’Europa occidentale nella crisi
degli anni settanta. Franco Angeli, 2007, pp. 39–66.
49 Luke A. Richter, “Nixon and Europe: Transatlantic Policy in the Shadow of Other Priorities” In:
Melvin Small, ed, A Companion to Richard Nixon. Wiley, 2011, pp. 444–459.
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3.3.2 What role for the United States?
The main problem with the Europeans was not ideological though. The ideological
prism compounded several other problems with the European allies. First of all
there was the strong feeling in Nixon and Kissinger that they were alone agains
a new wave of isolationism in the US. On February 15, while talking to General
Andrew J. Goodpaster, the Supreme Allied Commander in the Oval Office, Nixon
was very afraid of the consequences of Vietnam in the relationship with Europe:
The United States at the present time, after going through Vietnam,
will hear, understandably, voices raised, very sincere voices, that ‘Af-
ter Vietnam, let’s throw up our hands, turn inward, and withdraw from
our obligations in the world’.
This was unacceptable in Nixon’s view. They had to “demonstrate” that the U.S.
were a “dependable ally” because all “the power in the world lodged in the United
States means nothing [...] unless there is some assurance, some confidence, some
trust that the United States will be credible, will be dependable.”50
After the reporters departed Nixon and Goodpaster continued their conversa-
tion on the allied relationship. Nixon, still furious with Europeans criticism on
the Christmas bombing on Vietnam, commented:
The President said that the U.S. always turns the other cheek, but in
this case, what had been an alliance of interest and friendship is now
just an alliance of interest. [...] We will not bear grudges, but when an
ally is so presumptuous that it attacks us without waiting, for its own
political purposes, we will henceforth base our relationship solely on
the national interest, not on friendship.51
50 Nixon, Public Papers, 1973, p. 103.
51 Emphasis mine, Editorial Note, FRUS 38.1, p. 4.
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And completely rejecting the domino theory he once again explained that “Vietnam
was important not for itself but because of what it demonstrated in terms of support
for our friends and allies and in terms of showing our will to our enemies.”52 What
all of this meant was that the international role of the United States was fundamental
in the world order Nixon had in mind, not for the fear of the spread of Communism,
but because a forceful and important role helped build solid relationship with U.S.
allies.
Kissinger shared this idea. For example writing to Nixon on U.S. relations with
China he stressed there was a need for a “strong American world role.” If the U.S.
were to “withdraw from the world” they would be “useless to Peking as a counter-
weight to Moscow.”53 The need for the primacy of the United States on the military
and diplomatic field was widely shared in internal analysis of the administration, as
Nixon put it:
The day the U.S. ceases to be a formidable defense and diplomatic
power, economics will not be enough to hold it together. [...] We must
inform the country that having ended the war and with our new initia-
tives in China and the Soviet Union, this is the time for the U.S. to
continue to play a forceful role in the world – militarily, economically
and diplomatically. [...]
With the Vietnam war over, we must inspire the American spirit and
accept the role of world leadership. [...] Let’s not let the impression get
around that now that we have gotten out of Vietnam, let’s get out of the
world. [...]54
In the end what Nixon wanted was a world role for the U.S. but “a different world
role. We can’t call all the shots; we can’t dominate; but, we can’t let the world be
shaped in a way that would be counter to our interests.” This was why they wanted
52 Ibid., p. 6.
53 Kissinger to Nixon, 2 March 1973, FRUS 38.1, pp. 7, 12.
54 Memorandum for the President, 6 March 1973, FRUS 38.1, p. 14.
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a say in internal European decisions as we will see in the fourth chapter.55
We can conclude that both Nixon and Kissinger thought that a leading role in
diplomatic, military and economy of the United States was the backbone of main-
taining strong alliances. This strong role had to be pursued despite strong opposition
at home. For the United States to remain the leading actor in diplomacy and mili-
tary issues they had in mind a forceful diplomacy toward allies and enemies alike.
It was not their intention to disrupt transatlantic relations, but their secretive style
of diplomacy, almost entirely centered on hard power, lacked completely in finesse.
It helped them in revolutionizing U.S. relationships with Communist powers, but it
made a mess of diplomatic relations with Western European countries.
3.3.3 Modified confrontation
Beyond ideology and diplomacy there was economy. In his recent assessment on
transatlantic economic conflicts, particularly in relation to France, the historian Tra-
chtenberg concludes that economic frictions were not at the core of the souring of
French–U.S. relations and that “the real problem lay elsewhere.”56 Despite his strin-
gent argument I find this conclusion hard to accept. Firstly, even though the U.S. and
French leaders told each other that the economic problems were “easy to solve,”57
they created an “increasingly poisonous atmosphere”58 that informed the analysis
on each other’s actions on both parts of the Atlantic. Furthermore the forceful diplo-
macy that the U.S. had in mind toward Europe easily extended to economics leading
to the feared “one ball of wax approach.”
55 Ibid.
56 Trachtenberg, “The French Factor,” p. 24.
57 Pompidou–Nixon Meeting, 31 May 1973, DNSA, Doc. KT00742.
58 Costigliola, France and the United States, p. 173.
In the Nixon administration the view that the European Community was becom-
ing more and more an economic adversary became stronger with each passing year.
It was not anymore the time of spirited economic nationalism inspired by the Texan
John Connally, previous secretary of the treasury, whose basic claim was that “for-
eigners are out to screw us [...] Our job is to screw them first.”59 The words were
not so loaded anymore, but this strictly nationalistic policy had not been submitted
to a radical change.
In a meeting on September 1972 on economic and trade issues relating to West-
ern Europe, Peter M. Flanigan, President Nixon’s Assistant for International Eco-
nomic Affairs, explained the basic feeling toward the building Community. In his
view, the “atmosphere has been one in which the U.S. has been engaged in a grow-
ing sense of confrontation with the EC.” He felt that things could easily escalate. He
started by identifying three problems: the common external tariff; EC preferential
arrangements with third countries; the use of U.S. own tariffs through GATT. Then
he explained the four options that the U.S. had in dealing with CE:
• “Downplay confrontations and concentrate on a few things that we can solve
such as a standard code for products.”
• “Atlantic cooperation approach. Under this we would lay the groundwork in
the economic and political area for a possible major political initiative next
year. [...] We would ease off of confrontations which are harmful to the
climate and avoid rocking the boat, but this would allow current actions by
the EC against our trade interests to proceed unchecked.”
• “Modified confrontation. Continue to defend interests strongly and bring
many problems to a head but stop short of bringing issues to a GATT vote,
59 Quoted in William H. Becker, “The United States and the Search for a New Economic and Mon-
etary System in the 1970s.” In: Helga Haftendorn, ed. The Strategic Triangle: France, Germany,
and the United States in the Shaping of the New Europe. John Hopkins University Press and
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006, p. 199; see also Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston, eds.
Nixon in the World : American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977. Oxford University Press, 2008, p.
298.
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which we would probably lose. [...] We would press for solution of some
issues even at the risk of damaging relations.”
• “Precipitate a crisis. This is based on the premise that meaningful solutions
cannot be reached unless there is an atmosphere of impending crisis. This
would obviously bring us into major confrontation with the EC and spill
over into other aspects of our relationship if we cannot get the solutions we
want.”60
Given this basic options which was the preferred option that the U.S. intended to pur-
sue? In Flanigan’s view, during “interagency discussions all parties felt we should
vigorously promote U.S. interests,” for some, even “to the point of confrontation.”
The feeling that was shared by everyone was that “this should be developed as part
of a broader US-European relationship.”61 Here lay some of the ideas that would
later give birth to the Year of Europe initiative.
The President himself was not very clear on where the nationalists ruled the day:
Nationalism in Europe is stronger than nationalism in the U.S. and it is
damned strong here. They enjoy kicking the U.S. around. Eighty-eight
percent of all the European media is violently anti-US. They will cut
their own throats economically to take us on politically. We cannot get
a very liberal trade program through the US. On these issues our people
are very nationalistic.62
He added that thay needed “to consider possible Congressional reaction to [their]
failure to press [their] trade interests. Nationalist pressures are strong pressures in
Congress.”63 Finally, with the election coming Nixon thought wise to “let there be
60 Memorandum of Conversation, 11 September 1972. In: Bruce F. Duncombe, ed. Foreign Rela-
tions of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume 3: Foreign Economic Policy; International Mone-
tary Policy, 1969–1972. Government Printing Office, 2001, (Hereafter FRUS 3), epub file, doc.
100, par. 110.3–110.12.
61 Ibid., par. 110.13.
62 Ibid., par. 110.20.
63 Ibid., par. 110.22.
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no doubt” that U.S. position was “one of protectionism.”64
But these were not the only measures that the U.S. had in mind. European com-
petition was becoming stronger in fields where the U.S. had a strong comparative
advantage like the computer and aerospace industry. The “EC effort to subsidize par-
ticular industries or develop high technology industries” should be resisted “through
preferential arrangements.” While dividing the Europeans through these preferen-
tial agreements was the first step, the second one involved trade issues which “will
have to be related to larger issues including our military relationship. They need to
be played at the Presidential level. If they fear we will abandon our military sup-
port, it will affect the way they deal on trade matters.”65 This explains the parts of
Kissinger’s speech where he repeatedly spoke about solving the transatlantic prob-
lems at “the highest level” and there was a very clear intent of playing military
against economics.
Nixon had to decide which approach they should take with the Europeans. He
summarized his views in a very long monologue in which it was possible to observe
the seeds of the entire Year of Europe idea:
However, more is involved here than just questions of ‘horse-trading’
between soybeans and cheese. The question is what Europe wants its
position to be vis-a-vis the U.S. and the Soviet Union. We hear about
Finlandization of Europe. [...] The idea that Europe can defend itself
without the U.S. is ‘bull’. If NATO comes apart, they will be an eco-
nomic giant but a military and political pigmy. The USSRwill encroach
on them. It will not be in the traditional way but a new-style invasion.
European leaders are terrified at that prospect. European leaders want
to ‘screw’ us and we want to ‘screw’ them in the economic area. But
political relationships should be overriding for us and for them. [...] We
should not allow the umbilical cord between the U.S. and Europe to be
cut and Europe to be nibbled away by the Soviets. [...]
64 Ibid., par. 110.25.
65 Ibid., par. 110.28–110.29.
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The President was sure that all “non-Communist countries in Europe do not want to
come under that influence.” He thought that the Europeans knew very well that the
divisions and the nuclear umbrella of the United States could be very easily removed
from Washington. At the same time though, Nixon added “it is definitely not in our
interest to do so.” He recognized that “the foreigners are doing bad things to us
and we should do some bad things to them. But we must be under no illusions. We
cannot turn isolationist in the broader context.”66 This political analysis was exactly
what the French, since de Gaulle had thought: it was in the U.S. interest to stay in
Europe for political reasons. It was for this reason that many French politicians did
not feel the need to answer to U.S. calls for burden-sharing.
Nixon analysis was not limited to military and nuclear questions; it extended to
trade, but again, his political lens informed his view of the relations with Europe:
If we were only looking at trade, we could get along without the Euro-
peans or the rest of the world since trade is much less important to our
GNP than to theirs. [...] Trade is important politically. [...]
Our interests are served by being as tough as we can without going
over the line where anti-U.S. sentiment will cause them to turn against
us and break with us. The Europeans recognize that they do not matter
in the world any more. They know it. Economic issues are the things
they now concentrate on. They are big for them and small for us. [...]
The whole area of our economic relations affects our leverage posi-
tion in the world. In the future our relations will have a larger economic
content. This will require more subtlety in the way we conduct our over-
all relations. We are best to play this game. We are the strongest.67
For him therefore the economic matters were important only in their reference to
the political questions. In fact Nixon later examined the political question of the Eu-
ropean unification. He thought that the idea of a unified Europe did not have many
66 Ibid., par. 110.30–110.34.
67 Ibid., par. 110.35–110.36.
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realistic chances to succeed because “they will have one hell of a time acting as a
bloc.” For him, the Europeans “do not get along with each other. The French don’t
get along with the Germans, the Germans don’t get along with the British. It will be
some time before they can learn to act as a group. This means we have to work with
the heads of Government in the various countries and not that jackass [presumably
a reference to EC President Sicco Mansholt] in the European Commission in Brus-
sels.”68 Dealing with the Europeans bilaterally was not, at this point, a deliberate
choice to weaken European unity for Nixon. It was just because it was much bet-
ter than working with that “jackass” at the head of the European Commission and
because it suited better Nixon’s understanding of European reality.
In the concluding part of the meeting the Secretary of Commerce, Peterson en-
quired if they could “get something in the economic area by using political-security
leverage,” Nixon’s lapidary answer was “Yes.”69 Nixon’s policy choice was one
of “modified confrontation,” “bearing in mind the overriding importance of our po-
litical relations with Europe and that our trade problems must be resolved in the
context of larger policy considerations.”70
The policy set out by Nixon was followed closely as Flanigan reported to Nixon
on October 11, 1972. U.S. position during the annual US–EC consultations was to
“keep maximum pressure on the Community in respect to U.S. economic interests,
short of creating an irresolvable confrontation.” Flanigan was convinced that the
“current membership of the Commission is clearly dedicated to a course of action
contrary to the U.S. economic interest” and that while “paying lip service to the im-
portance of Atlantic unity, specific decisions are resolved in favor of the Community
and contrary to the interests of the United States.”71
68 Ibid., par. 110.40.
69 Ibid., par. 110.42–110.43.
70 Flanigan to Eberle, 12 September 1972, FRUS 3, doc. 101, par. 111.2.
71 Flanigan to Nixon, 11 October 1972, FRUS 3, doc. 102, par. 113.2–113.6.
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The views held by Flanigan were not the only ones presented in Washington.
Five days after his report Kissinger received a more nuanced view of the European
Commission and of Western European governments:
We believe Flanigan’s view of European attitudes is oversimplified.
There are plenty of people in Europe, if not in the Commission then
in top spots in various Western Governments, of whom it cannot be
fairly said that they are ‘determined to maximize economic potential
regardless of the cost to the U.S. and the Atlantic system.’ There are on
both sides of the Atlantic important and senior leaders and officials who
are eager to find a way to manage our admitted economic problems in
ways that will not destroy those common interests we share.
With all probability there were many officials who held softer views on the transat-
lantic relations in the United States and in Europe. Unfortunately the troublesome
economic conflicts hampered the build-up of mutual trust and of a cooperative at-
mosphere. Another monetary crisis hit at the beginning of 1973, while the Year of
Europe was taking its final form.
In this chapter I showed how some of the most aggressive ideas in Washington
regarding U.S. stance toward Europe – “modified confrontation” was not very far
from “precipitate a crisis” – composed the basis of the successive Year of Europe.
Nonetheless nothing was set in stone. Other options were open to the Nixon Admin-
istration. In the next chapter I will examine the economic events that shaped U.S.
and EC relations at the beginning of 1973. Why the most confrontational views be-
came the official Nixon Administration policy in dealing with Europe? While both
parts did not perceive economic frictions as fundamental in transatlantic relations,
yet those frictions had the a profound impact in forging respective perceptions and
reactions.
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Chapter 4
Monetary troubles
The monetary questions had been at the center of many debates between the Eu-
ropeans and in transatlantic fora. The Europeans had differing opinions in matters
regarding the flexibility of exchange rates and the dollar convertibility in gold which
had been abolished since the Nixon shocks of August 15, 1971. Generally speaking
the Europeans, and France in particular, were more at ease with a system a fixed
– or at least “adjustable,” as they were called for a time – exchange rates and with
the dollar convertibility. It was almost dogma in some European sectors that fixed
exchange rates and dollar convertibility were the best antidotes against monetary
instabilities.
During their encounter at the Azores on December 13–14, 1971, Nixon and Pom-
pidou agreed to a new system of fixed exchange rates and the U.S. promised to re-
store the convertibility of gold. The Smithsonian Agreement of the G–10 of Decem-
ber 18, 1971, which was supposed to implement the Azores decisions, did set new
exchange rates. The dollar was devalued by 7.9 percent, the pound and the franc
retained their old value and were, in fact, revalued by 8.57 percent with respect to
the dollar, the mark was revalued by 13.58 percent and stopped floating, and the
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yen was revalued by 16.88 percent. But the dollar remained non convertibile and
the Americans made no promise to defend the dollar at the new level.1
Indeed, it followed that the maintenance of that new exchange rate depended on
the willingness of central banks outside of the United States to accumulate unlimited
quantities of dollars. It was like there was no Smithsonian Agreement. Floating the
dollar was inevitable, for if the dollar was not convertible into gold, its devaluation
with respect to gold no longer had any meaning. When the pound was floated
starting from June 1972 it became apparent to everyone the limited value of the
Smithsonian Agreement.
A new monetary crisis erupted in February 1973 and led to an additional devalu-
ation by 10 percent of the dollar. This led in turn to the March 16 historic decision
to allow European currencies to float jointly against the dollar. The Bretton Wood
system had thus been effectively abandoned before the official Jamaica Conference
in January 1976. Freed from the constraints imposed by a system of fixed exchange
rates, the United States could henceforth allow the dollar to move in accordance
with America’s commercial interests; at the same time, the United States would
benefit from the fact that the dollar would continue to serve as a transnational cur-
rency, and that meant that the chronic U.S. payments deficit could continue, and
1 For this and the following paragraphs see, for example, Barry Eichengreen, The European Econ-
omy Since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond. Princeton University Press, 2007; Duccio
Basosi, Il governo del dollaro; Thomas W. Zeiler, “Opening Doors in the World Economy.” In:
Akira Iriye, ed. Global Interdependence: The World after 1945, Harvard University Press, 2014,
pp. 203–361; William Glenn Gray, “Floating the System: Germany, the United States, and the
Breakdown of Bretton Woods, 1969–1973.” In: Diplomatic History 31.2 (2007), pp. 295–323;
Daniel Sargent, “The Cold War and the international political economy in the 1970s.” In: Cold
War History 13.3 (2013), pp. 393–425; Duccio Basosi, “The US, Western Europe and a Changing
Monetary System.” In: Antonio Varsori and Guia Migani, eds. Europe in the International Arena
during the 1970s. P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2011, pp. 99–116; Richard N. Cooper, “Economic aspects of
the Cold War, 1962–1975.” In: Melvyn P. Leffler, Odd Arne Westad, eds. The Cambridge History
of the Cold War: Volume 2, Crises and Détente. Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 44–64;
Giovanni Arrighi, “The world economy and the Cold War, 1970–1990.” In: Melvyn P. Leffler,
Odd Arne Westad, eds. The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume 3, Endings. Cambridge
University Press, 2010, pp. 23–44.
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even that U.S. capital exports did not have to be limited. This represented a major
shift in the policy the Americans had followed since 1947: from this point on, the
strictly national interests of the the United States, in a very basic area, were now
more important than America’s responsibilities as a leader of the Free World.
In the following pages I will examine the political consequences of the monetary
crisis of February 1973. In the previous chapter I outlined some of the basic Wash-
ington feelings toward Europe. Nevertheless, many choices were available to the
Nixon Administration in its dealings with the transatlantic allies. My thesis is that
the European collective reaction to the monetary crisis defined the actual contents
of the Year of Europe speech. All started with the letter that Brandt sent to Nixon
at the beginning of March 1973. This letter was the spark for the U.S. response and
for Kissinger’s decision to start the collective search for a “new Atlantic Charter.”
My second argument is that it was not meant as a ploy to distract from the Wa-
tergate crisis because Nixon hoped to put it rapidly behind and didn’t think it would
blow to uncontrollable levels.2 On April 30 Nixon went went on national radio
and television to deliver his first Watergate speech. Nixon was convinced, after that
speech, that he had “at last and once and for all” put Watergate behind him as a
“nagging national issue.”3 The Year of Europe initiative had therefore the actual
meaning that Kissinger assigned to it in his memoirs: putting the transatlantic Al-
liance on a new basis. What undermined the initiative was that Kissinger’s objective
of reasserting U.S. role in the European decision-making process was accurately rec-
ognized in London, Paris and Bonn. As a consequence, all Europeans responded
harshly, if differently, to the U.S. challenge because they didn’t accept the role that
Kissinger intended for Europe in his proposed international system.
2 For the hypothesis of the Year of Europe as a public relations ploy see Robert Dallek, Nixon and
Kissinger, pp. 465-467
3 Quoted in Hynes, The Year that Never Was, pp. 95–96.
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My third argument is that the initiative was Kissinger’s doing. Nixon and Shultz
had ideas that were not coincident with Kissinger’s. The National Security Advisor
managed to bring them to share his views in the days following Brandt’s letter to
Nixon, at the beginning ofMarch, on the upcoming European joint float. Kissinger’s
pressures were compounded by the general mood toward Europe analyzed in the
previous chapter: the growing mistrust toward European leadership, the perceived
European shift to the left, the belief that a unifying Europe was a powerful and ir-
reducibly antagonistic economic adversary. Accordignly the Nixon Administration
assumed a confrontational and quid pro quo stance in monetary, security and com-
mercial issues. Linkage – globalisation in French jargon – was meant as a way to
extract economic and monetary advantages from Europe using security and defense
as leverage.
4.1 Transatlantic monetary tensions
As 1973 began, President Richard Nixon’s advisors were divided over the urgency
of the need for progress in negotiations to reform the international monetary system.
In September 1972, the Secretary of the Treasury had unveiled a proposal to reform
the international monetary system during the annual meeting of the International
Monetary Fund.4
A February 1–2, 1973, visit to the United States by British Prime Minister Ed-
ward Heath prompted administration officials to set down their thoughts on the sta-
tus of the monetary negotiations. Neither Shultz nor National Security Council staff
member Robert Hormats stressed the need for quick progress in the briefing mate-
4 27 September 1972, The New York Times, p. 70; also Editorial Note, FRUS 3, doc. 242; Hormats
to Kissinger, 3 October 1972, FRUS 3, doc. 243.
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rials they prepared for the visit. Peter Flanigan and Arthur Burns, Chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board, argued the importance of quicker progress. In a January
26 memorandum, Hormats noted this division to Kissinger: “Shultz’ memorandum
to you does not share Burns’ stress on the urgency of moving ahead on monetary
reform. It concentrates more on the substance of our position and reflects some op-
timism that it is being more fully understood and appreciated. Burns in the past has
proved to be a fairly keen observer of the European climate on monetary affairs, and
his views should be taken seriously. However, notwithstanding this, there is validity
in the position that we should not be rushed into merely patching up the system, but
should achieve a major and sustainable reform.”5
Similarly, in another January 26 memorandum to Kissinger, Hormats wrote:
“Burns, in a suggested set of talkers, wants the President to convey a sense of ur-
gency about the slow pace of progress and press Heath to get the Europeans to
move faster. He believes that, given the weakness of the US balance of payments,
the system is crisis prone. If a crisis were to develop the environment for reform
negotiations would deteriorate. Shultz conveys no sense of urgency and places more
stress on obtaining our substantive objectives.”6
On the first of February Burns confirmed his views on a letter directed to Nixon
with a speculative attack on the dollar already underway:
As long as a large disequilibrium in world payments persists and as
long as there is little international agreement on the ground rules gov-
erning monetary and trading relationships, we should not be surprised
if exchange markets become disorderly or if economic policies of in-
dividual nations become more nationalistic. Indeed, given the present
leisurely pace of international discussions on monetary reform and on
reductions in trade barriers, there is real danger that events will overtake
governments and lead to international trouble.
5 Editorial Note, FRUS 31, pp. 1–2.
6 Ibid.
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Burns suggested to alert Prime Minister Heath to this danger and advised Nixon to
“urge him to do what he can to push Europe forward into serious trade and monetary
negotiations aiming at a constructive, outward-looking position.” To highlight the
risks of political immobilism he pointed to the “Group of Twenty” – the so called
C–20 – who had just concluded a meeting in Paris on January 23–25, with “virtually
no progress.”7
Five days later he calculated that since January 22, when the exchange crisis had
begun, the outflow of dollars had been $4.3 billion, with more than fifty percent to
Germany alone, the rest scattered in other countries; and it had been accelerating.8
Shultz made it clear to Nixon that the crisis was “based on reality,” the reality of
$6 billion dollar trade deficit in 1972. In his thinking part of the blame was on the
deficient Smithsonian agreement – in part “because it wasn’t large enough, in part
because there are all sorts of offsets that countries have used, and in part because
it’s deteriorated.”
The solution suggested by Shultz was a devaluation of the dollar by 61/2 percent
accompanied by a similar revaluation by the Japanese. He new that this involved
“persuading the Europeans, particularly, to stand still and not try to, to counter any
move they think we might make, as well as persuading the Japanese to revalue
when we devalue.” To the possible European and Japanese opposition – after all the
Smithsonian was similar and had not worked – Shultz offered a possibile solution:
[W]e would put as a second part of this program an announcement that
we do intend to go forward with trade legislation before the Congress
that would [...] give the President authority to negotiate in a manner that
would help to expand world trade, but at the same time, have very strong
provisions in it that would protect our workers and our businesses and
would enable us to bargain for a fair deal in world trade. It would also
7 Burns to Nixon, 1 February 1973, FRUS 31, p. 3.
8 Conversation between Nixon, Shultz and Burns, 6 February 1973, FRUS 31, p. 4.
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have in it a provision through which you could declare a balance of
payments emergency and impose a surcharge. We think that if we were
in a position to tell the Japanese that, that would have quite some impact
on their willingness to go along with revaluation, without anything.9
The alternative that Shultz had in mind was to go the unilateral route and “float the
dollar and try to force others to let it float.” Nixon was not convinced, it was “too
much of a ‘To hell with the rest of the world”’ policy and Burns felt that everybody
else would regard it as “economic belligerency.” At the same time they were preoc-
cupied with the reaction of the general population – “[t]he average person doesn’t
know a damn thing about this” – and of Congress. It had to be presented with a
rhetoric similar to the “August 15th thing,”10 meaning President Nixon’s August
15, 1971, announcement of his New Economic Policy, which included suspension
of the dollar’s gold convertibility and the imposition of a 10 percent surcharge on
dutiable imports.11
But Nixon was preoccupied; he didn’t like the actual international arrangement.
“We don’t want to just lurch from crisis to crisis” “in the 3 years and 11 months
we have left here.” He wanted a meaningful international monetary system built
before he left office, and, at the beginning of 1973, the Watergate affair wasn’t even
included in the picture. It was there that Burns, convinced that “[c]rises ha[d] a func-
tion” because otherwise there was no “sense of urgency,” suggested the future line
of the administration i.e. that “trade, monetary reform, and defense – international
security, will all have to be handled together and will have to be done at the sum-
mit level.” It had to be negotiated between the “Big Four of Five”: Japan, England,
France, Germany, U.S.; “the rest w[ould] fall in to place.” And U.S. strong card was
9 Ibid., pp. 5–6.
10 Ibid., pp. 11–12.
11 The text of the President’s announcement is in Richard M. Nixon, Public Papers of the Presidents
of the United States: Richard M. Nixon, 1971: Containing the Public Messages, Statements, and
Speeches of the President. Government Printing Office, 1999, pp. 886–891.
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defense: “We are protecting the world, and they know it”; Burns was convinced that
this was “a hard card for you to play, and they know that, but this is something that
you, and you alone, can best evaluate at the right time.”12
From this conversation emerges clearly that, at the beginning of February 1973,
Nixon had not made his mind at all as to what needed to be done regarding Europe
or the Year of Europe initiative. All options were still open, and Nixon was still
listening very carefully the opinion of his advisors: “your judgment will be better
than mine in all this” and, for him, “there [we]re no political problems involved”
because “we don’t give a damn about any of them [the French and the British]
politically, now. [...] Let’s go right ahead.” Nixon preference, for the moment
being, was to “not to go all out on trade,” but if it was “necessary to do it [by] next
week in order to accomplish the monetary thing” then he would have done following
Shultz and Burns counsel.13
Only two days later, Shultz explained better to Nixon what the hidden parts of
his plan were about:
But at any rate, we’ve got to see what happens in Bonn, and so on.
And, maybe they will agree to our deal, and maybe they won’t. If
they don’t, then, you remember, our plan is to just go ahead and make a
unilateral announcement that we think the exchange rates are not in line,
and make a statement to the IMF along those lines and say, ‘We’re not
going to do anything that will try to hold exchange rates that we think
are obsolete’. And that will just cause the markets to go absolutely nutty
[laughs], and I think it will force their hand. It will be acrimonious. It
will not be as good as having worked it out, but we’re in the position
of saying, ‘Look, we tried to work it out with you. And if – we have
done this minor intervention ourselves’ – and I took quite a beating on
that yesterday – but the purpose of doing it is to be able to say to the
Germans, ‘Look, this thing is out of kilter. You’ve spent billions of
12 Conversation between Nixon, Shultz and Burns, 6 February 1973, FRUS 31, pp. 16–17.
13 Ibid., p. 20.
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dollars, and we put some money in, and we put some good faith into
this thing, and that just shows you that we couldn’t stop it.’ So, I think
that we’re in a good talking position that way.14
Nixon made up his mind and wrote to Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka: “I believe
the time has come for decisive action, including specifically a realignment of the
dollar-yen relationship of the required magnitude. I fear that delay in this matter can
only gravely risk long-lasting damage to the fabric of open international economic
cooperation.”15
The Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs, Paul A. Volcker, flew
to Japan and had a meeting with his Japanese counterparts at 9:30 p.m. During this
encounter he explained the particular role the the U.S. had in mind for Germany in
this monetary crisis; the U.S. expected that Germany would “take the lead in Europe
to keep the EC nations from devaluing along with the United States.” While he had
not spoken to the Germans, “he felt that it [wa]s reasonable to expect this.” Kiichi
Aichi, the Japanese Minister of Finance, said “that he understood. If the United
States can get the agreement of the Europeans, he agreed that Japan would float the
yen.”16 He was keen to reiterate that “Japan would go along if the Undersecretary
could persuade the Europeans to stand still.” The only problem in Volcker thinking
was Italy; he affirmed that he had no control of what Italy would do, so “he could
not guarantee Italy.”17 The tone of Volcker became ominous in final exchanges; he
said that “the Smithsonian Realignment was not a failure, even though inadequate,
because it represented the best political compromise possible at that time. This time,
however, he warned again that we could not fail to reach a sound economic decision;
14 National Archives (NA), Nixon Presidential Materials (NPM), White House Tapes, Oval Office,
Conversation 853–12, 8 February 1973.
15 Letter Nixon to Tanaka, undated, FRUS 31, p. 22.
16 Memorandum of Conversation, 8 February 1973, FRUS 31, p. 31.
17 Ibid., pp. 31, 33.
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to do so could have undesirable political consequences.”18
They were some uncertainties on what the European position would be. But
these were trumped by the idea that if the Europeans, specifically the Germans
given the absolute prominence of the mark, did not want to go along with U.S. sug-
gestions, than the administration would go alone, forcefully using its own economic
and military weight to realign European positions. On February 9 Brandt dissolved
any doubts regarding the Federal Republic of Germany’s position. He pointed out
that his country had “fulfilled its obligations under the Smithsonian Agreement in
letter and spirit” and that the current “critical development on the exchange markets
[wa]s to a large extent based on purely speculative movements.” Brandt’s govern-
ment had, therefore, “instructed the Deutsche Bundesbank to continue the interven-
tions” to keep the rate between dollars and marks stable and he explicitly asked for
support by “corresponding actions of the American monetary authorities”:
I would appreciate if the American monetary authorities would, in the
future, do everything in their power to support the Dollar rate which –
as I believe – would be in the spirit of the Smithsonian Agreement and
would certainly contribute to the calming down of the markets.
Needless to say, that I also deem it urgently necessary that a re- form
of the international monetary system has to take place. [...]
Furthermore, in my view, decisions are necessary which would con-
tribute to the further liberalization of world trade. [...]
Brandt’a principal fear was that Western inaction would “lead to dangerous political
consequences” and the “cohesion of the Free World would be endangered econom-
ically, psychologically and, finally also politically.”19
In a February 9 conversation with Rogers, West German Foreign Office State
Secretary, Karl Moersch, stressed his government’s “hope that the US will intervene
18 Ibid., p. 37.
19 Noebel to Nixon, 9 February 1973, FRUS 31, pp. 38–39.
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in the current monetary crisis.” He added that “the Europeans needed the time which
this would afford to reach agreement among themselves.” In parallel with Brandt’s
thinking he was afraid that If the Europeans “had to act under great pressure there
could be unfortunate political consequences which could prejudice the excellent
cooperation which exists in other fields such as CSCE and MBFR.”20
Brandt concluded his letter with a strong recommendation that “the authorized
representatives of our countries should meet if possible immediately in order to
discuss the monetary and trade situation and search for solutions.” At the same
time he wanted to discuss those same questions with his European counterparts,
particularly the French government.21 In fact on February 9, the British, French,
and West German Ministers of Finance had met in Paris. The following morning, at
7:30 a.m., Volcker and Shultz had a telephone conversation in which they analyzed
three possibile scenarios. Shultz, who was in Washington, drafted notes based on
his conversation with Volcker, who was in Bonn. The three alternatives presented
by Volcker were:
• European “Joint float”;
• “No action”;
• “Our plan.”
Volcker could not rule out European talks about a joint float and he “emphasized
German responsibilities to stand still plus be persuasive with others, including gold
and capital controls.” The German FinancedMinister, Helmut Schmidt had “squirmed
but [was] attracted to our plan and is now checking with Brandt.” Volcker assured
Schmidt that Brandt was “not looking for confrontation with Japan” and did not
want “to upset Pompidou before election.” The national elections in France were
20 Telegram 26260 to Bonn, February 12, NA, NPM, NSC Files, 687, Country Files, Europe, Ger-
many (Bonn), Vol. XIII, January–September 1973.
21 Noebel to Nixon, 9 February 1973, FRUS 31, p. 40.
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scheduled for March 4 and 11. While the Germans would have liked for the prob-
lem to go away, “Volcker emphasized that tough decisions [we]re necessary.”22 The
general impression that Brandt gave was that he was not opposed to the U.S. plan,
but he did not want to back it without discussing with his EC partners.23
Even though the Nixon response to Brandt was hopeful of reaching a prompt
agreement – “with the Federal Republic of Germany playing a leading role” – and
on continuing to strive “toward the common objective of an open world economy,”24
it all came down on February 12. Overwhelming speculative pressure against the
dollar prompted the closure of Western European exchange markets; that same spec-
ulative pressure had led to the closure of the Japanese foreign exchange market on
February 10. On the evening of February 12, Shultz announced that the adminis-
tration would seek Congressional approval of a 10 percent devaluation of the dollar.
He even announced the decision by the Japanese Government to let the yen float,
despite the Japanese request “that this matter be kept strictly confidential by the U.S.
and European countries concerned.”25 Moreover, “[c]onsultations with our leading
trading partners in Europe assure me that the proposed change in the par value of
the dollar is acceptable to them, and will therefore be effective immediately in ex-
change rates for the dollar in international markets.” Finally, Shultz announced that
the administration would soon send new trade legislation to Congress and would lift
all controls on capital flows by the end of 1974.26
22 Notes of a Telephone Conversation Between Volcker and Shultz, 10 February 1973, FRUS 31, pp.
40–41.
23 A second phone call at 9:10 a.m., Notes of a Telephone Conversation Between Volcker and Shultz,
10 February 1973, FRUS 31, p. 41.
24 Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany, 10
February 1973, FRUS 31, pp. 42–43.
25 Letter Ushiba to Rogers, undated, FRUS 31, p. 46.
26 For the text of Shultz’s statement see 13 February 1973, The New York Times, p. 56. For Nixon’s
public comments on Shultz’s statement, see Nixon, Public Papers, 1973, pp. 89–90.
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The nature itself of the the monetary crisis did not give much respite to the lead-
ers of the countries that were heavily invested by its effects. The U.S. government
decided to move in a specific direction, and it pressured her allies to do the same,
while at the same time deciding that it would move in that same direction, against
its allies if necessary. It was heartily felt in Washington that “tough decisions” were
necessary and that the U.S. government had to seize the initiative and move the in-
ternational system in the desired direction. Nixon himself was not very convinced
and probably did not like to talk about the argument. On February 10, the Assistant
to the President and Haldeman, commented in his diary that the President “doesn’t
want to get into the international monetary thing with Shultz. He keeps calling to
report.”27 The initiative was thus seized by economical advisors, Kissinger’s “tech-
nicians,” and they led the charge to abolish the last vestiges of the Bretton Woods
system. Enter European joint float and the President’s National Security Advisor
Henry Kissinger.
4.2 Brandt’s letter. . .
Western European and Japanese foreign exchange markets reopened in mid-February
1973. A modicum of calm temporarily returned to the markets, but, by the final
week of February, speculative pressure had again mounted against the dollar. The
foreign exchange markets were thus granted only a brief respite. Lack of confi-
dence in the new pattern of exchange rates quickly reappeared and again gave rise
to large-scale movements of capital. As a consequence, on 1 March several coun-
tries which had continued to maintain their exchange rates within fixed limits once
27 Harry Robbins Halderman, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House: The Complete
Multimedia Edition, CD–ROM, Sony Electronic Publishing, 1994.
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again experienced an enormous inflow of capital. Germany was the main victim:
in one day alone it absorbed the record amount of $ 2 800 million. This situation
led to many of the industrialized countries closing their foreign exchange markets
on 1 or 2 March.28 Western European central banks once again absorbed massive
sums of dollars in an effort to support the value of the dollar. The speculative pres-
sure quickly grew too great, and several Western European exchange markets were
closed on March 2.
In a press conference that day, President Richard Nixon professed his faith in
the fundamental strength of the American economy and the dollar, proclaiming that
the United States would “survive” the “international attack upon it [the dollar] by
people who make great sums of money by speculating.” The President also said:
Let me say there will not be another devaluation. I would say, second,
we are going to continue our program of fiscal responsibility so that the
dollar will be sound at home and, we trust as well, abroad. And we also
are going to continue our efforts to get the other major countries to par-
ticipate more with us in the goal that we believe we should all achieve,
which we set out at the time of the Smithsonian and other agreements,
and that is of getting an international monetary system which is flexible
enough to take care of these, what I believe are, temporary attacks on
one currency or another.29
The administration’s objective of a more flexible exchange system was now entering
the public discourse, almost two years after the so-called “Nixon shocks.”
On March 2, Brandt wrote to Nixon after his productive encounter with the
British Prime Minister. The monetary crisis changed the subject of the two prime
ministers’ discussions; nonetheless they were both surprised too see how much
their vision of Europe, and its relations with the United States, coincided. They ex-
28 “Information and Notices”. In: Official Journal of the European Communities, Vol. 17, No C 123,
14 October 1974, p. 2.
29 Nixon, Public Papers, 1973, p. 159.
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changed very warm letters in the following days to ascertain each other’s thinking
after having consulted their own “technicians”. Both were “utterly determined to
look for a community solution” because a joint float could not “be settled bilaterally
between [their] two countries”. In these letters they analyzed the technical difficul-
ties, such as those, for example, emerging from “special problems of the sterling
balances,” and proposed different solutions. On the possibile U.S. opposition Heath
explained to Brandt that he had told the to President Nixon that it was “no part of
our intention to damage the United States interests.” He believed that, “[o]n the con-
trary, [...] the improvement of cohesion and cooperation in Community” could only
“increase Europe’s strength and usefulness as a parties in the Atlantic Alliance.”30
What wrote Brandt that could incense Kissinger? I will report the entirety of
Brandt’s letter and I will italicize the passages that would led Kissinger to react
negatively.
The talks for which Prime Minister Heath was in Bonn yesterday and
today, centered on the alarming new currency crisis which – as you
know – forced the Federal Government to close the exchange market for
another time. We agreed that we must make every conceivable effort
to find a way out which strengthens European integration. After his
return to London, the Prime Minister will thoroughly examine what
contribution his Government can make to a common solution.
I am convinced that a joint action represents at the same time an
element of stabilization in the world political situation. This is to the
benefit of all members of the Western world. A weakening of the Com-
munity by separate action would be harmful to all.
Much will depend now on the results of the forthcoming meeting of
the Ministerial Council of the European Community. The Federal Gov-
ernment is prepared to do everything in its power in order to achieve a
30 Visit of Edward Heath, UK Prime Minister, to Bonn, 1–2 March 1973, TNA: PRO FCO 41/1360;
the letters that Brand and Heath sent to each other, Tel 195 to Bonn, Douglas-Home papers, 6
March 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 43; Bonn tel 331, 8 March 1973, Ibid., doc. 45; Tel 201 to Bonn,
10 March 1973, Ibid., doc. 46; Bonn tel 338, 11 March 1973, Ibid., doc. 47.
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positive result.31
4.3 . . . and Kissinger’s reaction
I read the letter, and I came to the judgment that the Europeans are go-
ing to take a common position, or are going to try to take a common
position, but they think that position will be unpalatable to us, and that
they are trying, or that Brandt is trying, to buy us off in phrases about
European integration and world stability for what he knows we won’t
like in the position they?re going to come up with. [...] My view from
the political point of view is that there’re two aspects: one is, we don’t
look strong if, two weeks after the devaluation there’s another specula-
tive wave that then, again, changes the exchange rate. I’ll put that aside.
The thing that bothers me most about the letter is that I think the time
has come where we must make clear to the Europeans that they cannot
take a common position without consultation with us on a matter that vi-
tally affects our interest and buy us off in currency of abstract European
integration, and that sort of thing. And, therefore, leaving aside now the
question of whether we should intervene or not, I think we must in any
event make clear to Brandt that this procedure is unacceptable to us.32
Kissinger position was very clear and he stated that, even though the European joint
float was not against U.S. interests as Shultz maintained, he thought that a strong
U.S. reaction would construe the “basis for doing other things later on.” There was
something incredibly wrong in all of this as Kissinger continued his analysis:
I don’t like the letter. I think it sort of assumes that we’re idiots that
can be paid off by phrases. I don’t like the fact that Heath isn’t in touch
with us at all.
31 Letter Brandt to Nixon, 2 March 1973, FRUS 31, pp. 49–50.
32 Emphasis mine, Conversation Among Nixon, Kissinger, and Shultz, 3 March 1973, FRUS 31, p.
72.
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After all, Kissinger’s added, “It’d be easy enough for Heath to communicate with
us”.33
In the remaining of the long conversation Kissinger explained what he had in
mind trying to convince both Nixon and Shultz to the virtue of his approach. First
of all he suggested to answer as soon as possibile to Brandt thanking him for his
communication, but than immediately explain that a “change in the exchange rates
between Europe and the United States is a matter of general interest; it is not a
unilateral decision by the Europeans.” It involved the Japanese beside the United
States. He proposed to “get the Japanese involved and score some points with the
Japanese.”34
It was not a good policy for the U.S. to “acquiesce in such a soppy palaver”, at
minimum, he insisted, the President should say: “We must be consulted.” The sub-
stance was not very important to Kissinger, he was not interested on the economic
side of all the affair, he wanted to create “the basis for cracking down on them later
on on something else.” What Kissinger wanted to read in an European letter such
as this was something that read like: “We want to hear what you. . . ”35
Nixon was not convinced yet. He did not understand very well Kissinger’s plan.
After all what he had in mind was to use the crisis and the letter “as a means to
keep the Europeans closer to us, rather than having them push away.” He wanted to
“approach it differently.” In his understanding, Kissinger’s approach would lead to
a Europeans pulling together. Kissinger explained better what he had in mind with
phrases very similar to what he would later use during his Year of Europe speech:
We are, of course, in favor of European integration. We are, of course,
we are also in favor of closer Atlantic partnership. [...]
33 Ibid., pp. 72–73.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., p. 74.
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It is impossible, therefore, for either side of the Atlantic to take uni-
laterally decisions that basically affect the other without consultation.
[...]
And, therefore, while you, of course, will proceed in your European
discussions, we believe we must have an opportunity, and we think so
should the Japanese, to express their view on how this affects the entire
monetary situation. [...]
[A]t the same time, we could inform the Japanese what we?ve done,
and they can then see us as the protector.
For Nixon this was a very good point, better still, “a couple of points.”36
Shultz explained that it was a very good idea – he had checked with Milton Fried-
man – to let the Europeans to float, even to force them to float. From the economic
point of view this was the best scenario. This was what needed to be done to go
toward the system that Nixon had inaugurated with the “August 15th thing.” Fur-
thermore, he pointed at the “$6, $7 billion” dollars that the Germans had acquired,
“and the value of those dollars has changed by ten percent; it?s gigantic.” He was
surprised that “the political figures in those countries [we]ren’t being attacked as be-
ing stupid for having bought these dollars, which then were depreciated, and there
they [we]re stuck with them.” He explained then that not intervening would bring
forth a situation in which the U.S. position would be stronger vis-à-vis Germany if
the common float worked, and stronger still if – as he believed – it did not work
at all, given the “tremendous amount of heterogeneity” in European economies –
“Italy on one extreme, Britain on the other extreme.”37
But Kissinger was “not talking economics.” He thought that devaluing again
would make them look week domestically and internationally. The U.S. had to
“show the Japanese and the Europeans that [they we]re not in a passive position”
and that “European integration was never seen as a substitute for Atlantic or world
36 Ibid., pp. 74–75.
37 Ibid., pp. 75–79.
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cooperation”, and, therefore, they could not “accept the proposition that a decision
like this should be taken without full consultation with the United States.” In the
end Kissinger was “no longer so sure that European integration [wa]s all that much
in [their] interest.” For the sake of the Atlantic alliance, Kissinger added, it was
better to “force them to deal separately” with the United States. He identified Eu-
ropean weak spot, the Germans; if the U.S. were to intervene the “Germans would
be breaking ranks.” And he identified an end game: “if the intervention works, as
I understand it, it will delay at least for a bit – make it harder to get a common
European monetary system.”38
Kissinger was particularly stressed by the idea that “letting nature take its course”
would force Europeans together:
I do not believe we should accept, because if that works here, they’ll
apply it all across the board, and increasingly, while demanding from
us that in those areas where we have freedom of maneuver, we consult
them.
At this point, Nixon started seeing the truth of Kissinger’s approach, his enthusiasm
showing through the transcript of the conversation:
Yeah. Yeah. This, this – that’s the, that’s the – what Henry just said.
We certainly must do that.39
Shultz was not convinced by Kissinger’s argument. He thought that they were
“on a different course,” the had “decided to try a flexible type system,” and they
“should keep pushing forward.” He remained steadfastly against intervention,40
but Nixon had made his mind and was thinking on Kissinger’s line of using “a
more positive leadership role through possible intervention in order to serve [their]
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., p. 80.
40 Ibid., pp. 82–83.
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interests in keeping the Europeans apart; keeping them from developing a united
policy against us.” He tried to convince Shultz that “in this international thing,” he
could not think “as an economist.”41 Finally, Shultz too was coming around:
I think we’re getting somewhere. I think the right approach is to have
the kind of letter Henry said, with no mention of intervention or any-
thing, and try to draw from them what it is that they have in mind.”
He was convinced in the end because he thought that there was “a very strong like-
lihood that their efforts at a joint float are going to be fruitless,” and that they were
going to have “an awful lot of trouble with it.”42
The letter that Nixon sent to Brandt was carefully crafted by Shultz and Kissinger
that same afternoon. It had a delicate equilibrium between what could be interpreted
as an encouragement, like the consideration the there was “no question about the
desirability of ending the new currency crisis as rapidly as possible,” and what indi-
cated U.S. real goal, for example, by not agreeing “that the only criterion that should
be considered in putting forward a solution [wa]s whether it contribute[ed] to the
strengthening of European integration.” The same construction was repeated sub-
sequently. Nixon wrote that he had “strongly supported European integration and
intend[ed] to continue to do so,” but, as he believed they both agreed, “European
integration should also be seen as a step towards increased Atlantic cooperation.”
And again in the closing lines:
I would therefore hope that before any proposals are made final we will
have an opportunity to express our views. I look forward to hearing
your reaction and I want to assure you about our commitment to Euro-
pean integration and Atlantic partnership.43
41 Ibid., 83–85.
42 Ibid., p. 90.
43 Message Nixon to Brandt, 3 March 1973, FRUS 31, p. 91.
100
The letter sent to Heath was worded in a similar, but somewhat more direct, fashion,
as for example in, “[i]t is a bad precedent for allies if they confront each other with
a fait accompli,” but conveyed the same general meaning.44
There are two different aspects worth noticing before concluding this section on
Kissinger’s reaction. The first is that U.S. economic analysis was perfectly sound.
They knew that the Europeans wanted a joint float, besides the ideal of European
unity – or, as Volcker put it, “half ideology and half pure economics” – because
if the exchange rates between European currencies were not in line the effect of
European trade would have been very steep because “that’s where most of their
trade” was.45 Burns put it on even clearer and stronger terms:
The Europeans are doing their trading primarily with one another. It’s
their trade with one another that counts in the aggregate, rather than
their trade with the U.S. Trade with the U.S. is a small part, relative to
their trade with one another. If they had a joint float, they would have
stable exchange rates with their major trading European partners. And,
they would be able to have achieved stability, and the exchange rate
with the U.S. would vary, but with one another, where it counts most,
the exchange rate would be stable. I think that’s the way the Europeans
look at it.46
At the end of this very long conversation Nixon conceded that he “happen[ed] to tilt
more [...] – to George’s view [...] – on the economic side,” but he had strong politi-
cal concerns. For this reason he offered his acute view on the European politics.
We’re getting into Europe now; we’ll be in it very heavily over the next
few months about NATO and MBFR, and all – the European Security
Conference. We’re in a watershed period with regard to our relations to
Europe. [...] the Europeans are terribly frustrated, because the Germans
44 Message Nixon to Heath, 3 March 1973, FRUS 31, p. 92.
45 This conversation happened before Kissinger knew about Brandt’s March 2 letter, Conversation
Among Nixon, Burns, Ash, Stein, Shultz, and Volcker, 3 March 1973, FRUS 31, p. 55.
46 Ibid., p. 56.
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can’t have an international policy. [...] The French are parochial. [...]
The British take the world view only because they’re British and have
always thought big. [...]
You have to realize that when the European leaders - oh, like Heath
– comes here, he loves to talk about, “Oh, how was your trip to China?”
[...] But he knows, as he talks to me, that what the British do doesn’t
make a damn bit of a difference in the world anymore. [...] They know
that what really matters is what – today is what the U.S. talks as says to
Russia, and 10 years from now what we may say to China, so forth and
so on.
[A]s I judge the European politicians, except for Heath, every one
is a parochial; every damn one. I mean, Brandt doesn’t understand
anything. He’s a nice, pleasant face, and all that sort of thing, but he’s
a dullard. In terms, except just through Berlin and the rest, he doesn’t
understand the world and never will. The Italians did two thousand
years ago, and they were finished.47
He concluded saying the the U.S. needed a Europe committed to NATO, “close to
the United States,” but his own analysis spelled in his mind the risk of looking only
at the “economic side.” Despite a very sound economic analysis both Kissinger’s
and Nixon’s thinking tilted toward the “leadership” side. And it is very easy to spot
in both of their speeches the elements that were going to characterize the Year of
Europe speech.
The second aspect deserving analysis is the fact that, despite Kissinger’s and
Nixon’s dismissal of the “economic side,” the economic, trade, and monetary crises
were the ones that sparked the transatlantic controversies. It was in reaction to the
monetary pressures that the European governments decided to move, politically, for
a joint float. I would even argue that there was neither “economical” nor “political”
aspects of international relations. The two aspects, while analytically distinct, were
so intertwined that all of the leaders had to take their decisions based on a body of
47 Ibid., pp. 68–69.
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knowledge derived from both camps. Deciding, as Nixon did, to knowingly take
a decision which was reputed a bad economic decision did not make it devoid of
economic thinking. In this sense, it was not possibile to separate the economics
from the politics.
4.4 The European joint float
Kissinger analysis was completely off course and, therefore, his reaction toward
Brandt’s letter was unwarranted. “Kissinger the tantrum-throwing depressive” was
showing once again at the edges of Kissinger the realist. The Europeans had not de-
cided anything yet, as Heath was keen to point out in his letter to Nixon on March
4.48 After several conferences between the Community countries at first, and then
between a larger number of countries (the enlarged Group of Ten met on March 9
in Paris49). On March 11, six members of the EEC – Belgium, Denmark, the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg – announced
that after March 16 the values of their currencies would jointly float vis-à-vis the
value of all other currencies, while remaining relatively fixed vis-à-vis one another.
The adapted the existing Community exchange rate scheme, maintaining the 2.25%
spread between the respective currencies – the “snake” – but ceasing the central
banks interventions aimed at the maintenance of fixed the margins against the dol-
lar – the “tunnel.”50 On March 16, 1973, Group of Ten financial representatives,
along with representatives from Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Switzerland, the
International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
48 Message Heath to Nixon, 4 March 1973, FRUS 31, p. 97.
49 UKREP Brussels tel 1322, PREM 15/1459, 12 March 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 49.
50 Ibid.; also see “Information and Notices”. In: Official Journal of the European Communities, Vol.
17, No C 123, 14 October 1974, p. 2–3.
103
velopment, the Bank for International Settlements, and the European Commission
met at the Ministerial level in Paris, where they gave their blessing to the March 11
establishment of the European Economic Community snake.51
The fact that the Heath and Brandt had not decided anything yet is confirmed,
for example, by the letter that Heath himself sent to Brand on March 6. In this letter
he wrote the their encounter “was particularly useful” because the were “able to talk
over the currency situation [...] at a stage when both of [them] were taking stock of
the situation and of possibile responses to it.” In the remaining of the letter Heath
discussed at length some possibile suggestions regarding how to deal with the crisis
“to be considered by the competent bodies”.52
In his rapid response to Washington Heath explained that “the first course con-
sidered” for fighting the currency crisis, “was to keep the markets open and absorb
the continuing influx of dollars,” but they had decided against it “because they be-
lieved that it might be interpreted as damaging to the United States.” He conceded
that “European integration obviously cannot be the sole criterion.” But it was, in
his view. “the fact that many people in Europe [we]re regarding our ability to work
out and agree to a joint Community solution to this crisis as a crucial test of the
strength of the enlarged Community?s purpose.” Furthermore, if the French were
forced to float alone, it would became “difficult to see how the Community could
hope to continue to follow integrated policies in any sphere.” He concluded on a
personal note using the same argument he would use in his letter to Brandt:
Mr. President, I recognise, and have always been grateful for, your
understanding of the importance of European integration in the wider
world context. I ask you to believe that neither Chancellor Brandt nor I
wish or intend that the progress of European integration should do other
than serve the interests of the Atlantic Alliance and strengthen Europe’s
51 For the final communiqué see The New York Times, 17 March 1973, p. 41.
52 Tel 195 to Bonn, Douglas-Home papers, 6 March 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 43.
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capacity to contribute to those interests.53
These assurances did not have any traction in Washington. On March 15 the Euro-
pean joint float became a reality. On March 14, in a telephone conversation with
Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, William Simon, Kissinger confirmed his posi-
tion: “I basically have only one view right now which is to do as much as we can to
prevent a united European position without showing our hand.”54
What had made Kissinger so staunch in his position against a common Euro-
pean solution? Why the repeated European assurances on the friendly nature of the
joint float did not change his mind? Why favorable counsel of U.S. economic advi-
sors toward the European float did not matter at all? Kissinger had very important
information that helped him in choosing the “realistic” path:
You understand, my reason’s entirely political, but I got an intelligence
report of the discussions in the German Cabinet and when it became
clear to me that all our enemies were for the European solution that
pretty well decided for me.’55
This phrase offers a glimpse on Kissinger’s thinking. In a restricted interpretation,
the enemies were probably the socialists in the German Cabinet. If the enemies were
just to the socialists the frame of reference would be very similar to Nixon’s. But in
a more risky interpretation, with the word enemies Kissinger had in mind Germans,
or even Europeans, in general. This second interpretation, while not substantiated
by direct references, is nonetheless grounded on Kissinger’s approach to European
countries as delineated by this study. For example, the linkage approach was not
very different from the one he had applied to U.S. relations with URSS and China.
There is some room to argue that his diplomatic approach with URSS and China
53 Message Heath to Nixon, 4 March 1973, FRUS 31, pp. 97–98.
54 Kissinger–Simon, 14 March 1973, DNSA, doc. KA09752.
55 Emphasis mine, Ibid.
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was less confrontational than his attitude toward the European “allies.”
The following day he had to cope with the failure of his masterplan. The fore-
casts on the possibilities of success of the joint float had been overwhelmingly neg-
ative.56 But now the agreement loomed only one day away. Kissinger asked Simon
whether the agreement would “drive the Europeans together,” Simon replied:
Well, basically – You’ve only got half of them together and while they
sit there and they say by golly, six of them are now floating jointly.
The UK, Italy, and several others, Canada, et cetera, are all floating by
themselves and enjoying it very much. Now if over a long period of
time this float worked properly, then perhaps they would be together.
Kissinger assertion was that they “couldn?t bust the Common float without get-
ting into a hell of a political fight.” Simon agreed and Kissinger stated that he
was nonetheless ready to continue and he thought they “should create conditions in
which the Common float is as hard to work as possible.” They agreed that the best
way to achieve this was a policy of non-intervention or “intervening at some times
to help some people but not others.”57
In the concluding exchanges of this conversation made clear what the approach
from that moment on ought to be in dealing with the Europeans. First of all he
wanted what he had agreed with Simon policed not as “as a technical-economic
matter.” Secondarily he continued: “I think from now on we have to throw our
weight around to help ourselves,” adding, “And then they’ll start paying attention to
us again.” And thirdly, Kissinger told Simon that he had “come to that view with
reluctance but once you move, I think you have always to move strongly.”58
56 See, for example, Shultz–Kissinger, 5 March 1973, FRUS 31, p. 99; Schmidt–Kissinger, 5 March
1973, Ibid., p. 103; With strong doubts still lingering in Kissinger–Simon, 15 March 1973, DNSA,
doc. KA09779.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
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4.5 A Temporary Conclusion on the Year of Europe
In the last two chapters I have gone in some detail in showing, repeatedly, what was
the political and economical thinking inWashington from September 1972 toMarch
1973. While at the beginning of the period there was no clear idea of what the Year
of Europe was about, slowly, but inexorably, a growing sense of urgency developed
in Nixon and Kissinger. Was this for the mounting pressures of Watergate as some
historians have argued?59
From the documents I have examined this does not seem to be the case. In none
of the transcripts of conversations regarding to economical, monetary and European
matters that I have read the two arguments have ever been linked by the protagonists.
On the contrary, it appears that, in Nixon’s view up to March 1973, the Watergate
affair was a minor drain on his energies. As it had been the case since the inception
of his presidency, he was completely geared toward foreign policy. In his mind, it
was in his masterful foreign policy that his political legacy would lay.
The Year of Europe itself seemed to disappear for some months. No one – not
even Kissinger or Nixon – had a precise idea of what it would mean. Linking
the concepts and the language of the Year of Europe to Kissinger’s writings in the
1960s is a very insightful exercise, but there is a strong risk of ignoring the very
important historical contingencies that actually shaped perception of Europe during
1973. The international situation in, for example, 1967, was very different from
that of world in a post-Bretton Woods system of the first half of the the 1970s. The
crystallized thoughts on transatlantic relations of Kissinger the Harvard professor
of 1967, would have had a very hard time of passing through the rapids of 1968,
the overhaul of August 1971, the complete change in leadership in Europe at the
59 Hynes, The Year that Never Was; Jones, “‘A Man in a Hurry”’.
107
beginning of the 1970s, and the complete about-face in the workings with USSR
and China. And this were just some of the changes in the economic, cultural and
political sphere that had informed those years.
Than the monetary crisis rocked again the transatlantic world, just three months
away from the last U.S. devaluation of the dollar. The Smithsonian rapidly lost
every last meaning it had up to that moment. Everything was on rocky shores again.
And it was in these difficult times that the Europeans managed to do what they had
in mind to since a long time: move as a unity on an important matter with strong
ramifications outside of Europe. And it was exactly the perception of a unified
Europe deciding on an important question without consulting the U.S. that incensed
Kissinger – and later Nixon.
Kissinger’s reaction came to late to stop the joint float, the world moved beyond
Kissinger’s grasp for the moment being. But he though himself positioned “in a
good strategic position,”60 ready for a follow-up attack on European unity. He com-
pletely agreed with Nixon’s assessment: “The way the Europeans are talking today,
European unity will not be in our interest, certainly not from a political viewpoint or
from an economic viewpoint.”61 He did not think that a “a unified European mon-
etary system is in our interest,” because he would haver rather played “with them
individually.”62
My temporary conclusion is that it was historical contingency and personality –
other factors being present but not determinant – that gave the final form to the Year
of Europe. The style of personal diplomacy that Kissinger and Nixon had inaugu-
rated in their dealings with the Communist powers was once more the protagonist.
In the remaining chapter I will concentrate on French and British documents in the
follow-up of April 23 speech. Did they understand clearly what the U.S. adminis-
60 Kissinger–Simon, 15 March 1973, DNSA, doc. KA09779.
61 Nixon to Kissinger, 10 March 1973, FRUS 31, p. 119.
62 Kissinger–Simon, 14 March 1974, DNSA, doc. KA09752.
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tration had in mind? Was their analysis linked to the hidden motives that informed
Kissinger and Nixon in their stance toward Europe?
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Chapter 5
Facing the U.S. Challenge
Watergate provided neither the origin nor the timing of the initiative, as many at
that time and since have claimed, but it did affect its lifespan. It became a recurring
theme in European’s analyses of Kissinger’s and Nixon’s stance. On the other side
of the Atlantic, the earthshaking Kissinger’s pronouncement on Europe proved of
little interest to the general American press or public. An abstract concept, like
“Europe,” was not likely to be as interesting as the Watergate affair. The article
from James Reston was alone in comparing Kissinger to Marshall and in giving
Kissinger’s pronouncement “les dimensions d’un événement historique.”1
The editorial published on the New York Times underlined that the Kissinger’s
speech, while maintaining a U.S. pledge of support for the European unity, con-
tained the “doubtful doctrine” that accorded to Europe a “regional” character com-
pared the global responsibilities of the United States. The newspaper added that
the pronouncement, despite its lofty nature, incorporated the typical vast array of
recriminations against Europe, some justified others more doubtful. The editori-
1 Kosciusko-Morizet, Réactions de la presse américaine au discours de M. Kissinger, 25 April 1093,
MAE, US files, 747; James Reston, “A Plea for Partnership; Kissinger, Like Marshall 26 Years
Ago, Asks Mutual Efforts on Mutual Issues.” In: The New York Times, 24 April 1973.
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alist concluded that the speech would have been more convincing if it had been
pronounced by the President himself.2
The Washington Post interpretation of the enterprise rested on purely internal
problems: for them it was a ploy to distract from Watergate. The commercial law
presented to Congress two weeks before – described as protectionist by both the
Washington Post and the New York Times – had much more substance to it than
the entire Year of Europe thing. The problem for the Washington Post rested on
economic confrontation with Europe and U.S. protectionism. Finally, for the news-
paper, the reaction in Europe could not be very positive given that this was just a
diversionary tactic engineered to distract from Watergate.3
Besides Watergate there were some fundamental questions that were to hamper
the chances of success of the Year of Europe. Kissinger had worked as a scholar
on the “troubled partnership” during the 1960s. He had identified the two solutions
that were usually put forward in order to improve the cohesion between the Atlantic
allies: a mechanism for improved consultation and “the development of a united
Europe with federal, supranational institutions as the precondition for an Atlantic
partnership.”4 Ironically, these two solutions were to haunt the implementation of
the Year of Europe.
2 ‘U.S. Seeks a ‘New Atlantic Charter’ to Resolve Strains with Europe.” In: The New York Times,
24 April 1973.
3 Kosciusko-Morizet, Réactions de la presse américaine au discours de M. Kissinger, 25 April 1093,
MAE, US files, 747.
4 Henry Kissinger, The troubled partnership: a re-appraisal of the Atlantic alliance. Published
for the Council on Foreign Relations by McGraw-Hill, 1965, p. 223; see also Pascaline Winand,
“LoadedWords and Disputed Meanings: the Year of Europe Speech and its Genesis from an Amer-
ican Perspective.” In: Jan van der Harst, ed. Beyond Custom Unions: The European Community’s
Quest for Deepening, Widening and Completion, 1969–1975, Bruylant, 2007, pp. 297–316.
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5.1 Un texte impérieux
Merely a month before Kissinger’s speech, an internal note of the French resumed
French–U.S. relations as follows:
Les relations entre le deux pays gardent pourtant une grande importance
en raison du caractère original del position de la France au sein de la
C.E.E., de l’Alliance atlantique, dans le négotiation de la C.S.C.E., ou
même à propos du Vietnam.
Des liens d’amititié anciens, qui n’excludent pas des divergences,
mais sont le fondement d’une certaine fidélité mutuelle, marquent ces
relations d’un caractère particulier qui s’est renforcé depuis l’arrivée au
pouvoir de M. Nixon.5
The French document went on to point out the convergences and, at the same time,
to highlight the ongoing consultations on the divergences between the two coun-
tries. They were dealing with: “questions monétaires et commerciales;” “le do-
maine aéronatique;” “le domaine de la sécurité et de la défense;” “la question de
la indemnisation ayant trait aux anciennes bases américaines en France;” “la lutte
commune [...] aux trafiquants de drogue;” “le problème du Vietnam.” All in all, the
document resumed:
Les relations franco-américaines gardent donc un caractère particulier,
malgré l’amélioration des relations entre les États-Unis, d’une part,
l’Union Soviétique et la Chine, d’autre part, et même si les relations
multilatérales dans le cadre européen vont se développant.6
French analyses before the Year of Europe speech, that regarded the French–U.S.
relations as complicated but full of opportunities, were not at all rare at the Quai
5 Saint-Légier, Relations franco-américaines, 19 March 1973, MAE, US files, 721.
6 Ibid.
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d’Orsay,7 even in the immediate aftermath of the European joint float.8
The immediate reaction to the speech was largely negative. Jean-Bernard Rai-
mond, diplomatic consultant for Pompidou, qualified Kissinger’s speech as a “texte
impérieux, qui exprime fondamentalment la volonté de puissance des États-Unis.”
The bigger risk was the other European partners, the primary reference being Ger-
many, were tempted: “leur préference allait à un monde atlantique à direction améri-
caine.”9 Raimond’s fear typified French fear of superpower condominium: the “ren-
forcement de la coopération entre l’URSS et le États-Unis” was throwing out of bal-
ance “l’équilibre politique mondial” and could lead “au dessaisissement politique
des puissances tierces.”10 The accord between Washington and Moscow to prevent
nuclear war strengthened French fears and, as Kosciusko-Morizet put it, could lead
to the denuclearization of Europe :
les Américains cherchant en fait à écarter tout usage de l?arme nu-
cléaire, tandis que les Russes s’appliquaient à dénucléariser et à neu-
traliser l’Europe occidentale, en la coupant des États-Unis et en déman-
telant le système de l’Alliance atlantique.11
In the following months French analyses became more and more embittered at
both the Quai d’Orsay and at the Élysée Palace. In the internal notes in preparation
for the Reykjavik summit between Nixon and Pompidou at the end of May 1973
was written with uncanny insight:
Bien que l’attitude fondamentale des États-Unis à l’égard de l’Europe
n’ait guère changé, Washington n’en imprègne pas moins ses relations
7 For example, Relations entre l’Europe et les États-Unis, 18 January 1973, MAE, 747.
8 Sauvagnargues, Entretien avec M. Frank, 16 March 1973, MAE, 747; Négociations commerciales
et monétaires entre les États-Unis et la Communauté économique européenne, 20 March 1973,
Ibid.
9 Note du 3 mai 1973 pour Pompidou, CHAN 5AG2, 1021.
10 Note Raimond pour Pompidou du 10 Mai 1973, CHAN 5AG2, 1021.
11 Quoted in Soutou, “La problématique de la Dètente,” p. 96.
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avec notre continent d’une humeur revendicative qui n’est peut-être que
la conséquence d’un malaise intérieur. La puissance des États-Unis ne
semble certes pas, à vues humaines, menacée d’être remise en cause.
The Americans were searching in Europe and in Japan “les responsables de leurs
propres angoisses.”12 Two days before Reykjavik, this view was emerged in another
document, this time at the Élysée Palace: “Harcelé sur le plan intérieur (affaire du
Watergate), M. Nixon a besoin de montrer au public américain qu’il dirige toujours
la politique extérieure des États-Unis avec vigeur et imaginations;” being impossi-
ble form him to reach a rapid solution on the “domaines monetaire et commercial,”
he was compelled to search for a swift victory on the “domain politique.”13
In French views, The United States were thus bracing for an impact against Eu-
rope. Their desire for something to present to the American public was leading them
towards confrontation. In fact, the U.S. were preparing “à demander à la Commu-
naute, sous la menace voilée de réduire leur participation à la défense de l’Europe,
sous celle, explicite, d’utilizer les moyens de protection prévus par le projet de loi
sur commerce (Trade Bill), et au nom de la solidarité atlantique, le plus concessions
possibile dans le domaines tariffaire, agricole, ainsi que dans celui des diverses as-
sociations conclues avec les pays d’Afrique et du bassin méditerranéen.”14 The
American idea of globalisation completed the arsenal of the United States in the up-
coming negotiations. The linkage consisted in conducting every single negotiation –
commercial, monetary, military – without loosing sight of U.S. political aims; here
lay Kissinger’s reason for wanting to conduct everything “at the highest level.”15
12 Entretiens de Reykjavik : 31 Mai – 1er Juin 1973 : Note de synthese, 18 May 1973, MAE, 727.
13 Déclaration atlantique – Motivations américaines, 28 May 1973, CHAN, Kosciusko-Morizet Pa-
pers, 582AP, 37; also Gerarg Amanrich, La politique européenne des États-Unis, 21 May 1973,
MAE, 747.
14 Entretiens de Reykjavik : 31 Mai – 1er Juin 1973 : Note de synthese, 18 May 1973, MAE, 727.
15 Ibid.
115
What was the French position? What wanted them to obtain in the upcoming
negotiations? And what was Pompidou’s objective in the Reykjavik summit? Again,
internal documents of the Ministère des affaires étrangères summarized them. First
of all, there was the timing problem: The political unity of Europe was too fragile
and there were serious risk that the overhaul proposed by Kissinger would simply
compromise all progresses toward European unity and offer to the United States
“les moyens d’imposer leur direction.” That this was the real intention of the Nixon
administration, “transparaît [...] dans le discours de M. Kissinger.”16
Secondarily, “Les méthodes proposées par les États-Unis sont impossibles à met-
tre en ouvre, puisque chacune des négociations – économique, monétaire, sur la
défense – se déroule dans son cadre propre (GATT, OCDE, OTAN, FMI) et entre
partenaires différents.” For example, it was impossible for France to exclude the
developing countries from discussions on monetary matters.17
Thirdly, so complex were the relations between the Western countries that sub-
ordinating them to a “concertation d’ensemble risquerait d’avoir un effet restrictiff.”
The situation was completely different from that present in the East, “où des mécan-
ismes politiques sont nécessaires pour stimuler des relations jusque là indigentes.”18
Finally, France was absolutely contrary to the idea of forming a block of rich
Western countries vis-à-vis Third World countries or East countries.19 This points
of view did not change very much during summer 1973. What changed was French
answer to U.S. challenge. In fact the French were very preoccupied with Europeans
reactions to the initiative. They studied carefully and repeatedly the reactions of
Britain, Germany, Italy, and that of the other Western and Eastern European coun-
16 Synthése en vue des entretiens franco-américaines des 31 mai et 1er juin 1973, undated but mid-
May 1973, MAE, 747.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
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tries. It was the slow identification of a common European position that led the
French to change their policy in summer: from the insistence to conduct a strictly
bilateral diplomacy with the United States to the French-lead European response to
Kissinger’s initiative. I will focus on this change of policy after the examination of
the British reaction.
5.2 To put flesh on its bones
The United States wanted Britain to lead. On the day of Kissinger’s pronouncement
Cromer wrote “Sonnenfeldt has repeated Kissinger’s request that we should say
something to welcome the speech.” Cromer warned of the risks that without a
positive European reaction the initiative would “fall flat.” He had no suggestions
for the moment being because he had not had the time to study the text in detail.20
The initial British reaction was generally warmer than the French one. They
appreciated the “attempt to undercut the efforts of the economic protectionists and
the Mansfieldites.” Without doubt the initiative would be “used to extract conces-
sions, especially in the trade field. But the speech could have been substantially
tougher.” Moreover this represented the “start of a long process of negotiation” and
a “major political act.”21 Kissinger, Trend noted, was now “a man in a hurry” in
regards to Europe; this hurry stemmed “from his increasing realisation that time is
running against him.”22 Fortunately the British looked favorably to several aspects
of the speech: “the stated desire for co-operation, not confrontation;” “the re-stated
20 Washington tel 1362, AMU 3/507/1, 23 April 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 71.
21 Ibid., doc. 72.
22 Minute: Trend to Heath, 24 April 1973, CAB 164/1233, DBPO 3.4, doc. 74.
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US commitment to Western defence;” “the renewed pledge of support for European
unity.”23
But with every passing day, for some reason that I have not been able to iden-
tify exactly, the British analyses became increasingly negative. For example, on
June 7, 1973, J. Oliver Wright, deputy under-secretary supervising the European
departments of the Foreign Office, wrote that if, despite Europeans moves toward
burden-sharing, Kissinger continued to insist that the British should “deliver the
French,” then:
[T]he Kissinger exercise would then be revealed less as an honest at-
tempt to put more sex appeal into the transatlantic relationship and more
as a bit of private enterprise on his part to add the European scalp to his
Russian and Chinese trophies and so improve his own position in Wash-
ington.24
Douglas-Home, described by Kissinger as “one of the wisest and most decent man
I have the privilege to met,”25 started to wonder if the “motive behind Kissinger’s
proposal” was “his personal wish to get his hands on the levers of power in the
Washington decision-making process on economic and monetary matters.”26 Why
this change? My hypothesis is that the continuous contacts and exchanges of views
with the rest of Europe caused this shift. Without fanfare, if this interpretation is
correct, the various inter-Europeans fora – most notably the EPC – were produc-
ing a partial convergence. As in the case of France, Britain dedicated the lion’s
share of her attention to the reactions of all the other Europeans.27 Other possi-
ble reasons, none at the exclusion of the others, were: the British assessments of
23 Minute by Overton, AMU 3/507/1, 30 April 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc 77.
24 Minute: J O Wright to Greenhill, MWE 3/304/1, 7 June 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 113.
25 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 721.
26 Tel 1234 Washington, AMU 3/507/1, 8 June 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 116.
27 Some examples from DBPO 3.4: Paris tel 588, AMU 3/507/1, 30 April 1973, doc 75; Tel 972
to Washington, MWE 3/304/1, 30 April 1973, doc. 78; Minute: Robinson to J O Wright, MWE
3/304/1, 16 May 1973, doc. 86; UKDEL NATO tel 8 saving, MWE 3/304/1, 11 May 1973, doc.
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Nixon’s weakness in the wake of Watergate; the profound dislike in FCO circles of
Kissinger’s personality and methods; Prime Minister Heath’s strong preference for
the European option.
On May 2, Trend wrote to Heath the the Year of Europe was “clearly designed as
a challenge to Europe.” It is “particularly vague about both the content of a new At-
lantic Charter” and at the same time “unnecessarily disparaging of the work already
in hand in various international contexts particularly on economic and monetary is-
sues.” Moreover with its reference to the dangers of leaving such issues solely to
experts “it may be inviting us, in effect, to subordinate the economic interests of
Europe to the political exigencies of Washington.” In Trend’s view it would not be
welcomed in Europe, particularly in France, and the British “must be wary of any
United States attempt to drive a political wedge between ourselves and our Euro-
pean allies or to use us as a stalking horse for Washington’s purposes in Europe.”28
What to do then? What were the best choices for the FCO? Abandon the U.S. to
themselves? Rebuffing the initiative, Trend thought, would only foster “isolationist
tendencies” in Washington, “which President Nixon’s Administration is genuinely
trying to resist.” Sir Trend proposed three possible, not mutually exclusive, devel-
opments (the italicized parts were underlined by Heath):
• “[A]ccept in principle the idea of a new Atlantic Charter if it were intended
to express in general terms a number of broad underlying objectives in the
monetary, trade and defence fields.”
• “To go beyond generalities and to endorse a more detailed set of objectives
designed to govern the course of negotiations would be much more difficult,”
90; Paris tel 691, PREM 15/1554, 18 May 1973, doc. 96; Extract from record of conversation:
Heath/Pompidou, PREM 15/1555, 22 May 1973, doc. 98.
28 Minute: Trend to Heath, Douglas-Home papers, 2 May 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 81. For other
negative analysis of Kissinger’s speech see in DBPO 3.4: Minute: Overton to Wiggin, AMU
3/507/1, 11 May 1973, doc. 88; Exchange of minutes: Overton/Wiggin, AMU 3/507/1, 6 June
1973, doc. 97.
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because it might prejudice British chances of extracting the best results from
the individual negotiations.
• “[T]he unifying political framework should be provided by some kind of very
high-level steering committee, which would supervise a number of working
parties concerned with the separate defence, economic and political issues”
creating “considerable problems in terms of both personalities and organi-
sation” and it would “considerably complicate our relations with our other
allies.”
Trend was not entirely convinced, he wanted the for HMG to show “full support”
to the United State Government in reaching their desires, but in accordance with
“European opinion.” Almost. Practically speaking it “would be preferable that the
United States, having launched this project should also be responsible for following
it up and making the running for at least the next round or two.”29
Unfortunately this last course was to prove unfeasible. In the meantime Cromer
had enquired in Washington circles on this Year of Europe. He was hoping to dis-
cover what were preparing in regard to the Year of Europe. He found out that “The
answer seems to be not much.” By this point, It was no big surprise to him that the
“State Department show no sign of having been consulted in advance.” Not much
did he obtain, for that matter, from “Kissinger’s own staff, who are busy with many
other matters including the Vietnam Peace Settlement, US/Soviet relations in the
light of Brezhnev’s forthcoming visit and so on, appear to have carried their think-
ing very far.” Like Trend, Cromer wanted the HMS to do something – “the current
malaise in US public affairs makes a response even more necessary” – “European
scepticism” would help “neither continent.” A skeptical argument, like seeing the
Atlantic Charter as the result of Kissinger’s “personal hankering after a conceptual
approach to international relations,” would be a mistaken and would help none of
29 Ibid. This last quotation was underlined by Heath.
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the continents. “I know,” he specified, “that there is suspicion in some quarters that
this concept of Kissinger’s is the product of his devious mind, a ploy designed to
win our acceptance for his ‘ball of wax’ concept, by high-flown appeals to Atlantic
solidarity and so on.” Of course, he went on, Kissinger and Nixon believed that
“progress towards some kind of reaffirmation of the Atlantic Charter is in the US
interest,” but there was, “nothing wrong in that” because this was not a zero-sum
game.30
Indeed, Cromer concluded, “I see no reason why to seek to bring Europe, the
United States and Japan, closer together should be to the detriment of European
unity: in fact, I think it might well prove the reverse.” Therefore he decided to
throw his “own hat into the ring” and propose a two stage approach:
• As the first stage he aimed at producing “a broad Declaration of Principles,”
It would “take ingenuity to avoid” that the statement would be so general that
the “Russians and just about everyone else could subscribe to it.”
• For stage two he envisioned a “series of actions to put flesh on its bones,” pos-
sibly producing conventions or even treaties, and maybe another declaration.
He saw two difficulties for this second stage. The primary problem was: how to
choose the right forum for these discussions? He thought that discussing them be-
forehand between the Nine – it had “the added advantage that it might give impetus
to the effectiveness of political discussion by the Davignon Committee” – and then
invite the other nations. That was exactly what Nixon and Kissinger did not want as
I have demonstrated in the previous chapters. British attempts to construe positive
European response to the U.S. initiative were destined to fail because of the inherent
and, to them, unknown nature of the initiative. The second problem was French po-
sition. With a good deal of condescendence, he proposed to meet French concerns
with “an appeal to their vanity,” flattering them with “an invitation to produce the
30 Letter: Cromer to Brimelow, AMU 3/507/1, 8 May 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 87.
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first draft, particularly if it was accompanied by a reference (whatever the truth of
the statement) to the suitability of the French language for such purposes.31
Initially Heath chose Trend’s suggestion as the way to “react to the Kissinger ini-
tiative.”32 The actual course of British diplomacy was not that easy to set anyhow.
What happened in practice, was that London was caught between very hard U.S.
pressures on one side and, on the other, French obduracy and Jobert’s stalling ma-
neuvers. It was Overton who caught better the course that British diplomacy later
assumed for at least one month:
I conclude that, as a result of the President’s commitment to working
out US/Europe relations and his weakened domestic position [Water-
gate and an hostile Congress], Europe is in a stronger bargaining po-
sition vis à vis the US if it plays its cards right. The President needs
success. But it is important to tempt him forward step by step so that
he cannot retreat, and not rebuff him at any stage. The President will
also try to exploit in bargaining his very weakness vis à vis Congress
(eg over the Trade Reform Bill). Europe should therefore adopt a sym-
pathetic and constructive stance but play things cool and long, decline
to be hustled, and progressively force the Americans to redefine their
objectives in face of the difficulties.33
French obstinacy made very difficult a positive response to Washington. Heath
refused to take the lead in formulating a unified European proposal. He was more
ready to forfeit the “special relationship” than to risk the faith that he had build in
Paris.34
31 Ibid.
32 Letter: Bridges to Norbury, CAB 164/1233, 3 May 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 84.
33 Minute: Overton to Wiggin, AMU 3/507/1, 9 May 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 88.
34 Möckli, “Asserting Europe’s Distinct Identity,” pp. 200–201; Edward Heath, Old World, New
Horizons: Britain, the Common Market and the Atlantic Alliance. Harvard University Press,
1970; Edward Heath, “European unity over the next ten years: from Community to Union.” In:
International Affairs 64.2 (1988), pp. 199–207.
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When Kissinger visited Britain on May 10, Whitehall made some vague proce-
dural suggestions about Kissinger’s proposal but remained noncommittal about the
content of any possible declaration.35 The rather negative French approach won lit-
tle cabinet sympathy, but Anglo-French cooperation36 was considered fundamental
to the Community’s success. Confrontation was to be avoided. Heath reminded to
FCO officials on June 20, 1973, that the enlarged EC was not ready to make a uni-
fied approach to Washington.37 Pompidou shared completely this position; he told
Nixon that the wide range of issues proposed for the transatlantic declaration would
be too much for the EC “car la Communauté européenne n’est pas une réalité poli-
tique, elle n’est qu’économique.”38 In the U.S. version of the Reykjavik meeting
Pompidou goes as far as to say “I did not speak for Europe although I did not forget
Europe. [...] I speak not on behalf of others, [...] I speak for France.”39
Of the big Three, only Brandt tried to speak explicitly on behalf of Europe, striv-
ing “d’apparaître comme un bon ‘Européen’,”40 but the German position was weak.
Quay d’Orsay felt that Germany was bound to fall into the arms of Washington
because of the indispensable U.S. security guarantee. The French opposition to
Bonn’s proposals was very much alive even at the end of August; there had not
been a French policy change in July, and it was only partial during August:
35 Record of conversation: Douglas-Home/Kissinger, AMU 3/548/14, 10 May 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc.
89.
36 For example, in the nuclear field, Helen Parr, “Anglo-French Nuclear Collaboration and Britains
Policy Towards Europe, 1970–1973.” In: Jan Harst, ed. Beyond the Customs Union: The Euro-
pean Community’s Quest for Deepening, Widening and Completion, 1969-1975. Bruylant, 2007,
pp. 35–59.
37 Cabinet Minutes, GEN 161(73) 3rd mtg, CAB 130/671, 20 June 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 137.
38 Les enregistrements des négociations entre Nixon et Pompidou, 31 May 1973, CHAN 5AG2,
1023.
39 Memorandum of Conversation, 1 May 1973, FRUS E15.2, pp. 953–954.
40 Visite du Chancelier Brandt aux États-Unis, 4 June 1973, MAE, US files, 748; Hiepel,
“Kissinger’s Year of Europe,” p. 285; Memorandum for the President’s File by Kissinger, 1 May
1973, FRUS E15.2, pp. 824–826; Möckli, European Foreign Policy, p. ritrovare; Möckli, “Assert-
ing Europe’s Distinct Identity,” pp. 199–200.
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En ce qui concerne la procédure nous ne pouvions retenir la suggestion
allemande d’un groupe de travail euro-américain. Ce n’etait pas la voie
permettant de faire apparaître l’identité européenne.
Quant à l’idee avancée par Bonn d’adopter lors de la venue de M.
Nixon un texte intérimaire qui ouvrirait la voie à un dialogue permanent,
elle n’avait pas notre appui.41
A combination of U.S. and French pressure and Germany’s inherent political weak-
ness led the German decision-makers to choose to play from the sidelines. So
heavy-handed was French pressure on Bonn, that the German Secretary of State,
Paul Frank, suggested not to argue in favor of transatlantic cooperation in order to
avoid conflicts between the Nine and France. From now on, Germany should not
expose itself too much and simply declare the they would prefer a substantial form
of cooperation between the CE and the United States. When the first drafts were
produced – by France and Britain – in September 1973, Walter Scheel, German
Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor, refrained from presenting a German draft
document to avoid any further irritation.42
Another example of French intransigence was theMay 14 lunch between Christo-
pher Ewart-Biggs, Minister at the British Embassy in Paris and François Puaux, po-
litical director at the Quai d’Orsay. Puaux expressed his clear distaste for Kissinger’s
initiative, and stated that even a simple European communiqué would signify “an
acceptance of the thesis of the global approach.” They had to rebuff this American
“offensive” and remain “European.” And in the improbable case of a Nixon’s trip to
Europe, there would be nothing “in the nature of a Community gang-bang.”43 Pom-
pidou himself had been clear in opposing to Brandt’s idea of a meeting between
Nixon and the EC Council of Foreign Ministers,44 and, again, when he ruled out
41 Courcel, Pour l’information personnelle de l’ambassadeur, 31 August 1973, MAE, US files, 747.
42 Hiepel, “Kissinger’s Year of Europe,” p. 288.
43 Ewart-Biggs to Wright, 14 May 1973, TNA: PRO PREM 15/1554.
44 Gfeller, Building a European Identity, p. 25.
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a meeting between the U.S. President and the EC head of states saying: “Ce serait
Charlemagne réunissant ses barons et leur dictant sa loi.”45
In conclusion, while London, Paris and Bonn shared concerns about the Year of
Europe, up to mid-summer 1973 they did not manage to elaborate a common answer.
Germans were convinced that the answer had to be European – possibly through
EPC – and positive, despite their referring to the initiative as “monstrous” and as one
reflecting the “wishful thinking of a great power” (Grossmachtwunschdenken).46
Britain too favored both a positive response to Kissinger and a common European
position. The French would have none of it. The only thing that, in French view,
that Nixon could hope for would be a series of bilateral meetings with the various
leaders. The lack of European coherence, as Pompidou’s told Brandt, would render
a Nixon’s visit to the Nine “a ballet des Neuf devant a Nixon [...] Nous ne pouvons
pas nous comporter comme des rois devant l’empereur romain. Ce n’est pas ma con-
ception des rapports.”47 Ewart-Biggs concluded that neither Pompidou nor Jobert
was “sorry to see the American Year of Europe bogged down.”48 French position
was both ideology and strategy. Indeed it was ideological because, as Ewart-Biggs
noted, “They are pathologically sensitive about any implication that Europe is in
any sense subordinate to or dependent upon the United States. It is strangely like a
sort of Third World psychosis towards the colonial power.”49 But it was also strate-
gic because France knew that it acted as the hardest nut to crack, the United States,
Britain, Germany and the rest of Europe would have to follow her lead. Indeed, no
flesh was put on its bones during the summer and the “key to unlock the Year of
Europe” rested firmly in the hands of Pompidou and Jobert.
45 Ibid., pp. 40–41.
46 Möckli, “Asserting Europe’s Distinct Identity,” pp. 199–200.
47 Négociations entre Nixon et Pompidou, 22 June 1973, CHAN 5AG2, 1023.
48 Paris tel 1044, MWE 3/304/1, 8 August 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 190; For the French version see
Entretien avec M. Ewart-Biggs – Relations Europe–États-Unis, 9 August 1973, MAE; EC files,
3810.
49 Paris tel 1122, MWE 3/304/1, 28 August 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 210.
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5.3 A dialogue of the deaf?
At the Reykjavik meeting on May 31 and June 1, 1973, between Pompidou and
Nixon it seemed almost as a dialogue of the deaf.50 Pompidou asked Nixon if the
Year of Europe was supposed to be a “béatification” or an “étranglement” of the
EC.51 The French, consistently against a multilateral approach, did not react well
when Kissinger declared, “immédiatement après les entretiens, que selon la déléga-
tion les contacts bilatéraux devraient permettre la réunion à brève échéance d’une
conférence multilatérale, à laquelle du côté français il n’a jamais été acquiscé.”52
The British noticed that “there was some colossal misunderstanding between the
Americans and the French about what it was that it had been really agreed at Reyk-
javik.”53 Kissinger blamed the press for being “wide off the mark,” and Brandt,
after all, the “idea of such a meeting had been Brandt’s, not theirs.”54
As a matter of fact, the only multilateral negotiations to which the French had
agreed were those on specific problems – to negate every U.S. attempt of global-
isation – “au sein des organismes existants (FMI, GATT, Conseil Atlantique). La
question éventuelle d’une conférence au sommet serait examinée à la lumière de
l’ensemble de ces negotiations. Mais il était trop tôt pour décider si un tel sommet
était utile.”55
Only after the meeting between Jobert and Kissinger in mid-June the French
were starting to take in consideration “l’opportunité d’organiser une rencontre mul-
tilatérale entre les adjoints des ministres des affaires entrangeres, ce qui pour nous
50 Reykjavik, 1 June 1973, MAE, US files, 727; Courcel, Entretiens de Reykajvik, 6 June 1973, Ibid.
51 Négociations entre Nixon et Pompidou, 22 June 1973, CHAN 5AG2, 1023.
52 Relations entre l’Europe et le États-Unis, 4 June 1973, MAE, US files, 748.
53 Letter: Trend to Cromer, CAB 164/1233, 8 June 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 115.
54 Record of meeting: Trend/Kissinger, CAB 164/1233, 4 June 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 108.
55 Courcel, Entretiens de Reykajvik, 6 June 1973, MAE, US files, 727.
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veut dire le directeur des affaires politiques.”56 The French tactic was working.
They refused – “contrairement à ce qui avait été annoncé par certains diplomates
américains” – a U.S. proposal for a small steering group composed of the United
States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany to prepare for a meeting of
Deputy Foreign Ministers on the grounds that it would irritate the smaller members
of the EC.57
Kissinger would try everything to get the French on board with initiative, the
nuclear cooperation examined in the first chapter was just one example. In Lon-
don he explained that he “he could not understand French logic in their attitude to
the US proposals for the Year of Europe.” The United States would have been, in
his view, “better off conducting the economic and trade negotiations as a test of
strength.” Moreover, “If the Administration wanted an immediate political success
to distract attention from the Watergate affair, as the French had alleged, a Connally-
type confrontation would be far more effective.” Finally, in what the British per-
ceived as “piece of quasi-blackmail,” Kissinger told them that, “unless the White
House started a massive fight now” on behalf of a good European response to the
Year of Europe, “Congress may legislate 75–90,000 troops out of Europe before
the end of the year, despite the President’s assurances that there will be no unilat-
eral withdrawal of American forces, and that this danger exists even before the start
of the MBFR negotiations.”58 The British were unimpressed. Such a withdrawal
“would be ‘an act of gross public indecency’ and the beginning of the end of the
Alliance.” For this reason they “clearly doubted whether it would happen.”59 The
FCO was shapeshifting in a den of Gaullists.
56 Courcel, Entretien entre le ministre et M. Kissinger, MAE, US files, 748.
57 Ibid.; Record of meeting: Trend/Kissinger, CAB 164/1233, 4 June 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 108.
58 Ibid.; Minute: J O Wright to Greenhill, MWE 3/304/1, DBPO 3.4, doc. 113.
59 Ibid.
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Anyhow not everything was frozen in Paris. Their continuous reading of Euro-
pean positions produced small to and fro shifts in the French position.60 Once again,
as in the case of Britain, I argue that this continuous exchange of informations was
behind the very slow shift toward the common European response that emerged
later, during the EPC ministerial meeting on September 10/11, 1973.
The EPC meeting of June 6, Douglas-Home wrote, “the discussions was be-
deviled by French suspicions that the rest of us were trying to blur the distinction
between the political cooperation and the council machinery.” They were able to
reach a common conclusion – the Belgian text – only because Jobert’s “sensitivity
about the possibility of appearing isolated in a position which could be represented
as not being ‘European’.”61 Yet by mid-July the French were having profound dis-
cussions at the Quai d’Orsay on the two drafts of a European response proposed
by Holland and Belgium respectively – “tous deux ono été rédigés avec prudence,
peut-être en raison des positions que le Ministre [Jobert] avait prises.”62
Some historians have concluded that Jobert was playing “a double game with
Kissinger, insisting on continuing the bilateral deliberations, while at the same time
working on a common EPC position within the framework of the Nine.”63 Jobert
in his memoirs depicted himself as the one who, as soon as he became French For-
eign Minister, pursued immediately the “Europe européenne” through EPC mecha-
nism.64 In reality, there was on the French part no desire to work by the EPC rules
60 The examples of French documents examining European positions abound. Here are some ex-
amples arbitrarily chosen from May 1973: La Grande-Bretagne et la coopération à Neuf dans
le domaine de la politique étrangère, 8 May 1973, MAE, Direction d’Europe, Sous-direction
d’Europe occidentale, Série Grande-Bretagne (Hereafter GB files) 353; Réactions au discours de
M. Kissinger, 14 May 1973, MAE, EC files, 3810; Visite du Chancelier Brandt aux États-Unis –
Rappel de Conclusions, 15 May 1973, EC files, 3810; Entretien avec M. Ducci : L’Italie, l’Europe
et les États-Unis : L’ère de soupçon, 8 May 1973, MAE, US files, 747.
61 Tel 450 to Paris, MWE 3/304/1, 6 June 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 110.
62 Projet de déclaration atlantique (rapports Europe–États-Unis), 13 July 1973, MAE, US files, 748.
63 Hiepel, ““Kissinger’s Year of Europe,” p. 286; a similar interpretation in Möckli, European For-
eign Policy, p. 163.
64 Jobert, Mémoires d’avenir, p. ritorvare; Jobert, L’autre regard, pp. 320–320.
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during summer. My hypothesis is that there was no double game aimed at taking a
lead role in Europe before September 1973. The French were delaying because they
hoped that such tactics could lead to the collapse of the entire US enterprise, given
the weakness of the Nixon Administration. In the end, it was despite themselves
that the French helped to put together a document in which EC states stated their
aspirations to become an internationally influential actor in September.
Before the EPC ministerial meeting of July 23 in Copenhagen, Jobert warned
that France would absent itself if pushed too far.65 The EPC meeting was held in
Copenhagen, the capital of the acting Danish presidency, rather than in Brussels,
despite the fact that the same ministers were to hold their EC Council meeting in
the afternoon, thanks to Jobert’s opposition. During the meeting itself, progress
was limited. Jobert agreed only to work on a European identity paper, a British
initiative in an effort to cut through the procedural obstacles, but tried once again to
delay any consideration of Nixon’s projected visit.66 During august France slowly
started to accept the idea of building an European machinery at the EPC ministerial
meeting on September. They marveled at the draft presented by Britain because it
had actually taken account of all French views.67 And they found very interesting
the European convergence on the response to the Year of Europe.68 Even Puaux
later would have said that “the French had been pleasantly surprised to find that,
far from being a Trojan Horse, British views had proved this summer to be very
“European.”69
65 Record of conversation: Jobert, Heath and Douglas-Home at 10 Downing Street, MWE 3/304/1,
3 July 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc 146.
66 Letter: Palliser to J O Wright, MWE 3/304/1, 24 July 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 171.
67 Relations Europe États-Unis : Reflexions du Foreign Office et document britannque, 22 August
1973, MAE, US Files, 748.
68 Rapports Europe États-Unis : Remarques sur les vues anglaises et italiennes, 27 August 1973,
Ibid.; Relations Europe États-Unis : Vues italiennes, 27 August 1973, Ibid.
69 Minute: M D Butler to Acland, MWE 3/304/6, 3 October 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 254.
129
The surprise came from an unexpected direction. On July 30, 1973, Brimelow
summarized this new and not yet stable European position to Kissinger:
By mid-August the Nine were to have made available to the Danish
Chairman the texts of contributions to a document which would consti-
tute the Community’s position on what might be said to the President,
if and when he came to Europe. The text would be worked on by the
Danish Chairman and would be reviewed by the political correspon-
dents in the capitals of the Nine by the end of August, by the Political
Directors on 4/5 September and by the Foreign Ministers of the Nine in
Copenhagen on 10/11 September.
Kissinger was perplexed. With who was he supposed to speak? The Danish Foreign
Minister, “whose name he did not know,” and “against whom he had nothing per-
sonally, was bound to be no more than a messenger boy.” The U.S. “could not be
presented with a fait accompli.” They were being said that “they would not be given
anything until it had been discussed with ‘Norway, Luxembourg and even Ireland’
and that then, in mid-September, the Danish Foreign Minister would come along to
them with a draft.” Such a procedure, Kissinger berated, “was incompatible with
the sort of relationship the US had had with Britain in the past, as well as insulting”
and that if “an adversary relationship was to develop then Europe must accept the
consequences, and they would be very painful.” For him, “the ‘Year of Europe’ was
over” and that in his personal view, Nixon’s European tour should be cancelled.”
The speech had been, he said, “one of the worst mistakes that he had made.”70
The meeting dragged on. Recriminations abounded on both sides. Kissinger said
out loud, probably for the first time, some of the aspects of the Year of Europe that
he had never mentioned to Europeans. The British officials were perplexed. Trend
told Kissinger that the “US were trying to get the machine to work faster than it was
capable of” and and that it “was the Americans who had asked for a coordinated
70 Record of meeting: Kissinger/Trend, RS 2/3, 22 August 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 179.
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European response.” After all, here in Europe they were “trying to create a political
union.” Kissinger’s response was illuminating:
Dr Kissinger said there had been no necessity for the Community to
respond as a group rather than as individual Heads of Government. He
had thought it would be quite possIble to have national reactions. He
had not realised that European Union had to come first. [...] [H]e em-
phasized that the US Government had never intended to use this initia-
tive to build Europe; they had wanted to build Atlantic unity.
He added the he resented the British for the procedure devised in Europe. “There
were two consequences: first, how to conduct the “Year of Europe,” and second,
how to conduct bilateral relations in future. Both would be severely affected by
recent events.”71
With ironical undertones, Trend asked Kissinger if he “was asking us to tell
the Europeans that the US was angry with us for having talked to the Europeans
first.” Kissinger answered saying that “the sensible procedure would have been a
discussion between the United States and the key European countries.” After all
the “US had never treated Britain as just another country.” The quandary had no
solutions because contradictions between what the U.S. had asked and what the U.S.
really aimed to achieve. Trend told Kissinger that “it would be extremely difficult
for us to say to our allies that the Americans were cross with us because we could
not conduct with them a kind of discussion that they refused to conduct with the
other Europeans.”72
It was at this point that in Britain Kissinger’s methods reached their nadir of
popularity. References to his “highly idiosyncratic way of doing business,”73 his
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.; The British told about this encounter to French relating almost everything: Beurmarchais,
Entretien anglo-américain sur les relations transatlantiques, 7 August 1973, MAE, EC Files, 3810.
73 Letter: Sykes to Brimelow, AMU 3/507/1, 22 August 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 201.
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going “into all this without adequate preparation,” with “imperfect understanding”
and “in a secretiveness of manner which has led to repeated misunderstandings,”74
to his “bilateral secretiveness” who “led to no end of misunderstandings,”75 started
to show in almost every analysis on the Year of Europe. The Germans started to call
him the Great Gambler and together with the British decided that “if the US author-
ities were seriously interested in European views on the US/European relationship
they should have the patience to await the outcome” of the September Copenhagen
meeting.76
On August 3 Heath approached Brand with a proposal for a tripartite meeting
with Pompidou. Brandt refused judging the British offer “too dramatic,” but the
flurry of activity during August was nonetheless steeped up between European coun-
tries. By the end of the month the machinery for the European response was almost
ready and the French started to consider playing by the EPC rules.77
5.4 The Nine Unite
But with Nixon’s visit becoming less and less probable the success of the Copen-
hagen meeting in September assumed a renewed importance. It transformed in the
desire to show the world that “Western Europe was working positively on the urgent
problems.” During his visit in Bonn, Brimelow observed that the irony was “just
when we in Europe thought [...] that we were beginning to make some progress, the
US [...] started to lose heart.” Nonetheless the British and the German had to be
careful, because everything could come down crash down given that the last French
74 Ottawa tel 4 to Paris, MWE 3/304/1, 3 August 1973, DPBO 4.3, doc. 182.
75 Bonn tel 7 to Ottawa, MWE 3/304/1, 3 August 1973, doc. 185.
76 Ibid.
77 Gfeller, Building a European Identity, pp. 41, 45.
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resistances were not completely overcome. Scheel told Brimelow that they “should
be flexlible” because “the French should be given the possibility of adjusting their
minds on procedure.”78
These last French resistances were overcome thanks to the general European
united position and the British drafts on the European Identity and on the declaration
on CE–American relations that were to be submitted for the Copenhagen meeting.
The general conclusion of the British draft was (emphasis mine):
Although the Nine were not consulted by the Americans before the
Year of Europe was launched and would have preferred an American
approach that was less precipitate, dramatic and demanding, there is
no need for the Nine to regard themselves as unduly on the defensive
or to be too apprehensive about the outcome. American exigencies
have provided a useful stimulus, as did those of the Soviet Union in
the context of the CSCE, towards greater co-operation among the Nine
and are thus helping to promote the objectives of the Nine. These can
be still further advanced if the Nine adopt and adhere to the principle
that agreement among themselves must always precede agreement with
the Americans. [...] In doing so, however, they should not aim at a
confrontation with the Americans nor attempt to achieve any kind of
victory. Their objective should be to offer the Americans the maximum
public impact, at the same time making it clear that concrete issues
must be separately negotiated and that the Year of Europe marks the
beginning of a longer process of re-shaping the Atlantic relationship.
The motto of the Nine should be suaviter in modo, fortiter in re.79
The Nine accepted this document as the basis for the future Copenhagen September
10/11 meeting.80 Jobert had already appropriated of the first British idea of an “iden-
tity paper”81 and he had given it a new dimensions. “L’Europe” he had intimated
78 Bonn tel 895, MWE 3/304/1, 17 August 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 200.
79 FCO paper, MWE 3/304/1, undated but mid-August 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 193.
80 The French acceptance in Europe–États-Unis, 20 August 1973, MAE, EC files, 3810; the last
version of the draft: Copenhagen tel 322, MWE 3/304/1, 5 September 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 220.
81 Tel 1528 to Washington, MWE 3/304/1, 24 July 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 167.
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should assert its identity on “tous azimuts, à tous usages, et pur elle-même.”82
EPC preparations went smoothly. When the ministerial meeting finally took
place it was an overwhelming success. “The French lifted their general reserves
on both substance and procedure” and a “tour de table on the European identity
revealed a large measure of agreement.” The Nine agreed on ten subjects to be dis-
cussed with Nixon in his forthcoming visit to Europe. In particular, they approved
the part of the declaration dealing with foreign policy matters and proposed a new
European–American bilateralism. It was also established a new procedure for the
European Commission to participate in those parts of the declaration that dealt with
issues that were within the competence of the Community, and it was proposed
that negotiations with the United States take place in ad hoc meetings between the
political directors of the Nine and their U.S. counterpart.83
Douglas-Home talked of a turning point in EC history and the beginning of a
“new diplomacy.”84 This could be a Year of Europe, Jobert thought, although in
a very different way from what Kissinger had intended.85 Had it not been for the
October war and the ensuing oil crisis he would have probably been right.
5.5 The end of the Year of Europe
The last three months of 1973 were full of tension and drama in the international
scene. The October war strained the détente between the superpowers and created
82 Relations Europe–Ètats-Units, 24 July 1973, MAE, EC files, 3810.
83 Copenhagen tel 339, AMU 3/507/1, 11 September 1973, DBPO 3.4, doc. 227; IXe Reunion
Ministerielle : Copenhague, 10/11 septembre 1973 : Releve de conclusions, 11 September 1973,
MAE, EC files, 3810.
84 Quoted in Möckli, “Asserting Europe’s Distinct Identity,” p. 207.
85 Jobert, L’autre regard, pp. 329–320.
134
new ruptures in transatlantic relations. The oil crisis put enormous financial strain
on oil-consuming countries and sparked a sense of vulnerability among industrial-
ized nations. Being much more dependent on oil imports than the U.S., the Nine
felt threatened for the first time by the economic policies of a group of develop-
ing countries. This introduced a North–South dimension into the European security.
Moreover the Arab oil producer did not treat the Nine as a group complicating there-
fore a coordinated effort.86
Despite these difficulties the EPC took another step forward issuing on Novem-
ber 6, 1973, a Declaration on the Middle East that contained the common European
policy on the Arab–Israel conflict. By the end of the Year the EPC brought the
heads of state into the EPC and published a Declaration on European Identity in
mid-December. Kissinger’s vaunted shuttle diplomacy between Egypt and Israel
unwittingly helped the unified European reaction. On November 12, in front of the
French Assemblée nationale, Jobert declared the Europe was being “traitée comme
une non-personne, humiliée dans son inexistence.”87 Europe’s complete marginal-
ization convinced French leaders that her only option was working through EPC.
However, as the end of the year approached, new pressures and frictions began to
produce cracks in the European common front. The sharp European-American rows
on Middle East illustrated the fact that the positions on the opposite shores of the
Atlantic were completely divergent. The ongoing negotiations on the declarations
related to the Year of Europe stagnated thanks to new proposals from Kissinger that
86 For this and the following paragraphs see, for example, Giuliano Garavini, Dopo gli imperi: in-
tegrazione europea nello scontro Nord-Sud. Le Monnier, 2009, chapter 5; Francesco Petrini,
“L’arma del petrolio: lo “shock” petrolifero e il confronto Nord-Sud. Parte prima. L’Europa alla
ricerca di un’alternativa: la Comunità tra dipendenza energetica ed egemonia statunitense” In:
Daniele Caviglia, Antonio Varsori, eds. Dollari, petrolio e aiuti allo sviluppo. Il confronto Nord-
Sud negli anni ’60–70. FrancoAngeli, 2007, chapter 3; Giuliano Garavini and Francesco Petrini,
“Continuity or Change? The 1973 Oil Crisis Reconsidered.” In: Antonio Varsori and Guia Migani,
eds. Europe in the International Arena during the 1970s. P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2011, pp. 211–230.
87 Quoted in Jean-Pierre Teyssier, “L’année 1973 dans la politique étrangère du président Pompidou.”
In: Politique étrangere, 39.4 (1973), pp. 473–504.
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reopened the debates in Europe. European inability to agree on effective economic
policies in dealing with the oil crisis and reciprocal accusations of lack of solidarity
threatened the very basis of European integration.
With U.S. economy in better shape and with the glaring successes of his personal
diplomacy in the Middle East, “Super–K,” as was now called Kissinger, was in a
much better position to “impose his will on the Nine” as one FCO official put it.88
Governments in Britain, West Germany, and elsewhere started to wonder whether
improved bilateral relations with Washington were not a better way to cope with the
massive economic and security challenges. The Washington Energy Conference
starting on February 11, 1974, was, in the words of Daniel Möckli, “a continuation
of the ‘Year of Europe’ by other means.”89 It was during this Conference that the
European front crumbled.
Kissinger that night said happily “We have broken the Community, just as I
always thought I wanted to.”90
88 Quoted in Möckli, European Foreign Policy, p. 252.
89 Ibid., p. 253.
90 Quoted in Gfeller, Building a European Identity, p. 129.
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Conclusion
The Year of Europe became history before the end of the year 1974. The head of
states of the Federal Republic of Germany, of the United Kingdom and of France,
that were responsible for the adversary transatlantic relationship, were all replaced
by mid-1974; Nixon himself resigned in August 1974. This change of leadership
on both sides of the Atlantic was compounded by the oil shock that shifted the per-
ceptions of decline from the United States to Western Europe. Kissinger’s initiative
stood at the convergence between the end of the post-war economic stability and
the crisis-ridden post Bretton Woods system. The Year of Europe had started with
the United States in economic and political competition with a bold and growing
Europe, but ended with a long period of European malaise. Moreover the economic
growth of the post-war years, les Trente Glorieuses, came to an abrupt end, while
stagflation, the combination of rising unemployment and uncontrollable inflation,
started plaguing Western countries. On the political side, European countries were
faced by the prospect of not being able to deal with oil producing countries without
the American diplomatic, economic and military might. This was arguably the prin-
cipal reason behind the Eight – the Nine minus France – decision to side with the
United States at the Washington Energy Conference.
From the U.S. point of view the Year of Europe was perceived as a complete
failure, “the year that never was.” However it was marked by growing European
attempts to coordinate their policies regarding commercial, monetary and political
issues. It produced one of the first cooperative efforts aimed at the reconciliation
of the respective foreign policies and at the definition of a common European iden-
137
tity. The mushrooming of meetings, contacts, communications, and other formal
and informal connections between the various layers the comprised the European
bureaucracy produced a slow but important convergence of approaches, analyses,
and responses to national and international problems. The Year of Europe unwit-
tingly strengthened this process. The European common search for a coordinated
and positive response to the Year of Europe meant more encounters and more ex-
changes. The added external pressure accelerated the ongoing European integration.
European countries, despite an unexpected and intense U.S. opposition, coordinated
successfully their response to the Year of Europe during the summer of 1973.
The U.S. push of a “new Atlantic charter” was not purely a diplomatic exercise.
In his April 23 speech Kissinger expressed the U.S. desire to consider all the rel-
evant aspects of an healthy Atlantic Alliance. The American willingness to see
their initiative succeed influenced the evolution of matters the were apparently un-
related. For example, it had a direct impact on French-U.S. nuclear cooperation.
The collaboration between France and the United States in this field was deemed a
fundamental one, “les saint des saints.” Knowingly Kissinger tried to use the U.S.
technological advantage in the nuclear field as a bargaining chip to soften French
stance toward the diplomatic Year of Europe undertaking. The capacity to link the
several strands of U.S. foreign policy toward a unique goal served Kissinger and
Nixon very well in their dealing with the Communist powers. Vice versa, that same
linkage, proved useless, if not harmful, in U.S. dealings with European allies.
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6.1 The Year of Europe genesis
The Year of Europe was not well received by its intended recipients. European
complaints included the lack of consultation, the timing of the initiative, and many
of its substantive and ideological contents. For these reasons the analysis of the
genesis of this attempted overhaul of transatlantic relations was the primary focus
of this dissertation.
The first question that arose was whether the Europeans were consulted in the
formulation of an initiative that supposedly saw them as protagonists. The answer
to this fundamental question is not straightforward. The three major countries, i.e.
Britain, France, and Germany were informed of U.S. intentions mainly through
Kissinger’s backchannels. They received contrasting informations on the nature of
the initiative; for example, French fears of Germany’s Ostpolitik were exploited by
Kissinger in order to get Pompidou’s green light on the venture. Only the British
were asked to contribute with their own proposals to the formulation of a “con-
ceptual framework” on transatlantic and East-West relations. The resulting British
proposals were dismissed by Kissinger as “mildly fatalistic.” In fact he proceeded
toward his search for a “new Atlantic charter” with no meaningful European contri-
bution. What is more, Kissinger confused a general discussion on Atlantic problems
with real consultation and he asked, secretly and bilaterally, for European public
support for something whose aims were not clearly stated or explained. The lack of
consultation and Kissinger’s methods were blamed later as the main culprits of the
failure of the initiative.
Secondarily, where lay the ideational and practical foundations of the Year of
Europe? The multifaceted nature of the initiative itself complicated the analysis
of the origins of the Year of Europe. For this purpose, I separated analytically the
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examination of the origins in two parts; the first part, i.e. the third chapter, was
dedicated to the exploration of the Kissinger’s and Nixon’s ideas on the role of
Europe in relation to the United States and to the larger world; the second part, i.e.
the fourth chapter, addressed the practical choices made by Kissinger and Nixon
in the days that preceded the April 23 speech. The results of my analysis on the
ideational origins of the Year of Europe showed that the understanding of the role
of the EC countries in Washington’s design was grounded on an economic and
political thinking that was common in the White House well before the launching of
the initiative. While the ideas that were presented during the speech were a clearly
a part of Kissinger’s and Nixon’s reasoning on the international architecture that
preceded the inception of 1973, they were not the only possible choices that the U.S.
Administration examined in regards to her dealings with Europe. The President and
his National Security Adviser did not have a categorical attitude toward European
allies.
In the fourth chapter I analyzed the effect of monetary crisis, that bedeviled the
transatlantic relations during the first months of 1973, on Kissinger’s and Nixon’s
thinking on Europe. The analysis of some of the discussions related to the mone-
tary problems with Europe, that took place in the White House during this period,
showed that the actual contents of the Year of Europe were not set in stone. Every
option remained open, even in March 1973. It was as a reaction to the European
joint float and its perceived unilateral nature, that Kissinger chose to pursue a con-
frontational stance. It was Kissinger that convinced Nixon that this was the best
course of action if the U.S. did not want to loose its primacy. The contingent events
and the European reaction to them were thus determinant in steering toward a adver-
sarial conception of the speech and the related overhaul of transatlantic relations.
Kissinger’s and Nixon’s personality played a large role in this defining of the
Year of Europe contents. Their cold war lens, their preferred methodologies, and
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their “dark view of human nature” led them to interpret negatively European deci-
sions, especially when they felt the U.S. was not being consulted and included in
European decision-making process. It was their harsh reaction to Brandt’s letter to
Nixon on March 2, 1973, that highlighted how contingent events – the monetary cri-
sis and the European joint float – could mix with the decision-makers personalities
and perceptions to cause important changes in policy-making and in international
relations.
6.2 The Year of Europe failure
Kissinger and Nixon did not intend to disrupt transatlantic relations. Their intention
was to ameliorate them and at the same time ensure U.S. presence during all phases
of EC decision-making process. They wanted a stronger Atlantic Alliance because
of their fear of an inward-looking and inimical Congress and of the perceived neg-
ative consequences on international stability in case of American isolation or in
case of U.S. loss of economic, diplomatic, or military primacy. At the same time
they regarded the enlarged EC as an inward-looking economic adversary and as a
greedy military pigmy and they were afraid that economic confrontation would led
to the slow death of the alliance and to the consequent “finlandisation” of Europe. A
stronger Alliance with a more assertive U.S. leadership was identified by Kissinger
and Nixon as the only possible course of action.
Unfortunately for them, the Year of Europe did not produce the results that they
expected. The adversarial economic atmosphere was poisoned by recriminations,
misperceptions and misunderstandings. This resulted in more complicated relations
with all the three bigger European partners. What is more, Europe responded with
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a unifying French-led front – and thus underscored by an anti-American rhetoric –
starting from September 1973 that was to dissolve only thanks to the October war
and its economic a political consequences.
The reasons for this failure were manifold and they extended well beyond the ini-
tial lack of consultation. First of all, the European did not have a clear picture of U.S.
real intentions. They sensed, sometimes rightly so, hidden motives in Kissinger’s
speech and in the general U.S. stance toward a unifying and enlarging European
Community. Many Europeans signaled hegemonic intents behind U.S. desire to
participate in the Nine – and not the Ten, as was pointed out in France – decision-
making process; others were afraid of the horse-trading between security and econ-
omy that the linkage approach suggested. The lack of clear communications with
Washington disrupted the attempts of the atlanticist in Europe to formulate a posi-
tive response to the Year of Europe. Many British and German officials expressed
repeatedly their desire to offer such a positive and, at the same time, collective Euro-
pean response. Sadly their efforts were misdirected because Kissinger was opposed
to any collective response. What he secretly wanted was U.S. participation in those
European fora were those same responses were being formulated.
The incomprehensions were exacerbated by the Administration’s secretive meth-
ods. This secretiveness concentrated the decision-making in the hands of a handful
of high-level officials and consequently diminished the influence of the Department
of State and of European institutions. At the same time, these same methods were re-
sponsible for the complication of intra-Europeans discussions because the informa-
tions in possession of each country were too dependent on what Kissinger had told
them through backchannels directly linked to head of states. Finally, Kissinger’s
diplomacy and personality heightened the perceptions that he was set upon a divide
et impera type of approach, playing Europeans countries one against the other.
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Another reason for both the failure of Kissinger’s enterprise and the build-up of
European suspicions was the Watergate scandal. I showed that Watergate did not
influence the genesis of the Year of Europe. Despite this, many analyses on both
sides of the Atlantic directly linked the initiative origins to the U.S. internal political
malaise, not counting the fact that the scandal diminished European willingness to
collaborate with a weak President. Playing for time was indicated in EC capitals
as a sensible and wise course because of the many uncertainties that beleaguered
Nixon personally. The conflict between Congress and the Presidency gave voice
to all those Europeans who thought that waiting for the future Administration was
the most secure bet. Someone even pointed out to the possibility that the entire
Year of Europe could have been just a tactical ploy to distract the american public
from the internal scandal. Therefore, Watergate influenced both the lifespan and the
development of the Year of Europe.
6.3 Further studies
There are many more questions that remain open or not sufficiently clarified in
regards to the Year of Europe. I will point out four groups of interlinked lines of
enquiry most directly tied to the arguments of this dissertation. The first group of
questions that is directly linked to my research is the demise of the European front
during the winter of 1973–1974.Why the Europeans reacted in a sauve-qui-peutway
to the oil crisis? What led them to abandon their struggles in shaping a common
foreign policy? Was it because of an uncompromising French stance or were there
strong economic and diplomatic motivations that complicated a fruitful European
cooperation? Or, finally, was it the more atlanticist profiles of the new European
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leaders that came to power during 1974 that shrank the political will for European
cooperation at the expense of the Atlantic link? Many of the relevant documents
for these questions are already available in the archives of European countries and
institutions and in the archives of the United States. A multi-national approach
linking economical as well as diplomatic aspects is required for such a study.
Going beyond the immediate effects of the Year of Europe, there is the ques-
tion of its long-term effects. The European integration was certainly halted by this
failure, but as is shown in the fifth chapter there were several positive aspects too.
For example, I have indicated the processes of socialization and convergence that
took place in the European bureaucracies thanks to an increasing number of formal
and informal meetings and contacts. What were the long-term effects of these pro-
cesses? Which of the procedures devised during the Year of Europe was translated
in the successes of the relaunch of the European integration during the 1980s? Were
there any errors that were avoided thanks to the experience provided by the partial
débâcle of the Year of Europe.
A third venue of enquiry derives from a comparative approach. Did the second
half of the 1970s produce crises similar to the Year of Europe? If so, what simi-
larities and what differences? Moving on a more theoretical level, is it possible to
identify long-lasting changes in diplomatic practices and methods? Was Europe de-
vising new ways for conducting diplomacy? The need to always consider carefully
the positions of every other European country probably had long-lasting effects in
the way in which Western European countries related to each other and to the rest
of the world. This line of enquiry could illuminate the successive birth of political
concepts such as soft- and hard-power and the hypothetical divergence between the
United States’ and Europe’s diplomatic cultures that led to the curious identification,
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respectively, with Mars and Venus.1
Finally, what about the press and its relations with these events? Were there any
convergences between the analyses of the events of 1973 offered by the opposite
sides of the political spectrum? Did the press, left-leaning or right-leaning, have
any influence on the decision-makers themselves? Were these press analyses signif-
icantly diverse in the various European countries? Did they converge as the events
progressed? Broadening the research field, what about the intellectual debate in
essays, memoirs, and journals? Taken together, these represented the different lay-
ers of élite thinking. Was there any type of élite consensus despite the possible
ideological and professional variations? Understanding how these different strands
interacted with each other, both nationally and transnationally, can improve the com-
prehension and the interpretation of historical events.
The Year of Europe was a very significant event, not because it produced the
overhaul of Atlantic relations it was supposed to, but because of its multifaceted
nature. It involved issues as diverse as political ideology and cold war strategy,
commercial and monetary conflicts, personal relations and élite opinion, fears of
superpower condominium and political scandal. It is as a result of the Year of Eu-
rope’s cross-linking of many wide-raging issues that its origins, its development, its
failure, and its consequences have fascinated, and will continue to do so, historians
with varied backgrounds and approaches.
1 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. Knopf
Doubleday Publishing Group, 2007.
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